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ABSTRACT
ON STABILITY AND EFFICIENCY IN DIFFERENT
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
Mehmet Karakaya
Ph.D. in Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
July, 2011
This thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first main part, hedonic coalition
formation games where each player’s preferences rely only upon the members of her
coalition are studied. A new stability notion under free exit-free entry membership
rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introduced which is stronger than both
core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. The weak top-choice property
is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable par-
tition. It is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee the existence
of a strongly Nash stable partition. Strong Nash stability under different membership
rights is also studied. In the first main part, hedonic coalition formation games are
also extended to cover formation games, where a player can be a member of several
different coalitions, and these games are studied. In the second main part, Nash im-
plementability of a social choice rule (via a mechanism) which is implementable via
a Rechtsstaat is studied. A new condition on a Rechtsstaat, referred to as equal treat-
ment of equivalent alternatives (ETEA), is introduced, and it is shown that if a social
choice rule is implementable via some Rechtsstaat satisfying ETEA then it is Nash
implementable via a mechanism provided that there are at least three agents in the soci-
ety. In the third main part, a characterization of the Borda rule on the domain of weak
preferences is studied. A new property, which is referred to as the degree equality,
is introduced, and it is shown that the Borda rule is characterized by weak neutrality,
reinforcement, faithfulness and degree equality. In the fourth main part, the graduate
admissions problem with quota and budget constraints is studied as a two sided many
to one matching market. The students proposing algorithm, which is an extension of
the Gale-Shapley algorithm, is constructed, and it is shown that the students proposing
algorithm ends up with a core stable matching if the algorithm stops. However, there
exist graduate admissions problems for which there exist core stable matchings, while
neither the departments proposing nor the students proposing algorithm stops. It is
proved that the students proposing algorithm stops if and only if no cycle occurs in
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the algorithm. It is also shown that no random path to core stability for the graduate
admissions problem exists.
Keywords: Hedonic coalition formation games, core stability, Nash stability, strong
Nash stability, membership rights, cover formation games, implementation via a
Rechtsstaat, Nash implementation via a mechanism, equal treatment of equivalent al-
ternatives, the Borda rule, degree equality, graduate admissions problem, the Gale-
Shapley algorithm, quota and budget constraints, random paths to core stable match-
ing.
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O¨ZET
C¸ES¸I˙TLI˙ I˙KTI˙SADI˙ ORTAMLARDA KARARLILIK VE
VERI˙MLI˙LI˙K U¨ZERI˙NE
Mehmet Karakaya
Ekonomi, Doktora
Tez Yo¨neticsi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray
Temmuz, 2011
Bu tez c¸alıs¸ması do¨rt ana kısımdan olus¸maktadır. Birinci ana kısımda her oyuncu-
nun tercihinin sadece kendisinin ic¸inde bulundug˘u koalisyonun u¨yelerine bag˘lı oldug˘u
hazcı koalisyon olus¸um oyunları c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Kuvvetli Nash kararlılıg˘ı adıyla yeni
bir kararlılık kavramı herhangi bir koalisyona giris¸ ve c¸ıkıs¸ın izne bag˘lı olmadıg˘ı
u¨yelik hakları c¸erc¸evesinde tanımlanmıs¸tır, bu yeni tanımlanan kararlılık kavramı
daha o¨nceleri c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸ olan c¸ekirdek ve Nash kararlılık kavramlarının her ikisinden
daha kuvvetlidir. En iyi zayıf sec¸im o¨zellig˘i tanımlanmıs¸ ve bu o¨zellig˘in kuvvetli
Nash kararlı koalisyon yapılarının varlıg˘ı ic¸in gerek s¸art oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir. Aza-
lan ayrılabilir tercihlerin de kuvvetli Nash kararlı koalisyon yapılarının varlıg˘ını
garantiledig˘i go¨sterilmis¸tir. Ayrıca kuvvetli Nash kararlılıg˘ı farklı u¨yelik hakları
altında da c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Yine, birinci ana kısımda hazcı koalisyon olus¸um oyunları
oyuncuların aynı anda birden fazla koalisyonun u¨yesi olabildig˘i o¨rtu¨s¸u¨k koalisyonların
olus¸um oyunlarına genis¸letilmis¸ ve bu oyunlar incelenmis¸tir. I˙kinci ana kısımda hak-
lar yapısı aracılıg˘ı ile uygulanabilir olan bir sosyal sec¸im kuralının bir mekanizma
vasıtasıyla Nash uygulanabilirlig˘i c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Haklar yapısı u¨zerinde es¸deg˘er
sec¸eneklere es¸it muamele adıyla yeni bir s¸art tanımlanmıs¸ ve bu s¸artı sag˘layan bir
haklar yapısı ile uygulanabilen bir sosyal sec¸im kuralının, en az u¨c¸ kis¸inin oldug˘u
bir toplumda, bir mekanizma vasıtasıyla Nash uygulanabilir oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir.
U¨c¸u¨ncu¨ ana kısımda Borda kuralının bir karakterizasyonu tanım bo¨lgesi zayıf ter-
cihler demeti olmak suretiyle c¸alıs¸ılmıs¸tır. Derece es¸itlig˘i diye adlandırılan yeni bir
o¨zellik tanımlanmıs¸ ve Borda kuralının karakterizasyonu zayıf no¨trlu¨k, pekis¸tirme,
sadakatlilik ve derece es¸itlig˘i o¨zellikleri ile yapılmıs¸tır. Do¨rdu¨ncu¨ ana kısımda kota ve
bu¨tc¸e kısıtları altında doktora kabul problemi iki taraflı es¸les¸me olarak incelenmis¸tir.
Gale-Shapley algoritmasının bir uzantısı olan ve o¨g˘rencilerin teklif go¨tu¨rdu¨g˘u¨ bir al-
goritma yazılmıs¸ ve bu algoritma durursa olus¸an es¸les¸menin c¸ekirdek kararlı oldug˘u
go¨sterilmis¸tir. Bununla beraber, ne bo¨lu¨mlerin teklif go¨tu¨rdu¨g˘u¨ ne de o¨g˘rencilerin
teklif go¨tu¨rdu¨g˘u¨ algoritmaların durdug˘u ve c¸ekirdek kararlı bir es¸les¸menin bulundug˘u
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durumlar mevcuttur. “Eg˘er ve sadece eg˘er algoritma ic¸erisinde bir do¨ngu¨ olus¸mazsa
o¨g˘rencilerin teklif go¨tu¨rdu¨g˘u¨ algoritma durur” o¨nermesi ispat edilmis¸tir. Ayrıca, dok-
tora kabul problemi ic¸in rastgele patika aracılıg˘ı ile c¸ekirdek kararlı bir es¸les¸meye
ulas¸ılamayacag˘ı da go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler: Hazcı koalisyon olus¸um oyunları, c¸ekirdek kararlılıg˘ı, Nash
kararlılıg˘ı, kuvvetli Nash kararlılıg˘ı, u¨yelik hakları, o¨rtu¨s¸u¨k koalisyonların olus¸um
oyunları, haklar yapısı aracılıg˘ı ile uygulanabilirlik, mekanizma aracılıg˘ı ile Nash uy-
gulanabilirlik, es¸deg˘er sec¸eneklere es¸it muamele, Borda kuralı, derece es¸itlig˘i, dok-
tora kabul problemi, Gale-Shapley algoritması, kota ve bu¨tc¸e kısıtları, c¸ekirdek karalı
es¸les¸meye rastgele patika aracılıg˘ı ile ulas¸ılabilirlik.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In every field of economic theory, the common main question is what outcomes are
stable and what outcomes are efficient. The next natural question concerns the re-
lationship between stability and efficiency. When does stability imply efficiency, and
under what circumstances can efficient outcomes be reached as equilibrium outcomes?
The first theorem of welfare economics states that a competitive equilibrium al-
location is Pareto efficient. An allocation is Pareto efficient if there does not exist
any feasible allocation that makes some agents better off without hurting some others.
Pareto optimality is the most natural efficiency notion for agents with non-transferable
utilities who are to act individually in a decentralized way. It is worth to note that
the first welfare theorem holds under two important conditions. One is that all goods
are private goods. The theorem does not hold in the presence of public goods. The
other hypothesis is that every agent’s preferences depend only on her own consump-
tion. Hence, an agent is not allowed either to be concerned or to be jealous about what
happens to her neighbor or to the rest of the world. In game theory, on the other hand,
there is no counterpart of the first theorem. That is, it is not the case that every Nash
equilibrium of a game is Pareto optimal. To the contrary, the main problem that game
theory seems to deal with is the tension between stability and efficiency. In contrast
to the first theorem of welfare economics, players in a game may be equipped with
preferences that reflect altruism as well as envy towards their opponents.
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The second theorem of welfare economics starts with an outcome which is Pareto
efficient and specifies sufficient conditions under which the efficient allocation can be
obtained as an equilibrium outcome by redistributing initial endowments in an econ-
omy. Not every efficient outcome may be socially desirable, however, as is typically
exemplified by dictatoriality, where all the goods in the economy go to the dictator.
The second theorem deals with the problem of designing a social configuration under
which efficient and socially desirable outcomes arise as equilibrium outcomes. The
counterpart of the second theorem in game theory can be thought of as implementa-
tion via a mechanism. Roughly said, a mechanism -conjoined with a game-theoretic
solution concept- redistributes the power among the players so as to achieve “socially
desirable” outcomes, if possible, paralleling the redistribution of initial endowments in
the economy.
An alternative way of dealing with design problems is introduced by Sertel (2002).
He proposes to explicitly introduce a rights structure (or a code of rights), specifying
what coalition is entitled to approve what changes in the states of affairs. The notion
of a rights structure can easily be seen to reduce to the notion of core-stability in the
very special case, where every coalition is entitled to approve any change in the state
of affairs. The notion of core-stability -by allowing every coalition to get formed and
to take joint binding decisions- combines efficiency and stability.
In this thesis, we deal with different environments as hedonic coalition formation
games or cover formation games, implementation via codes of rights or graduate ad-
missions problem under quota and budget constraints. Although the environments
considered exhibit a wide variety, what combines them is the efficiency-stability or the
invisible hand-design axes along which they are dealt with.
The first chapter studies hedonic coalition formation games. A hedonic coalition
formation game consists of a finite non-empty set of players and a list of players’ pref-
erences where every player’s preferences depend only on the members of her coalition.
Hedonic coalition formation games are used to model certain economic and political
circumstances such as the provision of public goods in local communities or forming
clubs and organizations. An outcome of such a game is a partition of the player set
(coalition structure) -that is, a collection of pairwise disjoint coalitions whose union
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is equal to the set of players. Given a hedonic coalition formation game, the main
concern is the existence of partitions that are stable in some sense. A partition is core
stable if there is no coalition each of whose members strictly prefers it to the coalition
to which she belongs under the given partition. We introduce the framework of “mem-
bership rights” of Sertel (1992) into the context of hedonic games. Given a hedonic
game and a partition, the membership rights employed specify the set of agents whose
approval is needed for each particular deviation of a subset of players. We define a
new stability notion under free exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong
Nash stability, which is stronger than the core stability studied earlier in the literature.
Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games and it is the strongest
stability notion fitting the context of hedonic coalition formation games. We introduce
the weak top-choice property, and show that it guarantees the existence of a strongly
Nash stable partition. We prove that descending separable preferences suffice for a
hedonic game to have a strongly Nash stable partition. We also study varying versions
of strong Nash stability under different membership rights.
In the first chapter, we also extend hedonic coalition formation games to cover
formation games, where a player can be a member of several different coalitions. For
example, a researcher can be a member of several research teams at the same time. A
collection of coalitions is referred to as a cover if its union is equal to the set of players.
We define stability concepts based on individual movements as well as movements by
subsets of players under different membership rights, and provide existence results for
covers which are stable in the corresponding senses.
In the second chapter, we consider an environment with a finite non-empty set
of alternatives and a finite non-empty set of agents, where each agent has complete,
reflexive and transitive preferences over the set of alternatives. A list of agents’ prefer-
ences is called a preference profile. A social choice rule (SCR) is a rule which chooses
a nonempty subset of alternatives at each preference profile. However, agents’ pref-
erences are not known to a designer (or planner) and an agent may benefit by not re-
vealing her true preferences. The “implementation” problem arises from this situation
as it gives rise to the question of whether it is possible to design a mechanism (game
form) which provides no incentives for misrepresentation of preferences. So, we are
back at design problem with which the second welfare theorem deals. A mechanism
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(game form) consists of a nonempty strategy set for each agent (messages) and an out-
come function which maps from joint messages into alternatives. A mechanism with a
preference profile on the set of alternatives induces a game in strategic form. A mech-
anism is said to implement an SCR according to a game theoretic solution concept σ if
the σ-equilibrium outcomes of the induced game coincide with the set of alternatives
assigned by the SCR at each preference profile of the society.
Sertel (2002) introduced the notion of a “Rechtsstaat” through which he explicitly
specifies a rights structure based on two functions, namely, the benefit function and the
code of rights function. Given a pair of alternatives and a preference profile, a benefit
gives us the set of all coalitions that strictly prefer the second alternative in the pair to
the first one at the given preference profile. A code of rights specifies, for every pair of
alternatives, a family of coalitions in which each coalition is given the right to approve
the alteration of first alternative to the second one. So, a code of rights is independent
of agents’ preferences. An alternative is said to be an equilibrium of a Rechtsstaat at a
given preference profile if there is no coalition which is given the right to approve the
alteration of this alternative to some other one such that every agent in the coalition
benefits from this alteration, i.e., all agents in the coalition strictly prefer the latter
alternative to the former one. It is clear that in a Rechtsstaat, the rights structure in the
society are explicitly given by its code of rights. An SCR is said to be implementable
via a Rechtsstaat if, at every preference profile, alternatives which are chosen by the
SCR coincide with the equilibria of the Rechtsstaat (Koray and Yıldız (2008)).
In the second chapter, we study Nash implementability of an SCR (via a mecha-
nism) which is implementable via a Rechtsstaat, i.e., what properties of a Rechtsstaat
implementing an SCR ensure that the SCR is also Nash implementable via a mecha-
nism. We introduce a condition on a Rechtsstaat which is referred to as the equal treat-
ment of equivalent alternatives (ETEA). We say that a Rechtsstaat satisfies ETEA,
if all agents are indifferent between two alternatives under any preference profile, then
one of these alternatives being an equilibrium of our Rechtsstaat implies that the other
alternative is also an equilibrium. We show that if an SCR is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat satisfying ETEA then it is Nash implementable via a mechanism when
there are at least three agents in the society. However, an SCR which is implementable
via a Rechtsstaat that violates ETEA may not be Nash implementable. We also show
4
that a Rechtsstaat satisfies ETEA if and only if its code of rights is as follows: for any
alternative x and any alternatives y and z (different from x), those and only those coali-
tions bearing the right to approve the alteration of y to x are also the coalitions which
have the right to approve the alteration of z to x. We define oligarchic Rechtsstaats
and show that if an SCR is implementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat then it is Nash
implementable provided that there are at least three agents in the society.
In chapter three, we study a characterization of the Borda rule on the domain of
weak preferences, where the Borda rule is defined for each finite set of voters having
preferences over a fixed set of alternatives. In the case of a collective decision problem
where each agent in a society has preferences over a finite set of alternatives, either
a social welfare function is employed to aggregate a list of agents’ preferences into
a social ordering of alternatives (social preference), or a social choice rule (SCR) is
employed to specify a set of selected alternatives at the given preference profile (social
choice). Since, in either approach, for all individuals in the society the outcome is the
same, the situation falls into the realm of the second theorem of welfare economics.
Our concern is to employ an SCR which is used to make a choice over alternatives
for each preference profile of a society. Many different SCRs have been established
to determine which alternative(s) should be selected when a preference profile of a
society is considered. An SCR should satisfy some desirable properties such as be-
ing Pareto optimal, non-dictatorial and independent of the names of alternatives and
voters. However, there are many SCRs which are Pareto optimal and non-dictatorial,
which necessitates us to look for further specifications that fully distinguish a desirable
SCR from others. We say that a set of specific properties characterize an SCR if the
SCR is the only one that satisfies these properties. When players have strict preference
relations over alternatives, the Borda rule is characterized by neutrality, reinforcement,
faithfulness and Young’s cancellation property (Young (1974), Hansson and Sahlquist
(1976)). Neutrality means that the names of the alternatives do not affect the selected
alternatives. An SCR satisfies reinforcement if there exist common selected alterna-
tives for any two disjoint voter sets and these common choices are considered the exact
selected alternatives for the combined society. Faithfulness is satisfied by an SCR if
there is only one agent in the society and the SCR chooses her top-ranked alternative.
An SCR satisfies Young’s cancellation property if, for every pair of alternatives, the
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number of agents who strictly prefer the first alternative to the second one is equal to
the number of agents who strictly prefer the second alternative to the first one implies
the selection of all alternatives.
We introduce a new property which is referred to as the degree equality; an SCR
satisfies degree equality if, for any two profiles of a finite set of voters, equality between
the sums of the degrees of every alternative under the two profiles implies that the same
alternatives get chosen by the SCR at these two profiles. We show that the Borda rule
is characterized by the conjunction of weak neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and
degree equality on the domain of weak preferences. As it is not often easy to show the
independence of neutrality from other axioms when it is used in a characterization, we
could not show that weak neutrality is independent of the other three axioms. We also
show that the Borda rule is the unique scoring rule which satisfies the degree equality.
In addition, we introduce a new cancellation property and show that it characterizes
the Borda rule among all scoring rules.
In the fourth chapter, we study the graduate admissions problem with quota and
budget constraints as a two sided many to one matching market as a continuation of
Karakaya and Koray (2003). One side of the market consists of the departments of a
university, while there is a set of students (applicants) on the other side. Each depart-
ment faces both quota and budget constraints set by the central university administra-
tion. Karakaya and Koray (2003) constructed the departments proposing algorithm,
and showed that if the algorithm stops then the resulting matching is core stable, and
it is possible that the algorithm does not stop while there is a core stable matching.
They also showed that the departments proposing algorithm stops if and only if no
cycle occurs in the algorithm, i.e., a finite sequence of matchings does not repeat itself
infinitely many times in the algorithm. The existence of either a departments-optimal
or a students-optimal matching is not guaranteed in the graduate admissions problem
with both quota and budget constraints.
We construct the students proposing algorithm, and show that the students propos-
ing algorithm ends up with a core stable matching if the algorithm stops. However,
there exist graduate admissions problems for which there exist core stable matchings,
while neither the algorithm proposing side being the departments nor that proposing
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side being the students stops. We show that the students proposing algorithm stops
if and only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm. Moreover, we show that there is no
random path to core stability for the graduate admissions problem, i.e., a core stable
matching can not be reached starting with an arbitrary matching and satisfying a ran-
domly chosen blocking coalition at each step. We also consider the model with the
assumption that the students care only about their reservation prices and do not derive
any further utility from money transfers over and above their reservation prices. Under
this model we get results similar to those obtained in the general model.
The thesis is organized as follows: Hedonic coalition formation games and cover
formation games are studied in chapter 2. Chapter 3 studies Nash implementation of
social choice rules which are implementable via a Rechtsstaat. Chapter 4 studies the
characterization of the Borda rule on the domain of weak preferences. Graduate ad-
missions problem with quota and budget constraints is studied in chapter 5. Chapter 6
constitutes the conclusion. Omitted proofs and examples are provided in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER 2
HEDONIC COALITION FORMATION GAMES AND
COVER FORMATION GAMES
2.1 Hedonic coalition formation games
2.1.1 Introduction
Individuals act by forming coalitions under certain economic and political circum-
stances such as the provision of public goods in local communities or forming clubs
and organizations. One way to describe such an environment is to model it as a (pure)
hedonic coalition formation game.
A hedonic coalition formation game consists of a finite non-empty set of players
and a list of players’ preferences where every player’s preferences depend only on the
members of her coalition.1 An outcome of such a game is a partition of the player
set (coalition structure) -that is, a collection of coalitions whose union is equal to the
set of players, and which are pairwise disjoint. Marriage problems and roommate
problems (Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor (1990b)) can be seen as
special cases of hedonic coalition formation games, where each agent only considers
who will be his/her mate. In fact, hedonic games are reduced forms of general coalition
1The dependence of a player’s utility on the identity of members of her coalition is referred to as
the “hedonic aspect” in Dre`ze and Greenberg (1980), and the formal model of (pure) hedonic coalition
formation games was introduced by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
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formation games where, for each coalition, how its total payoff is to be divided among
its members is fixed in advance and made known to all agents.
Given a hedonic coalition formation game, the main concern is the existence of
partitions that are stable in some sense. The stability concepts that have been mostly
studied so far are core stability and Nash stability of coalition structures.2 A partition
is core stable if there is no coalition each of whose members strictly prefers it to the
coalition to which she belongs under the given partition. A partition is said to be
Nash stable if there is no player who benefits from leaving her present coalition to join
another coalition of the partition which might be the “empty coalition” in this context.
Note that a Nash stable partition need not be core stable, and a core stable partition
need not be Nash stable.
One needs to focus attention on two key points when considering or comparing sta-
bility concepts, namely: (i) who can deviate from the given partition (e.g., a coalition
of players as in core stability, a singleton as in Nash stability), and (ii) what the devia-
tors are entitled to do (e.g., form a new, self standing coalition as in core stability, join
an already existing coalition -irrespective of how the incumbent members are effected-
as in Nash stability). For hedonic coalition formation games, the second point can be
examined by introducing membership rights. Sertel (1992) introduced four possible
membership rights in an abstract setting. Given a hedonic game and a partition, the
membership rights employed specify the set of agents whose approval is needed for
each particular deviation of a subset of players.
Under free exit-free entry (FX-FE) membership rights, every agent is entitled to
make any movements among the coalitions of a given partition without taking any
permission of members of the coalitions that she leaves or joins. An example in the
context of the roommate problem would be that whenever an agent finds a place in a
room she has the right to move into that room. So, two agents in different rooms may
benefit by exchanging their rooms without asking anyone else. Another example is
that a citizen of a country which is a member of the EU can move to another country
in the EU without the permission of either country.
2See the taxonomy introduced in Sung and Dimitrov (2007) for all stability concepts which were
studied in the literature.
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Under free exit-approved entry (FX-AE) membership rights, an agent can leave
her current coalition without the permissions of her current partners, but she can join
another coalition only if all members of that coalition welcome her, that is her joining
does not hurt any member of the coalition she joins. A typical example is provided by
club membership, where a member of a club can leave her current club without taking
into account whether her leaving hurts some members of that club. However, she needs
the approval of the members of a club that she wants to join. Another example is that
of a researcher, who is a member of a research team and can leave the team without the
permissions of other team members, while her joining another team is usually subject
to the approval of that team’s present members.
Under approved exit-free entry (AX-FE), every agent is endowed with rights, under
which she can leave her current coalition only if that coalition’s members approve her
leaving, while her joining requires no one else’s permission. An example would be
that of an army recruiting volunteers. Every healthy citizen in a certain age interval
may enter the army if he volunteers to do so, but is not allowed to freely exit once he
is in.
Under approved exit-approved entry (AX-AE) membership rights each player
needs to get the unanimous permission of the coalition that she leaves or joins. A
typical example is that of a criminal organization. An agent who is a member of a
criminal organization cannot leave it without permission as she may have information
about some secrets of the organization. Similarly, one cannot join a criminal organiza-
tion without permission by a similar token.
Note that under the definition of Nash stability, a player can deviate by leaving her
current coalition to join another coalition of the partition without any permission of
the players of the coalitions that she leaves or joins, although she might thereby be
hurting some of these. In other words, Nash stability is defined under FX-FE member-
ship rights. Other stability concepts that consider individual deviations under different
membership rights have already been studied in the literature. That is, individual sta-
bility is defined under FX-AE membership rights (Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)),
contractual Nash stability is defined under AX-FE membership rights (Sung and Dim-
itrov (2007)), and contractual individual stability is defined under AX-AE membership
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rights (Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) and Ballester (2004)).
The aim of this section is to study coalitional extension of Nash stability under FX-
FE membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, which has not been studied
yet. Note that strong Nash stability is not defined in Sung and Dimitrov (2007) but
they identified some weaker versions of strong Nash stability.
Two approaches will be employed while defining a strongly Nash stable partition.
The first approach is posed in terms of an induced non-cooperative game. A hedo-
nic coalition formation game induces a non-cooperative game in which each player
chooses a “label”; players who choose the same label are placed in a common coali-
tion. Strong Nash (respectively, Nash) stability in this induced game then corresponds
to strong Nash (respectively, Nash) of the corresponding partition in the coalitional
form of the game. The second approach is posed in terms of movements and reacha-
bility. A partition is said to be strongly Nash stable if there is no subset of players who
reach a new partition via certain admissible movements such that these players strictly
prefer the new partition to the initial one.
Banerjee et al. (2001) introduced the top-coalition and the weak top-coalition prop-
erties and proved that each property suffices for a hedonic game to have a core stable
partition. They also showed that if a game is anonymous and separable, then it has
a core stable partition. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) introduced two conditions,
called ordinal balancedness and weak consecutiveness. They showed that if a hedo-
nic game is ordinally balanced or weakly consecutive, then there exists a core stable
partition. Iehle´ (2007) introduced pivotal balancedness and showed that it is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a core stable partition. Alcalde
and Romero-Medina (2006) introduced four different restrictions on the domain of
each player’s preferences called as the union responsiveness condition, the intersec-
tion responsiveness condition, singularity and essentiality. They showed that each of
these conditions is sufficient for the existence of a core stable partition under the as-
sumption that players have strict preferences. Alcalde and Revilla (2004) proposed a
condition in each player’s preferences called as top responsiveness and showed that
if each player’s preferences satisfy top responsiveness then there exists a core stable
partition. Dimitrov et al. (2006) studied core stability in a hedonic game if players’
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preferences derived from appreciation of friends or aversion to enemies. They showed
that if players’ preferences are derived from either appreciation of friends or aver-
sion to enemies then a core stable partition exists. Pa´pai (2004) studied unique core
stability of hedonic games and introduced single-lapping property. She showed that
single-lapping property is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a hedonic game
to have a unique core stable partition. We note that none of the above conditions which
suffices for the existence of a core stable partition guarantees the existence of a strongly
Nash stable partition.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) showed that a hedonic game which is additively
separable and satisfies symmetry has a Nash stable partition. However, Banerjee et al.
(2001) provided an example of a hedonic game which is additively separable and satis-
fies symmetry, but has no core stable partition. Burani and Zwicker (2003) considered
descending separable preferences posed in the form of several ordinal axioms, and
showed that it is sufficient for the simultaneous existence of Nash and core stable par-
tition.
The weak top-choice property is introduced by borrowing the definition of weak
top-coalition from Banerjee et al. (2001), and shown that it guarantees the existence of
a strongly Nash stable partition (Proposition 1). It is also shown that descending sep-
arable preferences suffice for a hedonic game to have a strongly Nash stable partition
(Proposition 2).
How the concept of strong Nash stability changes under different membership
rights is also examined. It is shown that under FX-AE membership rights, a partition is
FX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is strictly core stable (Proposition
3), showing that core stability entails an FX-AE rights structure. Sung and Dimitrov
(2007) defined contractual strict core stability and showed that for any hedonic game
such a partition always exists. It is proved that under AX-AE membership rights, a
partition is AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is contractual strictly
core stable (Proposition 4).
This section is organized as follows: Section 2.1.2 presents the basic notions. Sec-
tion 2.1.3 introduces the weak top-choice property and provides an existence result.
Descending separable preferences are studied in section 2.1.4 and it is shown that
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there always exists a strongly Nash stable partition if players have descending sep-
arable preferences. In section 2.1.5, strong Nash stability under different membership
rights is studied. Section 2.1.6 concludes.
2.1.2 Basic notions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of players. A nonempty subset H of
N is called a coalition. Let i ∈ N be a player, and σi = {H ⊆ N | i ∈ H} denote the
set of coalitions each of which contains player i. Each player i has a reflexive, com-
plete and transitive preference relation i over σi. So, a player’s preferences depend
only on the members of her coalition. The strict and indifference preference relations
associated with i will be denoted by i and ∼i, respectively. Let = (1, . . . ,n)
denote a preference profile for the set of players.
Definition 1 A pair G = (N,) denote a hedonic coalition formation game, or sim-
ply a hedonic game.
Given a hedonic game, it is required that the set of coalitions which might form to
be a partition of N .
Definition 2 A partition (coalition structure) of a finite set of playersN = {1, . . . , n}
is a set pi = {H1, H2, . . . , HK} (K ≤ n is a positive integer) such that
(i) for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Hk 6= ∅,
(ii)
⋃K
k=1 Hk = N , and
(iii) for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . , K} with k 6= l, Hk ∩Hl = ∅.
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Let Π(N) denote the set of all partitions of N . Given any pi ∈ Π(N) and any
i ∈ N , let pi(i) ∈ pi denote the unique coalition which contains the player i. Since we
are working with hedonic games, for any player i ∈ N , the preference relationi over
σi can be extended over the set of all partitions Π(N) in a usual way as follows: For
any pi, p´i ∈ Π(N), [pi i p´i] if and only if [pi(i) i p´i(i)].
Definition 3 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is individu-
ally rational for player i if pi(i) i {i} and is individually rational if it is individually
rational for every player i ∈ N .
A partition is individually rational if each player prefers the coalition that she is a
member of to being single, i.e., each agent i prefers pi(i) to {i}.
Definition 4 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is core stable
if there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T , T i pi(i). If such a
coalition T exists, then it is said that T blocks pi.3
Definition 5 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game and pi ∈ Π(N) a partition. We say
that a player i ∈ N Nash blocks pi if there exists a coalition H ∈ (pi ∪ {∅}) such that
H ∪ {i} i pi(i). A partition is Nash stable if there does not exist a player who Nash
blocks it.
Two approaches will be employed while defining the strongly Nash stable partition.
In the first one, the non-cooperative game induced by a hedonic game is used.
Every hedonic game induces a non-cooperative game as defined below.
Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game with | N |= n players. Consider the follow-
ing induced non-cooperative game ΓG =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N
)
which is defined as
follows:
• The set of players in ΓG is the player set N of G.
3A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is strictly core stable if there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N such that for
all i ∈ T , T i pi(i), and for some i ∈ T , T i pi(i). If such a coalition T exists, then it is said that T
weakly blocks pi.
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• Let L = {L1, . . . , Lm} be a finite set of labels such that m = n + 1. Take L to
be the set of strategies available to each player, so Si = L for each i ∈ N . Let
S =
∏
i∈N Si denote the strategy space. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
induces a partition pis of N as follows: two players i, j of N are in the same
piece of pis if and only if si = sj (i and j choose the same strategy according to
s).
• Preferences for ΓG is defined as follows: a player i prefers the strategy profile s
to the strategy profile s´, sRis´, if and only if pis(i) i pis´(i), i.e., player i prefers
the coalition of those who choose the same strategy as she does according to s,
to the coalition of those who choose the same strategy as she does according to
s´.
Now, the main stability concept of this section will be defined by using the induced
non-cooperative game approach.
Definition 6 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is strongly
Nash stable if it is induced by a strategy profile which is a strong Nash equilibrium of
the induced non-cooperative game ΓG.
Thus, the Nash equilibria of ΓG correspond to the Nash stable partitions of G, and
the strong Nash equilibria of ΓG correspond to the strongly Nash stable partitions of
G. Hence, strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games, and it is
the strongest natural stability notion appropriate to the context of hedonic games.
If the strategy profile s which induces the partition pis is not a strong Nash equilib-
rium of ΓG, then there is a subset of players H ⊆ N which deviates from s (according
to s) and this deviation is beneficial to all agents in H . In such a case, it is said that H
strongly Nash blocks the partition pis.
The second approach is posed in terms of movements and reachability which is
derived from the first one.
Let pis be a partition which is induced by the strategy profile s, and H ⊆ N be a
deviating subset of players. The deviation of these players from s can be explained as
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movements among the coalitions of the partition pis, where the allowable movements
of these players are as follows:4
(i) All players in H /∈ pis choose a label which is not chosen by any player under
s.5 Let s´ denote the strategy profile that is obtained by this deviation. Now, H ∈ pis´.
This deviation means in terms of movements that all players in H leave their current
coalitions and form the coalitionH ∈ pis´ (which is the movement used in the definition
of blocking in the core stability).
(ii) All players in H 6 choose the label which is chosen by members of a coalition
T ∈ pis. Let s˜ denote the strategy profile that is obtained by this deviation. Now,
(H ∪ T ) ∈ pis˜. This deviation means all players in H leave their current coalitions and
join another coalition T of pis, so for each i ∈ H , pis˜(i) = T ∪H .
(iii) Players in H /∈ pis partition among themselves as {H1, . . . , Ht}, and for any
k ∈ {1, . . . , t}, agents in Hk choose the label which is chosen under s by an agent
j ∈ Hk+1, where it is taken t+ 1 = 1. Let ŝ denote the strategy profile that is obtained
by this deviation. Now, for any i ∈ Hk, piŝ(i) = (pis(j) \ H) ∪ Hk. This deviation
means individual players in H (or subsets of H) exchange their current coalitions in
the partition pis. For instance, let H = {i, j} /∈ pis and player i leaves pis(i) and joins
pis(j) \ {j}, and player j leaves pis(j) and joins pis(i) \ {i}. So, piŝ(i) = (pis(j) \
{j}) ∪ {i} and piŝ(j) = (pis(i) \ {i}) ∪ {j}. Note that more complicated movements
are possible when the size of H increases.7
Given a partition pi and a subset of playersH ⊆ N , by any movements ofH among
the coalitions of the partition pi, players of H obtain a new partition p´i, and it is said
that p´i is reachable from the partition pi via H .
4Movements of H are coordinated and simultaneous.
5Such a label always exists, since m = n+ 1.
6It is possible in here that H ∈ pis.
7Movements of H among the coalitions of the partition pis can also be explained as follows: Each
player in H leaves the coalition that she belongs under partition pis. Let pi−Hs = {T \ H | T ∈ pis
and T \H 6= ∅} denote the set of coalitions after each player in H leaves her current coalition. Now,
individual players or subsets of H can join any coalition (or an empty set) of (pi−Hs ∪ {∅}). This
approach is similar to the one given by Conley and Konishi (2002). In their approach, a set of agents
is only allowed to form coalitions among themselves, i.e., individual players or subsets of H are only
permitted to join the empty set. However, in our approach individual players or subsets ofH are allowed
to join not only the empty set but also any coalition of pi−Hs .
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Definition 7 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game and pi ∈ Π(N) be a partition. An-
other partition p´i ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}) is said to be reachable from pi by movements of a
subset of players H ⊆ N , denoted by pi H−→ p´i, if, for all i, j ∈ (N \ H) with i 6= j,
pi(i) = pi(j)⇔ p´i(i) = p´i(j).
Reachability by movements of a subset of agents simply says that agents who are
not deviators are passive, and a non-deviator remains with all former mates who are
not deviators. Notice that a subset of players Ĥ ⊇ H can do all movements that H
can. Note that for any pi ∈ Π(N) and p´i ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}), pi N−→ p´i, i.e., given any
partition pi all other partitions can be reached by movements of the grand coalition N .
Now, the strong Nash stability of a partition can also be defined in terms of move-
ments and reachability.
Definition 8 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is strongly
Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (p´i, H) (where p´i ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}) and ∅ 6=
H ⊆ N ) such that
(i) pi H−→ p´i (p´i is reachable from pi by movements of H), and
(ii) for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i).
If such a pair (p´i, H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash blocks pi (by inducing
p´i).
Note that the two definitions of strongly Nash stable partitions are equivalent (def-
initions 6 and 8).
It is clear that a strongly Nash stable partition is both core and Nash stable. How-
ever, a hedonic game which has a partition that is both core and Nash stable may not
have a strongly Nash stable partition.
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Example 1 Let G = (N,), where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the preferences of players
are as follows:
{1, 4} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3, 4} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1} 1 . . .,8
{2, 4} 2 {1, 2} 2 {2, 3, 4} 2 {2} 2 . . .,
{1, 3} 3 {3, 4} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {3} 3 . . .,
{3, 4} 4 {1, 2, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {4} 4 . . ..
The partitions pi = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and pi = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} are the only partitions
which are both core stable and Nash stable, and there is no partition pi ∈ (Π(N) \
{pi, pi}) which is either core stable or Nash stable. However, neither pi nor pi is strongly
Nash stable.
Let s˜ denote the strategy profile in ΓG which induces the partition pi. So, players
1 and 2 choose the same label under s˜, say L´, and players 3 and 4 choose the same
label under s˜, say L¯. Thus s˜ = (L´, L´, L¯, L¯). The strategy profile s˜ is not a strong Nash
equilibrium of ΓG, since players 2 and 3 deviate from s˜ as follows:9 Player 2 chooses
label L¯ and player 3 chooses label L´. Let ŝ = (L´, L¯, L´, L¯) denote the strategy profile
that is obtained by the deviation of players 2 and 3. Now, the strategy profile ŝ induces
the partition pi = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}.10 This deviation is beneficial to both players 2 and
3, since pi(2) 2 pi(2) and pi(3) 3 pi(3). Therefore, pi is not strongly Nash stable.
Now consider the partition pi = {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}. pi is not strongly Nash stable,
since players 1 and 4 strongly Nash block the partition pi by exchanging their current
coalitions, i.e., pi
{1,4}−−−→ pi, and pi(1) 1 pi(1) and pi(4) 4 pi(4).
Hence the partitions pi and pi are not strongly Nash stable, whereas they are both
core and Nash stable. Therefore there is no strongly Nash stable partition for this game.
8Note that only individually rational coalitions are listed in a player’s preference list, since remaining
coalitions for the player can be listed in any way.
9Note that players 2 and 3 dislike each other, that is {2} 2 {2, 3} and {3} 3 {2, 3}.
10This deviation means in terms of movements that players 2 and 3 exchange the coalitions that they
are in under pi, and the partition pi is reached by this movement.
18
Iehle´ (2007) introduced pivotal balancedness and showed that it is both necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a core stable partition. As strong Nash stability
implies core stability, and the hedonic game in Example 1 has a core stable partition
but lacks any strongly Nash stable partitions, it follows that pivotal balancedness is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for strong Nash stability.
2.1.3 The weak top-choice property
Banerjee et al. (2001) introduced two top-coalition properties and showed that each
property is sufficient for a hedonic game to have a core stable partition.
Given a nonempty set of players N˜ ⊆ N , a nonempty subset H ⊆ N˜ is a top-
coalition of N˜ if for any i ∈ H and any T ⊆ N˜ with i ∈ T , we have H i T .
A game G = (N,) satisfies the top-coalition property if for any nonempty set of
players N˜ ⊆ N , there exists a top-coalition of N˜ .
Given a nonempty set of players N˜ ⊆ N , a nonempty subset H ⊆ N˜ is a weak
top-coalition of N˜ if H has an ordered partition {H1, . . . , H l} such that
(i) for any i ∈ H1 and any T ⊆ N˜ with i ∈ T , we have H i T , and
(ii) for any k > 1, any i ∈ Hk and any T ⊆ N˜ with i ∈ T , we have
T i H ⇒ T ∩ (
⋃
m<kH
m) 6= ∅.
A game G = (N,) satisfies the weak top-coalition property if for any nonempty set
of players N˜ ⊆ N , there exists a weak top-coalition of N˜ .
For any nonempty set of players H ⊆ N , let W (H) denote the weak top-coalitions
of H . Thus, W (N) denote the weak top-coalitions of the grand coalition N .
Definition 9 A hedonic game G = (N,) satisfies the weak top-choice property if
W (N) partitions N .
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Proposition 1 If a hedonic game satisfies the weak top-choice property, then it has a
strongly Nash stable partition.
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game which satisfies the weak top-choice prop-
erty. Let W (N) = {H1, . . . , HK} with corresponding partitions {H11 , . . . , H l(1)1 }, . . .,
{H1K , . . . , H l(K)K }. Clearly,W (N) is a partition forN since the game satisfies the weak
top-choice property. Let W (N) = pi?. It will be shown that pi? is strongly Nash stable.
Suppose that pi? is not strongly Nash stable. Then, there exists a nonempty subset of
players H ⊆ N which strongly Nash blocks the partition pi?.
Note that H ∩ (⋃Kj=1H1j ) = ∅, since for any j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, for any i ∈ H1j
and any T ∈ σi, Hj i T . Now it will be shown that H ∩ (
⋃K
j=1H
2
j ) = ∅. For
any j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, any agent i ∈ H2j needs the cooperation of at least one agent
in H1j in order to form a better coalition than Hj . That is, for any i ∈ H2j and any
T ∈ σi, T i Hj implies T ∩H1j 6= ∅. However, it is known that H ∩H1j = ∅ for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , K}, so H ∩ (⋃Kj=1H2j ) = ∅.
Continuing with similar arguments it is shown that H ∩ (⋃Kj=1Hkj ) = ∅ for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , l¯}, where l¯ = max {l(1), . . . , l(K)}. However, this implies that there
does not exist a nonempty subset of players H ⊆ N which strongly Nash blocks the
partition pi?, a contradiction. Hence pi? is strongly Nash stable. 
We have constructed examples showing that the weak top-choice property and the
weak top-coalition property are independent of each other.11 If a game satisfies the
weak top-choice property and players have strict preferences, then the game may have
more than one strongly Nash stable partition.
A stronger version of the weak top-choice property can be defined as follows (by
using the definition of top-coalition): A hedonic game G = (N,) satisfies the top-
choice property if the top-coalitions of the grand coalition N form a partition of N .
Now, if a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property then it has a strongly Nash
stable partition. Moreover, if every player’s best coalition is unique then there exists
a unique strongly Nash stable partition which consists of the top-coalitions of N . We
11These examples are provided in the Appendix.
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have constructed examples showing that the top-choice property and the top-coalition
property (respectively, the weak top-coalition property) are independent of each other.
It is clear that if a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property then it also satisfies
the weak top-choice property. However, a hedonic game satisfying the weak top-choice
property may fail to satisfy the top-choice property.
An application of the weak top-choice property is Benassy (1982)’s uniform real-
location rule.12 Banerjee et al. (2001) showed that a hedonic game which is induced
by the uniform reallocation rule satisfies the weak top-coalition property, by proving
that any subset N˜ ⊆ N is a weak top-coalition of itself. Hence, the weak top-choice
property is satisfied, and the partition {N} is strongly Nash stable. Note that a hedo-
nic game which is induced by the uniform reallocation rule may violate the top-choice
property.13
2.1.4 Descending separable preferences
In a well established paper, Burani and Zwicker (2003) study hedonic games when
players have descending separable preferences, and show that such a hedonic game
always has a partition, which is called the top segment partition, that is both core
and Nash stable. Burani and Zwicker (2003) will be followed to define descending
separable preferences and the top segment partition.14
Let p : N → N be a permutation of the set of players and assume that p yields a
strict reference ranking of players
p1 > p2 > . . . > pn. (2.1)
The following conditions are defined for an individual player’s preferences.
Condition 1. (Common ranking of individuals, CRI) For any three distinct players
pi, pj and pk, if pj > pk then {pi, pj} pi {pi, pk}.
12See Banerjee et al. (2001) for details of the hedonic game derived from the uniform reallocation
rule.
13See example 3 (page 152) of Banerjee et al. (2001) for such an example.
14The reader is referred to Burani and Zwicker (2003) for more details of descending separable pref-
erences and the construction of the top segment partition.
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Condition 2. (Descending desire, DD) For any pair pi, pj of distinct players with
pi > pj and for any coalitionC containing neither player pi nor pj , if {pj}∪C pj {pj}
then {pi} ∪ C pi {pi} and if {pj} ∪ C pj {pj} then {pi} ∪ C pi {pi}.
Condition 3. (Separable preferences, SP) A profile of players’ preferences is sep-
arable if, for every i, j ∈ N and every coalition C such that C ∈ σi and j /∈ C,
{i, j} i {i} ⇔ C ∪ {j} i C and {i, j} i {i} ⇔ C ∪ {j} i C.
Condition SP implies the property of iterated separable preferences.
Definition 10 (Iterated separable preferences) For any player pi and for any two dis-
joint coalitions C and D with C 3 pi, if {pi, d} pi {pi} for every d ∈ D then
C ∪D pi C, and if {pi, d} pi {pi} for every d ∈ D then C ∪D pi C.
Condition 4. (Group separable preferences, GSP) For any player pi and for any
two disjoint coalitions C and D with C 3 pi, if {pi} ∪D pi {pi} then C ∪D pi C
and if {pi} ∪D pi {pi} then C ∪D pi C.
Condition 5. (Responsive preferences, RESP) For any triple of players pi, pj, pk
and for any coalition C such that pj, pk /∈ C and pi ∈ C, {pi, pj} pi {pi, pk} if and
only if {pj} ∪ C pi {pk} ∪ C and {pi, pj} pi {pi, pk} if and only if {pj} ∪ C pi
{pk} ∪ C.
Condition 6. (Replaceable preferences, REP) For any pair pi, pj of distinct players
with pi > pj and for any coalition C containing neither player pi nor pj , if {pi, pj} ∪
C pj {pj} then {pi, pj} ∪ C pi {pi} and if {pi, pj} ∪ C pj {pj} then {pi, pj} ∪
C pi {pi}.
Condition REP implies descending mutual preferences.
Definition 11 (Descending mutual preferences) For any pair pi, pj of distinct players
with pi > pj , if {pi, pj} pj {pj} then {pi, pj} pi {pi} and if {pi, pj} pj {pj} then
{pi, pj} pi {pi}.
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Definition 12 A profile of agents’ preferences is descending separable if there exists
a reference ordering (2.1) under which Conditions 1 (CRI), 2 (DD), 3 (SP), 4 (GSP), 5
(RESP), and 6 (REP) all hold.
Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have descending separable
preferences. A partition pi? = {T ?, {pl+1}, . . . , {pn}} is called a top-segment partition
which is obtained in terms of the reference ordering (2.1) as follows: First, the top-
segment coalition T ? is formed. Player p1, the first agent in the ordering, belongs to
the top-segment coalition. If the next agent, player p2, strictly prefers being alone to
joining p1, then T ? is completed and T ? = {p1}. If, however, {p1, p2} p2 {p2},
then player p2 is added to T ?. Continue to add players from left to right until a player,
denoted as pl+1, is reached who strictly prefers staying alone to joining the growing
coalition (or until everyone joins, if such an agent pl+1 is never reached). The top-
segment coalition is denoted by T ? = {p1, . . . , pl}. Second, let players from pl+1 to
pn each form a one member coalition.
Following results are taken from Burani and Zwicker (2003) which will be helpful
while proving that a hedonic game with descending separable preferences always has
a strongly Nash stable partition.
Lemma 1 (Burani and Zwicker (2003), Lemma 1, page 37) Every individually ratio-
nal coalition contains at most l members.
It is shown in Burani and Zwicker (2003) that there exists a coalition ∅ 6= T ?? =
{p1, . . . , pf} contained in T ? such that {pi, pl} pi {pi} holds for each agent pi ∈ T ??,
where such an agent with the highest index is denoted by pf .
Lemma 2 (Burani and Zwicker (2003), Lemma 3, page 38) For each of the players
in T ?? = {p1, . . . , pf} ⊂ T ?, coalition T ? is top-ranked among individually rational
coalitions (or tied for top). Therefore, no deviating coalition can contain any of the
players in T ??.
We will also need the following lemma.
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Lemma 3 For each player pk ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, {pk} pk {pj, pk} holds for any
pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl} = T ? \ T ??.
Proof First, it is shown that the lemma holds for agent pl+1. Consider agent pf+1.
Since pf+1 /∈ T ??, {pf+1} pf+1 {pf+1, pl}. Then, condition CRI and transitivity of
preferences imply, {pf+1} pf+1 {pf+1, pl+1}. This fact, together with descending
mutual preferences, yields that {pl+1} pl+1 {pf+1, pl+1}. Now, by condition CRI,
{pl+1} pl+1 {pj, pl+1} holds for any pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}. It is also needed to show
independently that {pl+1} pl+1 {pl, pl+1} holds, in case T ?? = {p1, . . . , pl−1}. Sup-
pose not. Condition CRI then implies that {pj, pl+1} pl+1 {pl+1} for all pj ∈ T ?.
Now, iterated separable preferences imply that (T ? ∪ {pl+1}) pl+1 {pl+1} which is
in contradiction with pl+1 /∈ T ?. So, {pl+1} pl+1 {pl, pl+1} also holds. Hence,
{pl+1} pl+1 {pj, pl+1} for any pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}.
Second, by condition DD, it holds for any pk < pl+1 that {pk} pk {pj, pk} for
every pj ∈ {pf+1, . . . , pl}, completing the proof. 
Our main result with descending separable preferences is now stated and proved.
Proposition 2 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. If players have descending sepa-
rable preferences, then there always exists a strongly Nash stable partition.
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have descending separable
preferences. Let pi? be a top-segment partition. It is known by Burani and Zwicker
(2003) that pi? is both core and Nash stable. It will be shown that pi? is strongly Nash
stable. Suppose that pi? is not strongly Nash stable. Then, there exists a pair (pi,H)
where pi ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi?}) and ∅ 6= H ⊆ N such that pi? H−→ pi and for all i ∈ H ,
pi(i) i pi?(i). Note that | H |> 1 since pi? is Nash stable.
Since pi? is both core and Nash stable, and it is supposed that H strongly Nash
blocks the partition pi?, another remaining four possible cases will be checked.
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Case 1. H ⊆ {pl+1, . . . , pn} andH strongly Nash blocks the top-segment partition
pi? by joining T ?.15
Since H strongly Nash blocks the partition pi? by joining T ?, (T ? ∪ H) pj {pj}
for all pj ∈ H . For any pi ∈ T ? and any pj ∈ H , pi > pj . So, by condition REP,
it holds for each pi ∈ T ? that (T ? ∪ H) pi {pi}. Hence, (T ? ∪ H) would be an
individually rational coalition which contradicts with Lemma 1, since | (T ?∪H) |> l.
So, there is no subsetH of {pl+1, . . . , pn} which strongly Nash blocks the top-segment
partition pi? by joining T ?.
Case 2. H $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, pi ∈ [N \ (T ? ∪ H)], and H strongly Nash blocks
the top-segment partition pi? by joining {pi}.16
SinceH strongly Nash blocks the partition pi? by joining {pi}, (H∪{pi}) pj {pj}
for all pj ∈ H . Note that since pi? is Nash stable, it is true for every pj ∈ H that
{pj} pj {pj, pk} for all pk ∈ [(H \{pj})∪{pi}]. Then, iterated separable preferences
imply that {pj} pj (H∪{pi}) for every pj ∈ H . This is in contradiction with the fact
that H strongly Nash blocks the partition pi? by joining {pi}. Hence, there does not
exist a proper subset H of {pl+1, . . . , pn} which strongly Nash blocks the top-segment
partition pi? by joining {pi}, where pi ∈ [N \ (T ? ∪H)].
Case 3. H ⊆ T ?, pi ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, andH strongly Nash blocks the top-segment
partition pi? by joining {pi}.17
Since H ⊆ T ? strongly Nash blocks the partition pi? by joining {pi}, (H ∪
{pi}) pj T ? for all pj ∈ H . This fact, together with Lemma 2, implies that
H ∩ T ?? = ∅. Let ph ∈ H be a player such that ph > pj for all pj ∈ (H \ {ph}). Note
that ph 6= pl, because | H |> 1. Since ph /∈ T ??, agent ph has preferences such that
{ph} ph {ph, pl}. Condition CRI yields that {ph, pl} ph {ph, pi} because pl > pi,
and transitivity of preferences implies, {ph} ph {ph, pi}. Then, descending mutu-
ality implies, {pj} pj {pj, pi} holds for each pj ∈ H . This result combined with
15So, pi = {T ? ∪H} = {{N}} if H = {pl+1, . . . , pn}, and pi = {T ? ∪H, {{pj} | pj ∈ N \ (T ? ∪
H)}} if H $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}.
16So, pi = {T ?, H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ? ∪ H ∪ {pi})]}} if H 6= N \ (T ? ∪ {pi}), and
pi = {T ?, H ∪ {pi}} if H = N \ (T ? ∪ {pi}).
17Now, pi = {T ? \ H,H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ N \ (T ? ∪ {pi})}} if H $ T ?, and pi = {H ∪
{pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ N \ (T ? ∪ {pi})}} if H = T ?.
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condition SP implies that H pj (H ∪ {pi}) for every pj ∈ H . Now, transitivity of
preferences yields for each pj ∈ H that H pj T ?. However, this is in contradiction
with pi? being core stable, i.e., H would block the partition pi?. Hence, there is no sub-
set H of T ? which strongly Nash blocks the top-segment partition pi? by joining {pi},
where pi ∈ {pl+1, . . . , pn}.
Case 4. H = H1 ∪H2, where H1 ⊆ T ? and H2 $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, pi ∈ N \ (T ? ∪
H2), and H strongly Nash blocks the top-segment partition pi? by joining {pi}.18
So, (H ∪ {pi}) pj T ? for all pj ∈ H1, and (H ∪ {pi}) pk {pk} for all pk ∈ H2.
Since pi? is Nash stable, it holds for each pk ∈ H2 that, {pk} pk {pk, ph} for any
ph ∈ [(H2 \ {pk}) ∪ {pi}]. Now, Lemma 2 implies that H1 ∩ T ?? = ∅, i.e., H1 ⊆
{pf+1, . . . , pl}. This fact, together with Lemma 3, implies that, for each pk ∈ H2,
{pk} pk {pk, pj} for any pj ∈ H1. Hence, for each pk ∈ H2 it holds that {pk} pk
{pk, px} for all px ∈ [(H\{pk})∪{pi}]. Then, iterated separable preferences imply that
{pk} pk (H ∪ {pi}) for all pk ∈ H2, which is the desired contradiction. Hence, there
does not existH = H1∪H2, whereH1 ⊆ T ? andH2 $ {pl+1, . . . , pn}, which strongly
Nash blocks the top-segment partition pi? by joining {pi}, where pi ∈ N \ (T ? ∪H2).
Since the four cases cover all possibilities it is concluded that there does not exist
a subset of players ∅ 6= H ⊆ N which strongly Nash blocks the top-segment partition
pi?. Hence pi? is strongly Nash stable. 
Based on Proposition 2, one can argue that Burani and Zwicker (2003) were study-
ing the wrong solution concept; they really should have been applying their methods to
strong Nash stability. We have constructed examples showing that preferences are de-
scending separable and the weak top-choice properties are independent of each other.
Burani and Zwicker (2003) also studied hedonic games on additively separable and
symmetric domain of preferences where players’ preferences are purely cardinal.
18So, pi = {T ? \ H1, H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ? ∪ H2 ∪ {pi})]}} if H1 $ T ?, and pi =
{H ∪ {pi}, {{pj} | pj ∈ [N \ (T ? ∪ H2 ∪ {pi})]}} if H1 = T ?. Note that H1 6= ∅ by case 2 and
H2 6= ∅ by case 3.
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Definition 13 A hedonic game G = (N,) is additively separable if for any i ∈
N , there exists a function vi : N → R such that for any H,T ∈ Σi, H i T ⇔∑
j∈H vi(j) ≥
∑
j∈T vi(j), where vi(j) = 0 for i = j.
Definition 14 An additively separable hedonic game satisfies symmetry if for any
i, j ∈ N , vi(j) = vj(i).
Definition 15 A profile of additively separable and symmetric preferences is purely
cardinal if there exists an assignment of individual weights w(i) to the players for
which the following vector v represents the profile: for all i, j ∈ N ,
v(i, j) =
{
w(i) + w(j) if i 6= j
0 if i = j
For any player i, her individual weight w(i) represents the fixed individual contri-
bution that she brings to any member of the coalition that she belongs. Purely cardinal
preferences are descending separable, where the reference ranking (2.1) of agents is the
permutation that ranks them in non-increasing order of their weights. Hence, a hedo-
nic game with purely cardinal preferences always has a strongly Nash stable partition.
However, we have provided an example showing that purely cardinal preferences is
not a necessary condition for a game to have a strongly Nash stable partition.
We have constructed examples showing that preferences being purely cardinal and
the weak top-choice property are independent of each other. Note that players’ prefer-
ences need not be purely cardinal for a separable19 and anonymous game.
A hedonic game G = (N,) satisfies anonymity if for any i ∈ N , for any H,T ∈
Σi with | H |=| T |, H ∼i T .
19A hedonic game is separable if players’ preferences satisfy Condition 3 (SP).
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Lemma 4 If a hedonic game is anonymous, additively separable and symmetric, then
players’ preferences are purely cardinal (hence has a strongly Nash stable partition).
Proof Let G = (N,) be an anonymous, additively separable and symmetric hedonic
game. Anonimity and additive separability imply that for any i ∈ N and any j, k ∈
(N \{i}) with j 6= k we have vi(j) = vi(k). This fact, together with symmetry, implies
that for any pair i, j ∈ N and any k ∈ (N \{i, j}) we have vi(k) = vj(k). So, players’
preferences for this game is represented by the functions v = (vi)i∈N illustrated below:
1 2 3 . . . n− 2 n− 1 n
v1 0 x x . . . x x x
v2 x 0 x . . . x x x
v3 x x 0 . . . x x x
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
vn−1 x x x . . . x 0 x
vn x x x . . . x x 0
where x ∈ R.
Players’ preferences are purely cardinal, i.e., there exists an assignment of individ-
ual weights w(i) to the players, where for any player i ∈ N , w(i) = x
2
. So, for any
i, j ∈ N , vi(j) = vj(i) = w(i) + w(j) = x if i 6= j, and vi(j) = 0 if i = j.
It is clear that x = 0 if and only if w(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , x > 0 if and only if
w(i) > 0 for all i ∈ N , x < 0 if and only if w(i) < 0 for all i ∈ N . So, any partition
pi ∈ Π(N) is strongly Nash stable if w(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . The partition {N} is
strongly Nash stable if w(i) > 0 for all i ∈ N and the partition {{i} | i ∈ N}, which
contains all singletons, is strongly Nash stable if w(i) < 0 for all i ∈ N . 
It is clear by the proof of Lemma 4 that if a hedonic game is anonymous, additively
separable and symmetric then it satisfies the top-choice property.20 However, we have
given an example showing that a hedonic game which satisfies the top-choice property
may not be additively separable and symmetric.
20If x = 0, then every partition is a top-coalition of N . If x < 0, then {{i} | i ∈ N}, which contains
all singletons, is the top-coalition of N . If x > 0, then the grand coalition is a top-coalition of itself.
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The strong Nash stability for hedonic games is not the unique stability notion which
has not been studied earlier. In fact, two other stability notions for hedonic games can
be defined.
Definition 16 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game and pi ∈ Π(N) a partition. We say
that a subset of players T ⊆ N coalitionally Nash blocks pi if there exists a coalition
H ∈ (pi ∪ {∅}) such that for each player i ∈ T , (H ∪ T ) i pi(i). A partition is
coalitionally Nash stable if there does not exist a subset of players which coalitionally
Nash blocks it.
Definition 17 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is core-
exchange stable if it is core stable and there does not exist a subset of players T ⊆ N
such that individual players in T or subsets of T (strongly Nash) block pi by exchanging
their current coalitions under pi.
It is clear that these two concepts are independent of each other, and each of these
concepts is weaker than strong Nash stability. Moreover, a partition is both coalition-
ally Nash stable and core-exchange stable if and only if it is strongly Nash stable.
We have constructed an example showing that neither the weak top-choice property
nor the preferences being descending separable is necessary for a hedonic game to have
a strongly Nash stable partition. Hence, it is an open question to find a condition which
is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition.
2.1.5 Strong Nash stability under different membership rights
Different societies may have different membership rights, and a designer employs a
certain rights structure to achieve some aims. This section studies how the concept
of strong Nash stability changes under different membership rights. We will see that
strong Nash stability under different membership rights fits with the earlier concepts.
FX-FE strong Nash stability is what has been called strong Nash stability in previ-
ous sections. Now, its strict version is defined.
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Definition 18 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is free exit-
free entry strictly strongly Nash stable (FX-FE strictly strongly Nash stable) if there
does not exist a pair (p´i, H) (where p´i ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}) and ∅ 6= H ⊆ N ) such that
(i) pi H−→ p´i (p´i is reachable from pi by movements of H),
(ii) for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i), and for some i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i).
Definition 19 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is free
exit-approved entry strongly Nash stable (FX-AE strongly Nash stable) if there does
not exist a pair (p´i, H) such that
(i) pi H−→ p´i,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , for all k ∈ (p´i(i) \ {i}), p´i(k) k pi(k).
Definition 20 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is approved
exit-approved entry strongly Nash stable (AX-AE strongly Nash stable) if there does
not exist a pair (p´i, H) such that
(i) pi H−→ p´i,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i), and
(iii) for all k ∈ (N \H), p´i(k) k pi(k).
Definition 21 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is approved
exit-free entry strongly Nash stable (AX-FE strongly Nash stable) if there does not
exist a pair (p´i, H) such that
(i) pi H−→ p´i,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , for all j ∈ (pi(i) \ {i}), p´i(j) j pi(j).
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Strict versions of concepts given in definitions 19-21 are defined by replacing item
(ii) with [for all i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i), and for some i ∈ H , p´i(i) i pi(i)].
Lemma 5 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. If a partition pi ∈ Π(N) is FX-AE
strongly Nash stable, then it is core stable.
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game and pi ∈ Π(N) be an FX-AE strongly
Nash stable partition. Suppose that pi is not core stable. Then, there is a coalition
T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T , T i pi(i). Let p´i = {T, {{H \ T} | H ∈ pi and
H \ T 6= ∅}} denote the partition that is obtained from coalition T ’s blocking of pi.
Now, it is shown that the pair (p´i, T ) satisfies the three conditions of FX-AE strong
Nash stability. First, it is clear that p´i is reachable from pi by T , i.e., pi T−→ p´i. Second,
since it is supposed that T blocks pi, i.e., for any i ∈ T , T = p´i(i) i pi(i). Third,
for any i ∈ T , p´i(i) \ {i} = T \ {i}. So, for all i ∈ T , for all k ∈ (p´i(i) \ {i}), we
have p´i(k) k pi(k). Hence, the pair (p´i, T ) satisfies the three conditions of FX-AE
strong Nash stability, in contradiction with pi being FX-AE strongly Nash stable, i.e.,
coalition T would block the partition pi under FX-AE membership rights. Hence, pi is
core stable. 
Note that this lemma implies that if a partition is FX-AE strictly strongly Nash
stable, then it is strictly core stable. Now, it is shown that the converse of this lemma
is true under the assumption that players have strict preferences.
Lemma 6 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have strict preferences.
If a partition pi ∈ Π(N) is core stable, then it is FX-AE strongly Nash stable.
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have strict preferences. Let
pi ∈ Π(N) be a core stable partition. Suppose that pi is not FX-AE strongly Nash
stable. Then, there exists a pair (p´i, H) such that players in H strongly Nash block the
partition pi by inducing p´i under FX-AE membership rights.
Since pi is core stable, H cannot block pi. So, H strongly Nash blocks the parti-
tion pi by either players in H (or subsets of H) exchange their current coalitions that
they belong under pi or all players in H leave their current coalitions and join another
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coalition of the partition pi. In either case, there exists a coalition T ∈ p´i such that
T ∩H 6= ∅. Since the membership rights is FX-AE and players have strict preferences,
we have p´i(j) j pi(j) for all players j ∈ (T \ H). This result, together with the fact
that H strongly Nash blocks the partition pi, implies that p´i(i) i pi(i) for all i ∈ T .
However, this is in contradiction with pi being core stable, i.e., coalition T would block
the partition pi. Hence, pi is FX-AE strongly Nash stable. 
This lemma is not true without the assumption of strict preferences.
Example 2 Let G = (N,), where N = {1, 2} and players’ preferences are as fol-
lows: {1, 2} ∼1 {1}, and {1, 2} 2 {2}.
The partition pi = {{1}, {2}} is core stable. However pi is not FX-AE strongly
Nash stable, since player 2 strongly Nash blocks the partition pi by joining {1} under
FX-AE membership rights, i.e., pi
{2}−−→ p´i = {{1, 2}}, and p´i(2) 2 pi(2) and p´i(1) ∼1
pi(1).
Lemma 6 implies, if a partition is strictly core stable, then it is FX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable. The following proposition is an implication of lemmata 5 and 6.
Proposition 3 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is FX-AE
strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is strictly core stable.
Note that if players have strict preferences then a partition is FX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable if and only if it is FX-AE strongly Nash stable, and a partition
is strictly core stable if and only if it is core stable. Proposition 3 shows that core
stability entails an FX-AE rights structure.
Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is contractual core
stable (defined in Sung and Dimitrov (2007)) if there does not exist a coalition T ⊆ N
such that
(i) for all i ∈ T , T i pi(i) and
(ii) for all j ∈ (N \ T ), pi(j) \ T j pi(j).
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Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is contractual strictly
core stable (defined in Sung and Dimitrov (2007)) if there does not exist a coalition
T ⊆ N such that
(i) for all i ∈ T , T i pi(i) ,
(ii) for some i ∈ T , T i pi(i), and
(iii) for all j ∈ (N \ T ), pi(j) \ T j pi(j).
Lemma 7 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. If a partition pi ∈ Π(N) is AX-AE
strongly Nash stable, then it is contractual core stable.
Proof LetG = (N,) be a hedonic game and pi ∈ Π(N) be an AX-AE strongly Nash
stable partition. Suppose that pi is not contractual core stable. Then, there is a coalition
T ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ T , T i pi(i) and for all j ∈ (N \ T ), pi(j) \ T j pi(j).
Let p´i = {T, {{pi(j) \ T} | j ∈ (N \ T ) and pi(j) \ T 6= ∅}} denote the partition
that is obtained from coalition T ’s blocking of pi. Now, it is shown that the pair (p´i, T )
satisfies the three conditions of AX-AE strong Nash stability. The first two conditions
are trivially satisfied, i.e., pi T−→ p´i, and for all i ∈ T , T = p´i(i) i pi(i).
Let H = {j ∈ N | j /∈ T and j ∈ pi(i) for some i ∈ T} and H¯ = {j¯ ∈ N | j¯ /∈
pi(i) for any i ∈ T}. Note that H, H¯ and T are pairwise disjoint, and N = H ∪ H¯ ∪T .
Since it is supposed that T blocks pi and this blocking does not hurt any player, for any
j ∈ H we have p´i(j) j pi(j). Note that H¯ = {j¯ ∈ N | p´i(j¯) = pi(j¯)}, so for any
j¯ ∈ H¯ we have p´i(j¯) ∼j¯ pi(j¯). Hence, for any k ∈ (N \T ) we have p´i(k) k pi(k), i.e.,
the third condition of AX-AE strong Nash stability is also satisfied by the pair (p´i, T ).
Hence, the pair (p´i, T ) satisfies the three conditions of AX-AE strong Nash stability,
this contradicts with pi being AX-AE strongly Nash stable. That is, T would strongly
Nash block the partition pi under AX-AE membership rights. Hence, pi is contractual
core stable. 
By this lemma, it can be said that if a partition is AX-AE strictly strongly Nash
stable, then it is contractual strictly core stable. Now, it is shown that the converse of
lemma 7 is true under the assumption that players have strict preferences.
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Lemma 8 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have strict preferences.
If a partition pi ∈ Π(N) is contractual core stable, then it is AX-AE strongly Nash
stable.
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game where players have strict preferences. Let
pi ∈ Π(N) be a contractual core stable partition. Suppose that pi is not AX-AE strongly
Nash stable. Then, there exists a pair (p´i, H) such that H strongly Nash blocks the
partition pi by inducing p´i under AX-AE membership rights.
Let T = {i ∈ N | p´i(i) 6= pi(i)} denote the set of agents whose coalitions changed
from pi to p´i. Note that T 6= ∅. Now, for any i ∈ T we have p´i(i) i pi(i), since players
have strict preferences and it is supposed that pi is not AX-AE strongly Nash stable.
However, each player in T leaves her current coalition under pi, and forms the
coalitions T1, . . . , TK which are pairwise disjoint and their union is equal to T such
that for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Tk ∈ p´i. Now, for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we have, for all
i ∈ Tk, Tk i pi(i) and for all j ∈ (N \Tk), pi(j) \Tk j pi(j). This is in contradiction
with pi being contractual core stable, i.e., for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, a coalition Tk would
block the partition pi without hurting other players. Hence, pi is AX-AE strongly Nash
stable. 
Lemma 8 may fail to be true if the assumption that players have strict preferences
is relaxed.21 By lemma 8, it can be said that, if a partition is contractual strictly core
stable, then it is AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable. The next proposition follows
from lemmata 7 and 8.
Proposition 4 Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game. A partition pi ∈ Π(N) is AX-AE
strictly strongly Nash stable if and only if it is contractual strictly core stable.
Sung and Dimitrov (2007) showed that for any hedonic game a contractual strictly
core stable partition always exists. This result together with Proposition 4 implies that
an AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable partition always exists for any hedonic game.
21Consider example 2. The partition pi = {{1}, {2}} is contractual core stable. However, it is not
AX-AE strongly Nash stable, since pi
{2}−−→ p´i = {{1, 2}}, and p´i(2) 2 pi(2) and p´i(1) ∼1 pi(1).
34
Note that, if a partition is AX-FE strongly Nash stable, then it is AX-AE strongly
Nash stable. This fact and lemma 7 imply, if a partition pi ∈ Π(N) is AX-FE strongly
Nash stable then it is contractual core stable. However, the converse is not true.
Example 3 Let G = (N,), where N = {1, 2} and players’ preferences are as fol-
lows: {1} 1 {1, 2}, and {1, 2} 2 {2}.
The partition pi = {{1}, {2}} is contractual core stable. However pi is not AX-FE
strongly Nash stable, since player 2 strongly Nash blocks the partition pi by joining
{1} under AX-FE membership rights, i.e., pi {2}−−→ p´i = {{1, 2}}, and p´i(2) 2 pi(2) and
pi(2) \ {2} = ∅, i.e., there is no player that player 2 needs to get a permission to leave
from the coalition pi(2).22
2.1.6 Conclusion
In this section, we studied hedonic coalition formation games where each player’s pref-
erences rely only upon the members of her coalition. A new stability notion under free
exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introduced
which is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature.
Strong Nash stability has an analogue in non-cooperative games and it is the strongest
stability notion appropriate to the context of hedonic coalition formation games. The
weak top-choice property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of
a strongly Nash stable partition. It is also shown that descending separable preferences
guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. Strong Nash stability under
different membership rights is also studied.
22The partition p´i = {{1, 2}} is AX-FE strongly Nash stable since player 2 does not permit player
1 to leave from {1, 2}. However, p´i is not individually rational, since {1} 1 p´i(1). So, there is no
individually rational and AX-FE strongly Nash stable partition for this game.
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2.2 Cover formation games
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section, we define cover formation games as an extension of hedonic coalition
formation games. A collection of coalitions is referred to as a cover if its union is equal
to the set of players. Thus, a player can be a member of several different coalitions in a
cover formation game, whereas a player can be a member of only one coalition under
a hedonic coalition formation game. For instances, a researcher can be a member
of several research teams at the same time, and an individual may be a member of
several clubs or she may have more than one nationalities. A country possibly has
memberships of some free trade agreements.
A cover formation game consists of a finite set of players, each of whom is en-
dowed with preferences over nonempty collections of coalitions each of which con-
tains herself. We define stability concepts based on individual movements as well as
movements by a subset of players under different membership rights.
Although purely cardinal preferences guarantee the existence of an FX-FE strongly
Nash stable partition for hedonic coalition formation games (by Proposition 2), purely
cardinal preferences do not even guarantee the existence of an FX-FE Nash stable
cover for cover formation games (Lemma 9). We introduce the notion of a top-choice
property for cover formation games and show that it suffices for the existence of an
FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover (Proposition 5).
We show that if players have additively separable preferences, then there exists an
FX-AE Nash stable cover (Proposition 6). We also show that there always exists an
AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable cover for any cover formation game (Proposition
7).
This section is organized as follows: Section 2.2.2 presents the basic notions. Re-
sults are given in Section 2.2.3, and Section 2.2.4 concludes.
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2.2.2 Basic notions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a nonempty finite set of players. A nonempty subset H of N
is called a coalition. Let i ∈ N be a player, and σi = {H ⊆ N | i ∈ H} denote the set
of all coalitions each of which contains player i. For any player i, let Σi = (2σi\ {∅})
denote the non-empty power set of σi. Each player i has a reflexive, complete and
transitive preference relation i over Σi.23 So, a player’s preferences depend only on
the members of her coalitions, i.e., each player considers only who will be her partners
in the coalitions that she belongs, and she is not interested in what other coalitions her
partners belong.
The strict and indifference preference relations associated with i will be denoted
by i and ∼i, respectively, and defined as follows: For all X (i),Y(i) ∈ Σi,
[X (i) i Y(i)] if and only if [X (i) i Y(i) and not Y(i) i X (i)], and
[X (i) ∼i Y(i)] if and only if [X (i) i Y(i) and Y(i) i X (i)].
Let = (1, . . . ,n) denote a preference profile for the set of players.
Definition 22 A pair E = (N,) denote a cover formation game.
Given a cover formation game we are interested in the coalitions that might form.
We require that the union of the coalitions be equal to the set of agents, i.e., we require
that the set of coalitions be a cover of N .
Definition 23 We say that a set of coalitions Θ = {H | H ∈ (2N\{∅})} is a cover of
N if
⋃
H∈ΘH = N .
Let Ψ(N) denote the set of all covers ofN .24 Given any Θ ∈ Ψ(N) and any i ∈ N ,
we let Θ(i) = {H ∈ Θ | i ∈ H} denote the set of all coalitions each of which contains
the player i under cover Θ. The preference relation i of player i over Σi can be
extended over the set of all covers Ψ(N) in a usual way: For any covers Θ, Θ´ ∈ Ψ(N),
[Θ i Θ´] if and only if [Θ(i) i Θ´(i)].
23We abuse notation that we also use i to denote preferences of agent i over Σi.
24We note that a partition is also a cover since the union of the coalitions in a partition is equal to the
set of agents. So, Π(N) $ Ψ(N).
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Given a cover formation game, our concern is the existence of covers which are
stable in some sense. We will define some stability concepts based on individual as
well as coalitional deviations under different membership rights.
Definition 24 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is
individually rational for player i if Θ(i) i {i} and is individually rational if it is
individually rational for every player i ∈ N .
A cover is individually rational if each player prefers the set of coalitions that she
belongs to being single, i.e., each agent i prefers Θ(i) to {i}.
We will employ two approaches while defining FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover.
In the first one, we will use the non-cooperative game induced by a cover formation
game.
Every cover formation game induces a non-cooperative game as defined below.
Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game with | N |= n players. Consider
the following induced non-cooperative game ΓE =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (Ri)i∈N
)
which is
defined as follows:
• The set of players in ΓE is the player set N of E.
• Let L = {L1, . . . , Lm} be a finite set of labels such that m = 2n. We take L to
be the set of strategies available to each player, so Si = L for each i ∈ N . Let
S =
∏
i∈N Si denote the strategy space. A strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
induces a cover Θs ofN as follows: a coalitionH belongs to Θs if and only if all
agents in H choose the same label as part of their strategies under s, i.e., there
exists L ∈ L such that L ∈ si for all i ∈ H .
• Preferences for ΓE is defined as follows: a player i prefers the strategy profile s
to the strategy profile s´, sRis´, if and only if Θs(i) i Θs´(i), i.e., player i prefers
the coalitions of Θs(i) to which she belongs to the coalitions of Θs´(i) that she is
a member of.
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We now define FX-FE Nash and strong Nash stable covers by using the induced
non-cooperative game approach.
Definition 25 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is
FX-FE Nash stable (respectively, FX-FE strongly Nash stable) if it is induced by a
strategy profile which is a Nash equilibrium (respectively, strong Nash equilibrium) of
the induced non-cooperative game ΓE .
Thus, the Nash equilibria of ΓE correspond to the Nash stable covers of E, and the
strong Nash equilibria of ΓE correspond to the strongly Nash stable covers of E.
If the strategy profile s which induces the cover Θs is not a Nash equilibrium (re-
spectively, strong Nash equilibrium) of ΓE , then there is a player i ∈ N (respectively, a
subset of players H ⊆ N ) which deviates from s (according to s) and this deviation is
beneficial to agent i (respectively, all agents in H). In such a case, it is said that i Nash
blocks (respectively, H strongly Nash blocks) the cover Θs under FX-FE membership
rights.
The second approach is posed in terms of movements and reachability.
We first explain what we mean by individual movements. Let Θs be a cover which
is induced by the strategy profile s, and i ∈ N be a deviating agent. The deviation of
player i from s can be explained as movements among the coalitions of the cover Θs as
follows: Player i leaves some of her current coalitions and joins some coalitions that
she does not belong under Θs. We let BΘs(i) ⊆ ({B ∈ Θs | i ∈ B} ∪ {∅}) 25 denote
the set of coalitions that player i leaves, and TΘs(i) ⊆ ({T ∈ Θs | i /∈ T} ∪ {∅}) 26
denote the set of coalitions that player i joins by her individual movements among the
coalitions of Θs. Note that following cases are possible:
(i) BΘs(i) 6= ∅ and HΘs(i) 6= ∅, that is player i leaves some coalitions that she is
a member of under Θs and joins some coalitions that she is not in under Θs by her
individual movements.
25That is, BΘs(i) ⊆ (Θs(i) ∪ {∅}).
26That is, TΘs(i) ⊆ [(Θs \Θs(i)) ∪ {∅}].
39
(ii) BΘs(i) = ∅ and HΘs(i) 6= ∅, that is player i does not leave any coalition that
she is in under Θs and joins some coalitions that she is not a member of under Θs by
her individual movements.
(iii) BΘs(i) $ Θ(i) and HΘs(i) = ∅, that is player i leaves some coalitions that
she is in under Θs and does not join any coalition that she is not in under Θs by her
individual movements.
So, it is not possible to have both BΘs(i) = ∅ and HΘs(i) = ∅ by individual
movements of player i ∈ N .
Secondly, we will define what we mean by movements of a subset of players ∅ 6=
H ⊆ N among the coalitions of a cover Θs. Given a cover Θs and a subset of players
H ⊆ N , agents ofH coordinate among themselves, and some players ofH leave some
of their current coalitions and some players of H join some coalitions that they are not
in under Θs. Note that movements of H are simultaneous. Again we use the notation
that for any i ∈ H , BΘs(i) ⊆ ({B ∈ Θs | i ∈ B} ∪ {∅}) denote the set of coalitions
that player i ∈ H leaves, and TΘs(i) ⊆ ({T ∈ Θs | i /∈ T} ∪ {∅}) denote the set of
coalitions that player i ∈ H joins by movements of H among the coalitions of Θs.
We note that it is possible that for all i ∈ H , BΘs(i) = ∅ and TΘs(i) = ∅ by
movements of a subset of players H ⊆ N . That is, each agent in H keeps her existing
coalitions Θs(i) and does not join any coalition that she is not in under Θs, but agents
inH form new coalitionsH1, . . . , HK among themselves such that
⋃k=K
k=1 Hk = H and
for any k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, Hk /∈ Θs.
Given a cover Θ and a subset of players H ⊆ N , by any movements of H among
the coalitions of Θ, players of H obtain a new cover Θ´ ∈ (Ψ(N) \ {Θ}), and it is said
that Θ´ is reachable from the cover Θ via H .
Definition 26 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game and Θ ∈ Ψ(N) be a cover.
Another cover Θ´ ∈ (Ψ(N) \ {Θ}) is said to be reachable from Θ by movements of
a subset of players H ⊆ N , denoted by Θ H−→ Θ´, if, for any j, k ∈ (N \ H) and any
coalition T ∈ Θ with j, k ∈ T there exists a coalition T´ ∈ Θ´ such that j, k ∈ T´ .
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Reachability by movements of a subset of agents says that a non-deviating agent
remains with all former mates who are not deviators. Notice that a subset of players
Ĥ ⊇ H can do all movements that H can. Note that for any covers Θ, Θ´ ∈ Ψ(N) we
have Θ N−→ Θ´.
In the sequel we use the notation that BΘ(i) ⊆ ({B ∈ Θ | i ∈ B}∪{∅}) denote the
set of coalitions that player i leaves, with a generic coalition B ∈ BΘ(i) and a generic
player b ∈ B, and TΘ(i) ⊆ ({T ∈ Θ | i /∈ T} ∪ {∅}) denote the set of coalitions to
which player i joins, with a generic coalition T ∈ HΘ(i) and a generic player t ∈ T .
We now define FX-FE strong Nash stability of a cover in terms of movements and
reachability.
Definition 27 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is FX-
FE strongly Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (Θ´, H) (where Θ´ ∈ (Ψ(N)\{Θ})
and ∅ 6= H ⊆ N ) such that
(i) Θ H−→ Θ´ (Θ´ is reachable from Θ by movements of H), and
(ii) for all i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i).
If such a pair (Θ´, H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash blocks Θ under FX-
FE membership rights (by inducing Θ´).
Given a cover formation game, note that a cover is FX-FE Nash stable if there is no
singleton coalition that blocks it in the above sense, i.e., a cover is FX-FE Nash stable if
there is no player such that it is beneficial for her to make individual movements among
the coalitions of the given cover without taking into account that her movements may
hurt some of other players.27
27Note that the two definitions of FX-FE (strongly) Nash stable covers are equivalent (definitions 25
and 27).
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We now define strong Nash stability under other membership rights.
Definition 28 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is
FX-AE strongly Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (Θ´, H) such that
(i) Θ H−→ Θ´,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , all T ∈ TΘ(i) and all t ∈ T , Θ´(t) t Θ(t).
If such a pair (Θ´, H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash blocks Θ under FX-
AE membership rights (by inducing Θ´).
Definition 29 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is
AX-AE strongly Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (Θ´, H) such that
(i) Θ H−→ Θ´,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i), and
(iii) for all j ∈ (N \ T ), Θ´(j) j Θ(j).
If such a pair (Θ´, H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash blocks Θ under AX-
AE membership rights (by inducing Θ´).
Definition 30 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. A cover Θ ∈ Ψ(N) is
AX-FE strongly Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (Θ´, H) such that
(i) Θ H−→ Θ´,
(ii) for all i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i), and
(iii) for all i ∈ H , all B ∈ BΘ(i) and all b ∈ B, Θ´(b) b Θ(b).
If such a pair (Θ´, H) exists, then it is said that H strongly Nash blocks Θ under AX-
FE membership rights (by inducing Θ´).
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Since movements of a deviating subset of players H are simultaneous, we assume
for above definitions that complete movements of H are first announced, then know-
ing these movements, players of the coalitions that members of H leave and/or join
approve or disapprove these movements if they are entitled with such a right. There
may exist a player j ∈ (N \H) such that for some i, h ∈ H (possibly i = h), j ∈ B
for some B ∈ BΘ(i) and j ∈ T for some T ∈ TΘ(h), i.e., movements of H may affect
player j via both coalition B that i leaves and coalition T to which h joins.
If we restrict our attention to singleton coalitions for the concepts given in defini-
tions 28-30, we obtain corresponding Nash stable notions.
We can define strict versions of concepts given in definitions 27-30 by replacing
item (ii) with [for all i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i), and for some i ∈ H , Θ´(i) i Θ(i)].
2.2.3 Results
We will study the existence of (strongly) Nash stable covers under different member-
ship rights.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) showed that for hedonic coalition formation
games if players’ preferences are additively separable and symmetric28 then there ex-
ists an FX-FE Nash stable partition. We know by Proposition 2 that for hedonic coali-
tion formation games if players have purely cardinal preferences29 then there always
exists an FX-FE strongly Nash stable partition. A question arises that whether these
results hold for cover formation games.
28These properties are given in definitions 13 and 14, respectively. Since we are working with cover
formation games, if players’ preferences are additively separable, then a player i compares two col-
lections of coalitions X (i),Y(i) ∈ Σi as follows: [X (i) i Y(i)] ⇐⇒ [
∑
j∈X:X∈X (i) vi(j) ≥∑
j∈Y :Y ∈Y(i) vi(j)], where vi : N → R is a function.
29See definition 15 and recall that purely cardinal preferences are descending separable.
43
Lemma 9 Purely cardinal preferences do not guarantee the existence of an FX-FE
Nash stable cover for cover formation games.
Proof We will provide a cover formation game where players have purely cardinal
preferences, but has no FX-FE Nash stable cover.
Let E = (N,), where N = {1, 2, 3} and individual weights are w(1) = −15,
w(2) = −65 and w(3) = 115. So, additively separable and symmetric preferences of
players are represented by the following functions v = (vi)i∈N :
1 2 3
v1 0 −80 100
v2 −80 0 50
v3 100 50 0
We will show that there does not exist an FX-FE Nash stable cover.30 Suppose that
there exists a cover Θ which is FX-FE Nash stable.
Note that any cover including {1, 2, 3} (respectively, {1, 2}) is not FX-FE Nash
stable, since player 2 benefits by leaving {1, 2, 3} (respectively, {1, 2}). So, {1, 2, 3} /∈
Θ and {1, 2} /∈ Θ.
If {2, 3} ∈ Θ, then we must have that {1, 2, 3} ∈ Θ, otherwise player 1 benefits by
joining {2, 3}. However we know that {1, 2, 3} /∈ Θ, so {2, 3} /∈ Θ.
If {2} ∈ Θ, then we must have that {2, 3} ∈ Θ, otherwise player 3 benefits by
joining {2}. However we know that {2, 3} /∈ Θ, so {2} /∈ Θ.
So, we have that {1, 2, 3} /∈ Θ, {1, 2} /∈ Θ, {2, 3} /∈ Θ and {2} /∈ Θ. This means
that there is no coalition in Θ which contains player 2, in contradiction with that Θ is
a cover of N . Hence there does not exist a cover which is FX-FE Nash stable. 
30Note that the partition pi = {{1, 3}, {2}} is the unique FX-FE Nash stable partition.
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Although purely cardinal preferences property suffices for the existence of an FX-
FE strongly Nash stable partition for hedonic coalition formation games, it does not
even guarantee the existence of an FX-FE Nash stable cover for cover formation games.
We introduce following notation.
Given a nonempty set of players T ⊆ N with i ∈ T , let Chi(T ) = {Y ∈ (2T ∩ Σi) |
Y i X for all X ∈ (2T ∩ Σi)} denote the set of best alternatives of player i on
(2T ∩ Σi) under i. Thus, for any player i, Chi(N) denote the set of best alternatives
of player i over Σi under i, i.e., Chi(N) = {Y ∈ Σi | Y i X for all X ∈ Σi}.
Definition 31 A cover formation game E = (N,) satisfies the top-choice property
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) for all i ∈ N , | Chi(N) |= 1, and
(ii) for all i ∈ N , all T ∈ Chi(N) and all j ∈ T , T ∈ Chj(N).
Proposition 5 If a cover formation game E = (N,) satisfies the top-choice prop-
erty, then it has a unique FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover, Θ?, where for each player
i ∈ N we have Θ?(i) = Chi(N).
Proof Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game which satisfies the top-choice
property. Let Θ? =
⋃
i∈N Chi(N) = {H1, . . . , HK}. It is clear that Θ? is a cover
of N . Note that Θ?(i) = Chi(N) for every player i ∈ N . This fact, together with
the top-choice property, implies that for all i ∈ N we have Θ? i Θ for any Θ ∈
(Ψ(N) \ {Θ?}). Hence Θ? is an FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover.
Since for any covers Θ, Θ´ ∈ Ψ(N) we have Θ N−→ Θ´ and the game satisfies the
top-choice property, any FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover must includeH1,. . ., HK−1
and HK . Hence, Θ? is the unique FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover. 
We note that the top-choice property is not necessary for a cover formation game
to have an FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover.
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Proposition 6 Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game. If players have additively
separable preferences, then there always exists an FX-AE Nash stable cover.
Proof Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game where players have additively
separable preferences. We will construct a cover, Θ?, and show that it is FX-AE Nash
stable.
For any player i, let H?(i) = {H ∈ Σi |
∑
j∈H vi(j) ≥ 0} denote the set of
all coalitions each of which gives a non-negative payoff to player i. We define Θ? as
follows: Θ? = {H ⊆ N | for all i ∈ H , H ∈ H?(i)}. That is, a coalition H is in
Θ? if each player in H gets a non-negative payoff from being a member of H , and Θ?
contains all such coalitions.
We note that Θ? is a cover ofN .31 Suppose that Θ? is not FX-AE Nash stable. Then
there exists a player i ∈ N who Nash blocks Θ? under FX-AE membership rights.
Claim 1: TΘ?(i) = ∅, i.e., for any coalition T ∈ Θ? with i /∈ T , there exists a player
t ∈ T such that she disapproves player i’s joining to coalition T .
Proof of Claim 1. Let T ∈ Θ? with i /∈ T . Since (T ∪ {i}) /∈ Θ?, there exists
a player t ∈ T such that (T ∪ {i}) /∈ H?(t), i.e., ∑j∈(T∪{i}) vt(j) < 0. This fact,
together with FX-AE membership rights, implies that player t disapproves player i’s
joining to T . Hence, TΘ?(i) = ∅, i.e., player i cannot join any coalition T ∈ Θ? such
that i /∈ T .
Claim 2: BΘ?(i) = ∅, i.e., player i does not leave any coalition that she is a member
of under Θ?.
Proof of Claim 2. Note that for all H ∈ Θ?(i), we have ∑j∈H vi(j) ≥ 0. So, if
player i leaves a coalition that she belongs under Θ?, then she gains at most nothing.
So, it is not a profitable movement for player i to leave a coalition that she is a member
of under Θ?. Hence, player i does not leave any coalition that she is in under Θ?, i.e.,
BΘ?(i) = ∅.
31For all i ∈ N we have {i} ∈ H?(i) as vi(i) = 0. So, Θ? contains all singleton coalitions, and
hence
⋃
H∈Θ? H = N .
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By claims 1 and 2, TΘ?(i) = ∅ and BΘ?(i) = ∅, which is the desired contradiction.
Hence Θ? is FX-AE Nash stable.32 
Ballester (2004) showed that there always exists an AX-AE Nash stable partition
for hedonic coalition formation games. Sung and Dimitrov (2007) defined contractual
strict core stability and showed that every hedonic coalition formation game has such
a partition. We know by Proposition 4 that a partition is AX-AE strictly strongly Nash
stable if and only if it is contractual strictly core stable. Hence, an AX-AE strictly
strongly Nash stable partition always exists for any hedonic game.
Following result shows that for cover formation games there always exists an AX-
AE strictly strongly Nash stable cover.33
Proposition 7 There always exists an AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable cover for
any cover formation game.
Proof Let E = (N,) be a cover formation game and Θ1 ∈ Ψ(N) be an individually
rational cover.34 Now we will define an algorithm.
Period 1. Start with cover Θ1 and search for a pair (Θ2, H1) (where Θ2 ∈ (Ψ(N) \
{Θ1}) and ∅ 6= H1 ⊆ N ) such that following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Θ1
H1−→ Θ2,
(ii) for all i ∈ H1, Θ2(i) i Θ1(i), and for some j ∈ H1, Θ2(j) j Θ1(j), and
(iii) for all l ∈ (N \H1), Θ2(l) l Θ1(l).
If there exists such a pair (Θ2, H1), then we go to next period, and next period starts
with Θ2. If there does not exist such a pair, then we stop and we say that the result of
the algorithm is Θ1.
32We note that Θ? need not to be FX-AE strongly Nash stable.
33We note that our proof is similar to the one given in Sung and Dimitrov (2007) to show the existence
of a contractual strictly core stable partition.
34An individually rational cover always exists for any cover formation game, e.g., a cover consisting
of only all singleton coalitions is individually rational.
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In general, we have following in Period k:
Period k. Start with Θk and search for a pair (Θk+1, Hk) such that following con-
ditions are satisfied:
(i) Θk
Hk−→ Θk+1,
(ii) for all i ∈ Hk, Θk+1(i) i Θk(i), and for some j ∈ Hk, Θk+1(j) j Θk(j),
and
(iv) for all l ∈ (N \Hk), Θk+1(l) l Θk(l).
If there exists such a pair (Θk+1, Hk), then we go to next period, and next period
starts with Θk+1. If there does not exist such a pair, then we stop and we say that the
result of the algorithm is Θk.
Claim. The algorithm stops in a finite period.
Proof of Claim. Note that while passing from one period to another period at
least one player is made strictly better off and no player is made worse off. This
fact, together with AX-AE membership rights, implies that a cycle never occurs in the
algorithm. Note that | σi |= 2n−1 and let 2n−1 − 1 = c. A player i ∈ N can be better
off at most | Σi | −1 = 2c − 1 times without being worse off. Hence the algorithm
stops at most at period n2c − n which is finite since n is finite. Hence the algorithm
stops in a finite period.
Let the algorithm stops at period k and Θk is the result of the algorithm. Clearly
Θk is an AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable cover, otherwise the algorithm would not
stop at period k. 
2.2.4 Conclusion
We introduced cover formation games, and for each membership rights we defined
corresponding Nash and strongly Nash stable covers. We showed that purely cardinal
preferences are not sufficient for the existence of an FX-FE Nash stable cover. We
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introduced the top-choice property and showed that it suffices for the existence of an
FX-FE strongly Nash stable cover. We also proved that additively separable prefer-
ences guarantee the existence of an FX-AE Nash stable cover. We also showed that for
any cover formation game there always exists an AX-AE strictly strongly Nash stable
cover.
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CHAPTER 3
NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE
RULES WHICH ARE IMPLEMENTABLE VIA
RECHTSSTAAT
3.1 Introduction
We consider an environment with a finite non-empty set of agents and a finite non-
empty set of alternatives. Each agent has preferences over the set of alternatives where
indifferences are allowed and a list of agents’ preferences is called a preference profile.
A social choice rule (SCR) is a rule which chooses a nonempty subset of the set of
alternatives at each preference profile. An SCR can be seen as a reflection of some
social planner’s values at each preference profile, it gives the list of alternatives which
are considered as desirable for the society, i.e., it makes a choice in the name of the
society. Therefore there may be, and generally will be information problem in the
society and the question of how a planner can learn individuals’ information in order
to implement an SCR, is an interesting one (Hurwicz (1972)).
If the planner has all relevant information, then her problem would just to choose
the alternatives indicated by the SCR. The implementation problem arises when the
preferences of individuals are private information; if the social planner does not know
the preferences of the individuals, so the preference profile of the society, how can she
decide on the alternatives which should be chosen?
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The planner’s problem is to design a mechanism in order to get the necessary infor-
mation in the process of choosing an alternative. The simple approach to mechanism
design is to ask agents to reveal their preferences. However this approach will gen-
erally be unsatisfactory, because agents will be able to benefit by misreporting their
preferences. As their preferences are private information, this misreporting will not be
detectable. So we can take a more general approach to mechanism design and ask each
individual to send an abstract “message” to the planner and the planner’s problem is to
determine an outcome function, i.e., an appropriate relation between the messages sent
by the agents and the set of alternatives. Hence, a mechanism (game form) consists
of a nonempty strategy set (messages) for each agent and an outcome function which
maps from joint messages into alternatives. A mechanism with a preference profile on
the set of alternatives induces a game in strategic form. A mechanism is said to im-
plement an SCR according to a game theoretic solution concept σ if the σ-equilibrium
outcomes of the induced game coincide with the set of alternatives assigned by the
SCR at each preference profile of the society. At this point implementation theory is
on a different footing from game theory. Whereas game theory is concerned with how
a given game will be played, implementation theory deals with the design of games.
Maskin (1999) gave a partial characterization of Nash implementability in terms of
two conditions called Maskin monotonicity and no veto power. Maskin monotonicity
turns out to be a necessary condition (which is not sufficient) for Nash implementabil-
ity. In a society with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity combined with no veto
power is a sufficient condition for Nash implementability, although no veto power con-
dition is not necessary. Danilov (1992) introduced essential monotonicity and showed
that with at least three agents, essential monotonicity is both necessary and sufficient
for an SCR to be Nash implementable when agents have strict preference relations
over the set of alternatives, and Yamato (1992) extended this result to weak domain of
preferences, i.e., agents are allowed to have indifferences over alternatives. Moore and
Repullo (1990) introduced a condition, referred to as Condition µ, and showed that
when there are at least three agents in the society, an SCR is Nash implementable if
and only if it satisfies Condition µ.
Sertel (2002) studied designing rights by introducing the notion of a Rechtsstaat.
A Rechtsstaat is a pair ω = (β, γ), where β and γ are functions, called a benefit
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and a code of rights, respectively. Given a pair (x, y) of alternatives and a preference
profile, a benefit gives us the set of all coalitions that strictly prefer y to x at the given
preference profile. Given a pair (x, y) of alternatives, a code of rights specifies a family
γ(x, y) of coalitions in which each coalition is given the right to approve the alteration
of x to y. Given a preference profile, a coalition in γ(x, y) approves the alteration of x
to y if all members of the coalition strictly prefer y to x at the given preference profile.
An alternative x is said to be an equilibrium of a Rechtsstaat at a given preference
profile if, there is no coalition which is given the right to approve the alteration of x
to some other alternative y such that every agent in the coalition strictly prefers y to x.
Sertel (2002) investigated Rechtsstaats which posses invisible hand property and the
preservation of the best public interest which are parallel to the first and the second
theorems of welfare economics.
Koray and Yıldız (2008) studied implementation via a Rechtsstaat. An SCR is
said to be implementable via a Rechtsstaat if, at every preference profile, alternatives
which are chosen by the SCR coincide with the equilibria of the Rechtsstaat. They
characterized the SCRs which are implementable via Rechtsstaats. Moreover, they
identified some properties of a Rechtsstaat which guarantee Nash implementability of
an SCR which is implementable via Rechtsstaat. We note that in the model of Koray
and Yıldız (2008), every agent has strict preference relations over alternatives, and an
SCR may be empty-valued at some preference profiles. However, we allow agents to
have weak preference relations over alternatives, and in our context an SCR is non-
empty valued. Hence, our results are not comparable with the results of Koray and
Yıldız (2008).
We will study Nash implementation of social choice rules which are implementable
via a Rechtsstaat in this chapter. We will introduce a property, called as the intersec-
tion property, and show that every Rechtsstaat satisfying this property has non-empty
equilibria at each preference profile (Proposition 8). We will then show that if an SCR
is implementable via a Rechtsstaat then it is is weakly Pareto optimal and Maskin
monotonic (Proposition 9).
We say that a Rechtsstaat ω satisfies equal treatment of equivalent alternatives
(ETEA), if for any alternatives x and y, and any preference profile such that all agents
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are indifferent between x and y, then x being an equilibrium of ω implies that y is
also an equilibrium of ω. However, there exists an SCR which is implementable via
a Rechtsstaat that violates ETEA, but it is not Nash implementable (Example 5).
We will show that, when there are at least three agents, if an SCR is implementable
via some Rechtsstaat satisfying ETEA then it is essentially monotonic, hence Nash
implementable by Yamato (1992) (Theorem 1). We will also show that a Rechtsstaat
ω = (β, γ) satisfies ETEA if and only if for any alternative x and any alternatives y
and z (different from x) we have γ(y, x) = γ(z, x) (Proposition 11).
We will define oligarchic Rechtsstaats and show that if an SCR is implementable
via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat then it is Nash implementable when there are three or
more agents, and we will prove that such an SCR also satisfies neutrality.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the basic notions. The
notion of Rechtsstaat is introduced in section 3.3. Main results are given in section 3.4.
Section 3.5 introduces oligarchic Rechtsstaats. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Basic notions
For any non-empty finite set T , we let P(T ) = 2T , P0(T ) = P(T ) \ {∅}, and #T
denote the cardinality of T .
Alternatives
Let A denote a non-empty finite set of alternatives, and we assume that #A ≥ 2.
Agents
LetN = {1, . . . , n} denote a non-empty finite set of agents, and we assume that n ≥ 2.
Preferences
A preference on B ⊆ A is a complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on B.
Let W (B) denote the set of all preferences on B. An n-tuple RN ∈ W (A)N is called
a preference profile. For a coalition H ∈ P0(N), RH ∈ W (A)H denote a preference
profile for coalition H . For any i ∈ N , let Pi denote the strict preference relation
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associated with Ri and Ii denote the indifference relation associated with Ri. For any
R ∈ W (A), let top(R) = {x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A} denote the set of best
alternatives at R.
Social Choice Rules
A social choice rule (SCR) is a map F : W (A)N → P0(A), i.e., for every preference
profile RN ∈ W (A)N , an SCR F assigns a non-empty subset F (RN) of A.
Mechanism and Implementation
A mechanism (or game form) is an (n+ 1)-tuple G = (S1, . . . , Sn; g) where
(i) for each i ∈ N , Si is a nonempty set of strategies for player i,
(ii) g : SN = S1 × · · · × Sn → A is a map called the outcome function.
For H ∈ P0(N), SH =
∏
i∈H Si, and an element sH of S
H is called a strategy
profile for coalition H . A mechanism G = (S1, . . . , Sn; g) at each preference profile
RN ∈ W (A)N induces a game (in strategic form) (G,RN).
A strategy profile sN ∈ SN is called a Nash equilibrium of (G,RN) if for every
i ∈ N , g(sN)Rig(s´i, sN\{i}) for any s´i ∈ Si. Let NE(G,RN) denote the set of all
Nash equilibria of the game (G,RN).
Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR and G = (S1, . . . , Sn; g) a mechanism.
We say that G implements F in Nash equilibrium if g(NE(G,RN)) = F (RN) for
all RN ∈ W (A)N . We say that F is Nash implementable if there is a mechanism G
which implements it in Nash equilibrium.
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3.3 Rechtsstaat
Sertel (2002) studied designing rights by introducing Rechtsstaat. We will follow Ser-
tel (2002) to define a Rechtsstaat.
Given N and A, a Rechtsstaat is a pair ω = (β, γ), where β and γ are functions,
called a benefit and a code of rights, respectively, which are defined as follows:1
• A function β : A×A×W (A)N → P(P0(N)) is called a benefit and defined as
follows: For any (x, y) ∈ A × A with x 6= y, H ∈ P0(N) and RN ∈ W (A)N ,
H ∈ β(x, y;RN) if and only if yPix for all i ∈ H . Let β(x, y;RN) gives us the
set of all willing coalitions for an alteration of x to y at RN , i.e., β(x, y;RN) =
{H ∈ P0(N) | yPix for all i ∈ H}.
• A code of rights is a function γ : A×A→ P(P0(N)) which specifies for every
x, y ∈ A with x 6= y, γ(x, y) of family of coalitions in which each coalition is
given the right to approve the alteration of alternative x to alternative y, that is,
for any H ∈ P0(N), H ∈ γ(x, y) if and only if the coalition H is given the
right to approve the alteration of x to y. Given any RN ∈ W (A)N , we say that
coalition H ∈ γ(x, y) approves the alteration of x to y at RN if and only if yPix
for all i ∈ H . For any x, y ∈ A, we let γ(x, y) denote the set of all minimal
coalitions each of which has the right to approve the alteration of x to y, i.e., for
anyH ∈ P0(N), H ∈ γ(x, y) if and only ifH ∈ γ(x, y) and there does not exist
H´ $ H such that H´ ∈ γ(x, y).
In the sequel, we assume that a code γ satisfies following axioms:
(A1) For all x, y ∈ A and all H ∈ P0(N), if H ∈ γ(x, y), then for all H´ ⊇ H we
have H´ ∈ γ(x, y).2
(A2) For all x, y ∈ A, there exists H ∈ P0(N) such that H ∈ γ(x, y).
1The original definition of Rechtsstaat given in Sertel (2002) also contains a function α : A× A→
P(P0(N)) which is called ability. For any x, y ∈ A with x 6= y, the ability α gives a family α(x, y) of
coalitions which are able to bring the alteration of alternative x to alternative y. We assume that for any
x, y ∈ A with x 6= y, α(x, y) = P0(N). So, we do not include ability in the definition of Rechtsstaat.
2By axiom A1, γ is monotonic with respect to the players.
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Axioms A1 and A2 imply that for all x, y ∈ A, N ∈ γ(x, y), i.e., for all x, y ∈ A,
the grand coalition N has the right to approve the alteration of x to y.
Given N and A, we let Ω denote the set of all Rechtsstaats (on N and A) each of
which satisfies the axioms A1 and A2.
An alternative x ∈ A is an equilibrium of Rechtsstaat ω at RN (defined in Sertel
(2002)) if and only if for all y ∈ (A \ {x}), β(x, y;RN) ∩ γ(x, y) = ∅.
Let ε(ω,RN) denote the set of equilibria of Rechtsstaat ω at RN ∈ W (A)N .
Following example shows that ε(ω,RN) = ∅ for some ω ∈ Ω at some RN ∈
W (A)N .
Example 4 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. Let ω˜ = (β, γ˜), where γ˜ is defined
as follows:
γ˜(a, b) = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {N}}, γ˜(a, c) = {{2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {N}},
γ˜(b, a) = {{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {N}}, γ˜(b, c) = {{2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {N}},
γ˜(c, a) = {{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {N}}, γ˜(c, b) = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {N}}.
We consider following profile RN ∈ W (A)N :
R1 R2 R3
a b c
b c a
c a b
Now, a /∈ ε(ω,RN) since β(a, c;RN) ∩ γ˜(a, c) = {2, 3}, b /∈ ε(ω,RN) since
β(b, a;RN) ∩ γ˜(b, a) = {1, 3}, and c /∈ ε(ω,RN) since β(c, b;RN) ∩ γ˜(c, b) = {1, 2}.
Hence, ε(ω˜, RN) = ∅.
We now define another Rechtsstaat ω̂ = (β, γ̂), where for any pair x, y ∈ A and a
coalitionH ∈ P0(N),H ∈ γ̂(x, y) if and only if #H ≥ 2. Hence, for every pair x, y ∈
A we have γ̂(x, y) = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {N}}. We again consider the profile
RN ∈ W (A)N . Now, a /∈ ε(ω̂, RN) since β(a, c;RN)∩ γ̂(a, c) = {2, 3}, b /∈ ε(ω̂, RN)
since β(b, a;RN) ∩ γ̂(b, a) = {1, 3}, and c /∈ ε(ω̂, RN) since β(c, b;RN) ∩ γ̂(c, b) =
{1, 2}. Hence, ε(ω̂, RN) = ∅.
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Let Ω∗ ⊂ Ω denote the set of Rechtsstaats such that for every ω ∈ Ω∗, ε(ω,RN) 6=
∅ for all RN ∈ W (A)N .
We will introduce a property, called intersection property, and show that any
Rechtsstaat satisfying this property has non-empty equilibria at every preference pro-
file.
Definition 32 Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat. We say that ω satisfies the intersection
property if there exists T ∈ P0(N) such that for all x, y ∈ A, and all H ∈ γ(x, y),
T ⊆ H , i.e.,⋂(x,y)∈(A×A) γ(x, y) 6= ∅.
Proposition 8 Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat. If ω satisfies the intersection property,
then ω ∈ Ω∗.
Proof Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat which satisfies the intersection property. We
will show that ω ∈ Ω∗. Since ω satisfies the intersection property, there exists T ∈
P0(N) such that T =
⋂
(x,y)∈(A×A) γ(x, y). We will show that for all RN ∈ W (A)N ,
all j ∈ T and all x ∈ A, if x ∈ top(Rj), then x ∈ ε(ω,RN).
Let RN ∈ W (A)N , j ∈ T and x ∈ A be such that x ∈ top(Rj). Suppose
that x /∈ ε(ω,RN). Then, there exist y ∈ (A \ {x}) and H ∈ P0(N) such that
H ∈ [β(x, y;RN) ∩ γ(x, y)]. Since T =
⋂
(x,y)∈(A×A) γ(x, y), we have T ⊆ H .
However, since j ∈ T and x ∈ top(Rj), for any y ∈ (A \ {x}) we have xRjy. So,
j /∈ H for all H ∈ β(x, y;RN). This contradicts with that H ∈ β(x, y;RN). That is,
agent j does not approve the alteration of x to y since x ∈ top(Rj). So, x ∈ ε(ω,RN).
Hence, ω ∈ Ω∗. 
Definition 33 An SCR F : W (A)N → P0(A) is said to be implementable via
Rechtsstaat ω (defined in Koray and Yıldız (2008)) if for all RN ∈ W (A)N , F (RN) =
ε(ω,RN).
We note that since F (RN) 6= ∅ for every RN ∈ W (A)N , if F is implementable via
a Rechtsstaat ω, then ω ∈ Ω∗.
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For example, a dictatorial SCR F d is implementable via dictatorial Rechtsstaat ωd.3
3.4 Results
In this section, we will study what properties of a Rechtsstaat implementing an SCR
ensure that the SCR is also Nash implementable.
Definition 34 We say that alternative x strongly Pareto dominates alternative y at
RN ∈ W (A)N , if xPiy for all i ∈ N . For any RN ∈ W (A)N , let SPO(RN) denote
the set of all strongly Pareto undominated alternatives at RN . We say that an SCR F is
weakly Pareto optimal if for all RN ∈ W (A)N , F (RN) ⊆ SPO(RN).
Let L(x,Ri) = {y ∈ A | xRiy} denote the lower counter set of Ri at x ∈ A.
A preference profile R˜N ∈ W (A)N is obtained by a monotonic transformation of
RN ∈ W (A)N at x ∈ A, if L(x,Ri) ⊆ L(x, R˜i) for all i ∈ N . We let MT (RN , x)
denote the set of preference profiles which are obtained by a monotonic transformation
of RN at x ∈ A.
Definition 35 We say that an SCR F : W (A)N → P0(A) is Maskin monotonic if for
all RN , R˜N ∈ W (A)N and all x ∈ F (RN), if R˜N ∈MT (RN , x) then x ∈ F (R˜N).
Maskin (1999) showed that if an SCR is Nash implementable then it is Maskin
monotonic. He also showed that when #N ≥ 3, if an SCR satisfies Maskin mono-
tonicity and no veto power condition,4 then it is Nash implementable.
The next proposition shows that an SCR which is implementable via a Rechtsstaat
is both weakly Pareto optimal and Maskin monotonic.
3An SCR F d : W (A)N → P0(A) is dictatorial if there exists d ∈ N such that for all RN ∈
W (A)N , F d(RN ) = top(Rd), and a Rechtsstaat ωd = (β, γd) is dictatorial if there exists d ∈ N such
that for all pairs x, y ∈ A, γ(x, y) = {{d}}, where d ∈ N is called the dictator.
4We say that an SCR F : W (A)N → P0(A) satisfies no veto power condition if for all RN ∈
W (A)N and all x ∈ A such that there is i ∈ N , for all j ∈ (N \ {i}), L(x,Rj) = A, then x ∈ F (RN ).
58
Proposition 9 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. If F is implementable via
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ), then F is weakly Pareto optimal and Maskin monotonic.
Proof Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR which is implementable via Rechtsstaat
ω = (β, γ). So, for all RN ∈ W (A)N , F (RN) = ε(ω,RN).
Let x, y ∈ A, RN ∈ W (A)N be such that xPiy for all i ∈ N . By axiom A2,
we have γ(y, x) 6= ∅. So, β(y, x;RN) ∩ γ(y, x) 6= ∅, i.e., y /∈ ε(ω,RN). As F is
implementable via ω, we have y /∈ F (RN). Hence, F is weakly Pareto optimal.
We will now show that F is Maskin monotonic. Let RN , R˜N ∈ W (A)N ,
x ∈ F (RN) and R˜N ∈MT (RN , x). We will show that x ∈ F (R˜N). Since F is imple-
mentable via ω and x ∈ F (RN), we have x ∈ ε(ω,RN). Suppose that x /∈ ε(ω, R˜N).
So, there exist z ∈ A and H ∈ P0(N) such that H ∈ [β(x, z; R˜N) ∩ γ(x, z)]. Since
R˜N ∈ MT (RN , x), i.e., for all i ∈ N , L(x,Ri) ⊆ L(x, R˜i), we have that the set
of agents who prefer x to z under RN continues to prefer x to z under R˜N . Now,
this fact together with H ∈ β(x, z; R˜N) implies that for all i ∈ H we have zPix,
i.e., H ∈ β(x, z;RN). So, H ∈ [β(x, z;RN) ∩ γ(x, z)], which is in contradiction
with x ∈ ε(ω,RN). Hence, x ∈ ε(ω, R˜N). As F is implementable via ω, we have
x ∈ F (R˜N). Hence, F is Maskin monotonic. 
Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR, and B ∈ P0(A). We say that an alternative
x ∈ A is essential for i ∈ N in B for F if there exists RN ∈ W (A)N such that
L(x,Ri) ⊆ B and x ∈ F (RN). LetEss(F, i, B) denote the set of essential alternatives
for i ∈ N in B for F .
Definition 36 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. We say that F is es-
sentially monotonic if for all RN , R˜N ∈ W (A)N and for all x ∈ F (RN), if
Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) ⊆ L(x, R˜i) for all i ∈ N , then x ∈ F (R˜N).
Danilov (1992) showed that when #N ≥ 3 and players have strict preference rela-
tions over alternatives, an SCR F is Nash implementable if and only if it is essentially
monotonic. Yamato (1992) extended this result and showed that when #N ≥ 3 and
players have weak preferences over alternatives, essential monotonicity is both neces-
sary and sufficient for an SCR to be Nash implementable.
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We now define a new condition on a Rechtsstaat, referred to as the equal treatment
of equivalent alternatives.
Definition 37 Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat. We say that ω satisfies the equal treat-
ment of equivalent alternatives (ETEA) if for all x, y ∈ A, and all RN ∈ W (A)N
with xIiy for all i ∈ N , then [x ∈ ε(ω,RN) implies y ∈ ε(ω,RN)].
We note that a dictatorial Rechtsstaat satisfiesETEA, but it violates no veto power
condition.5 Another example of Rechtsstaat which satisfies ETEA but violates no
veto power condition is the weakly Pareto optimal and individually rational Rechtsstaat
ωIR−WPO = (β, γIR−WPO) with respect to some a0 ∈ A, where for any b ∈ (A\{a0}),
γIR−WPO(b, a0) = P0(N), γIR−WPO(a0, b) = {{N}}, and for any b, c ∈ (A \ {a0})
with b 6= c, γIR−WPO(b, c) = {{N}}. Thus, for any RN ∈ W (A)N we have ∅ 6=
ε(ωIR−WPO, RN) = {b ∈ A | bRia0 for all i ∈ N} ∩ SPO(RN), and ωIR−WPO
satisfies ETEA6 but it violates no veto power condition.
We now state a lemma which will be useful while determining essential sets of a
subset of alternatives for an SCR that is implementable via a Rechtsstaat, and we will
provide its proof in the Appendix.
Lemma 10 Let F be an SCR which is implementable via Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ). For
any i ∈ N , any B ∈ P0(A) and any x ∈ B,
(i) if B 6= A and {i} /∈ γ(x, y) for all y ∈ (A \B), then x ∈ Ess(F, i, B),
(ii) if B 6= A and {i} ∈ γ(x, y) for some y ∈ (A \B), then x /∈ Ess(F, i, B),
(iii) if B = A, then Ess(F, i, B) = A.
An SCR which is implementable via a Rechtsstaat violating ETEA may not be
Nash implementable as shown by the following example.
Example 5 Let A = {x, y, z}, N = {1, 2, 3} and ω = (β, γ) where γ is as follows:
γ(y, z) = γ(z, x) = {{3}}, and γ(x, y) = γ(x, z) = γ(y, x) = γ(z, y) = {{N}}.
5We say that a Rechtsstaat ω satisfies no veto power condition if for allRN ∈W (A)N and all x ∈ A
such that there is i ∈ N , for all j ∈ (N \ {i}), L(x,Rj) = A, then x ∈ ε(ω,RN ).
6So, when #N ≥ 3, an SCR which is implementable via ωIR−WPO is Nash implementable by
Theorem 1.
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Note that ω satisfies the intersection property since for every pair a, b ∈ A and any
coalition H ∈ γ(a, b) we have 3 ∈ H . Hence, ω ∈ Ω∗ by Proposition 8. However, ω
violates ETEA.7 Consider the profile RN :
R1 R2 R3
x, y, z x, y, z z
x, y
Now, x ∈ ε(ω,RN) and xIiy for all i ∈ N . However y /∈ ε(ω,RN), since
β(y, z;RN) ∩ γ(y, z) = {3}.
We define an SCR F ω as follows: F ω(RN) = ε(ω,RN) for all RN ∈ W (A)N .
We will now show that F ω is not essentially monotonic, hence it is not Nash imple-
mentable. Consider following profiles R´N and R̂N :
R´1 R´2 R´3 R̂1 R̂2 R̂3
y y x y y x
x, z x, z y x, z x, z z
z y
We have y ∈ F ω(R´N). Now, Ess(F ω, 1, L(y, R´1)) = Ess(F ω, 2, L(y, R´2)) =
A by Lemma 10-(iii) since L(y, R´1) = L(y, R´2) = A. By Lemma 10-(ii),
z /∈ Ess(F ω, 3, L(y, R´3)) since x /∈ L(y, R´3) and γ(z, x) = {{3}}. So,
Ess(F ω, 3, L(y, R´3)) = {y}. Note that for all i ∈ N we have Ess(F ω, i, L(y, R´i)) =
L(y, R̂i). However, y /∈ F ω(R̂N) since β(y, z; R̂N)∩ γ(y, z) = {3}. Hence, F ω is not
essentially monotonic.
Proposition 10 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. If F is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA, then for any i ∈ N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and
any x ∈ A with x ∈ F (RN), we have Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) = L(x,Ri).
Proof Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR that is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA. Let RN ∈ W (A)N and x ∈ A be such
that x ∈ F (RN). We will show that Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) = L(x,Ri) for all i ∈ N .
7Hence, a Rechtsstaat ω satisfying the intersection property may violate ETEA.
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It is clear that for all i ∈ N , Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) ⊆ L(x,Ri). So, suppose that there
exist j ∈ N and y ∈ L(x,Rj) such that y /∈ Ess(F, j, L(x,Rj)), i.e., alternative y is
not essential for agent j in L(x,Rj) for F . So, there is no R̂N ∈ W (A)N such that
L(y, R̂j) ⊆ L(x,Rj) and y ∈ F (R̂N), that is
for all R̂N ∈ W (A)N , if L(y, R̂j) ⊆ L(x,Rj) then y /∈ F (R̂N). (3.1)
We now consider the preference profile RN ∈ W (A)N , where for any i ∈ N , Ri is
obtained from Ri by putting y indifferent to x without changing the ordering of other
alternatives, i.e., for all i ∈ N , xI iy, and for any z, z´ ∈ (A \ {y}), zRiz´ if and only if
zRiz´.
Now, for all i ∈ N we have L(x,Ri) ∪ {y} = L(x,Ri). So, for all i ∈ N we
have L(x,Ri) ⊂ L(x,Ri), i.e., RN ∈ MT (RN , x). Therefore, x ∈ F (RN) since
x ∈ F (RN) and F is Maskin monotonic.
Since y ∈ L(x,Rj), we have L(x,Rj) = L(x,Rj). Moreover, since xIjy, we have
L(x,Rj) = L(y,Rj). So, L(y,Rj) = L(x,Rj) = L(x,Rj), i.e., L(y,Rj) = L(x,Rj).
This fact, together with the statement in (3.1), implies that y /∈ F (RN). However, xI iy
for all i ∈ N and x ∈ F (RN) imply that y ∈ F (RN), since ω satisfies ETEA,
which is the desired contradiction. So, there do not exist j ∈ N and y ∈ L(x,Rj)
such that y /∈ Ess(F, j, L(x,Rj)). Therefore, for all i ∈ N we also have L(x,Ri) ⊆
Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)), and hence Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) = L(x,Ri). 
We now show that an SCR which is implementable via some Rechtsstaat satisfying
ETEA is essentially monotonic.8
Theorem 1 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. If F is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA, then F is essentially monotonic (hence
Nash implementable, when #N ≥ 3).
Proof Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR that is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA. We will show that F is essentially mono-
tonic.
8For similar results in matching problems, see Kara and So¨nmez (1996), Kara and So¨nmez (1997)
and So¨nmez (1996).
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Let RN , R˜N ∈ W (A)N and x ∈ A be such that x ∈ F (RN) and
Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) ⊆ L(x, R˜i) for all i ∈ N . We will show that x ∈ F (R˜N).
By Proposition 10, for all i ∈ N we have Ess(F, i, L(x,Ri)) = L(x,Ri). Hence,
L(x,Ri) ⊆ L(x, R˜i) for all i ∈ N . This fact combined with Maskin monotonicity (by
Proposition 9) implies that x ∈ F (R˜N). So, F is essentially monotonic. Hence, when
#N ≥ 3, F is Nash implementable by Yamato (1992)’s result. 
Moore and Repullo (1990) showed that when #N ≥ 3, an SCR F is Nash imple-
mentable if and only if it satisfies Condition µ.
Definition 38 We say that an SCR F : W (A)N → P0(A) satisfies Condition µ if there
is a set B ⊆ A and for all triplets (i, RN , a) ∈ N ×W (A)N ×A such that a ∈ F (RN),
there is a set Ci = Ci(a,RN) such that a ∈ Ci ⊆ L(a,Ri)∩B, and conditions (i), (ii)
and (iii) are satisfied:
(i). Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N , if Ci ⊆ L(a, R̂i) for all i ∈ N , then a ∈ F (R̂N).
(ii). Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N , if there exist i ∈ N and c ∈ A such that c ∈ Ci ⊆
L(c, R̂i), and B ⊆ L(c, R̂j) for all j ∈ (N \ {i}), then c ∈ F (R̂N).
(iii). Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N , if there exists c ∈ A such that c ∈ B ⊆ L(c, R̂i) for all
i ∈ N , then c ∈ F (R̂N).
Next result follows from Theorem 1 and its proof is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. If F is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA, then F satisfies Condition µ (hence, when
#N ≥ 3, F is Nash implementable).
The question of how much ETEA does impose a restriction on a Rechtsstaat is an
interesting one.
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Proposition 11 A Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfies ETEA if and only if γ has follow-
ing property:
For any x ∈ A, any y, z ∈ (A \ {x}), γ(y, x) = γ(z, x). (3.2)
Proof “⇒” Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat which satisfies ETEA. Suppose that
γ violates property (3.2). Then there exist x ∈ A and y, z ∈ (A \ {x}) such that
γ(y, x) 6= γ(z, x). So, we have that γ(y, x) 6= γ(z, x). Then, at least one of the
following cases occur:
Case 1. There exists Ĥ ∈ γ(y, x) such that for all H ∈ P0(Ĥ), H /∈ γ(z, x).
Case 2. There exists H˜ ∈ γ(z, x) such that for all H ∈ P0(H˜), H /∈ γ(y, x).
If case 1 occurs, then we consider following profile R̂N :
R̂Ĥ R̂N\Ĥ
x x, y, z
A \ {x} A \ {x, y, z}
Now, z ∈ ε(ω, R̂N) and yÎiz for all i ∈ N . However y /∈ ε(ω, R̂N) since Ĥ ∈
[β(y, x; R̂N) ∩ γ(y, x)], which is in contradiction with that ω satisfies ETEA.
If case 2 occurs, then we consider following profile R˜N :
R˜H˜ R˜N\H˜
x x, y, z
A \ {x} A \ {x, y, z}
Now, y ∈ ε(ω, R˜N) and yI˜iz for all i ∈ N . However z /∈ ε(ω, R˜N) since H˜ ∈
[β(z, x; R˜N) ∩ γ(z, x)], which contradicts with that ω satisfies ETEA.
“⇐” Let ω = (β, γ) be a Rechtsstaat such that γ satisfies property (3.2). Suppose
that ω violates ETEA. Then, there exist x, y ∈ A and RN ∈ W (A)N with xIiy for
all i ∈ N such that x ∈ ε(ω,RN) but y /∈ ε(ω,RN). Since y /∈ ε(ω,RN), there exist
z ∈ (A \ {x, y}) and H ∈ P0(N) such that H ∈ [β(y, z;RN) ∩ γ(y, z)]. The fact
that H ∈ β(y, z;RN), together with xIiy for all i ∈ N , implies that H ∈ β(x, z;RN).
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Since H ∈ γ(y, z) and γ satisfies property (3.2), we have that H ∈ γ(x, z). Hence,
H ∈ [β(x, z;RN) ∩ γ(x, z)] which is in contradiction with that x ∈ ε(ω,RN). 
We note in here that Rechtsstaats ω˜ and ω̂ given in Example 4 satisfy property (3.2),
so ω˜ and ω̂ satisfy ETEA. However, as shown in Example 4 that ω˜, ω̂ /∈ Ω∗. Hence,
for a Rechtsstaat ω satisfying ETEA we may have ω /∈ Ω∗.
3.5 Oligarchic Rechtsstaats
In this section, we will define oligarchic Rechtsstaats and show that if an SCR is im-
plementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat then it is Nash implementable when there
are at least three agents in the society.
Definition 39 We say that a Rechtsstaat ωK = (β, γK) is oligarchic if there exists
K ∈ P0(N) such that for all pairs x, y ∈ A, γK(x, y) = {{K}}, i.e., γK(x, y) consists
of the coalition K and all of its supersets.
Such a coalition K ∈ P0(N) is called an oligarchy.9 For example, for a dictatorial
Rechtsstaat ωd we have K = {d}. We note that K = {N} is also possible.
It is clear that an oligarchic Rechtsstaat satisfies the intersection property. So, for
any oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK we have ωK ∈ Ω∗ by Proposition 8. It is also clear
that for an oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK = (β, γK), γK satisfies property (3.2). So, an
oligarchic Rechtsstaat satisfies ETEA.10 Hence, when #N ≥ 3, if an SCR F is
implementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK then F is Nash implementable by
Theorem 1.
Definition 40 We say that an SCR F : W (A)N → P0(A) satisfies neutrality if for any
permutation τ : A → A and any RN ∈ W (A)N , we have F
(
(RN)
τ
)
= τ
(
F (RN)
)
,
where for each i ∈ N and x, y ∈ A, τ(x)Rτi τ(y)⇔ xRiy.
9Note that Rechtsstaats ω˜ and ω̂ given in Example 4 are not oligarchic.
10Note that an oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK = (β, γK) satisfies following stronger version of ETEA:
for all x, y ∈ A, all RN ∈W (A)N with xIky for all k ∈ K, if x ∈ ε(ωK , RN ) then y ∈ ε(ωK , RN ).
65
Moulin (1983) showed that when #N ≥ 3, if an SCR F is Maskin monotonic and
satisfies neutrality then it is Nash implementable. We now show that an SCR which is
implementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat satisfies neutrality.
Proposition 12 Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR. If F is implementable via an
oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK = (β, γK), then F satisfies neutrality.
Proof Let F be implementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK = (β, γK), RN ∈
W (A)N , and x ∈ F (RN). Let τ : A → A be a permutation such that τ(x) = y.
We will show that y ∈ F((RN)τ). Suppose that y /∈ F((RN)τ). Then, there exist
z ∈ (A \ {y}) and H ∈ P0(N) such that H ∈ [β
(
y, z; (RN)
τ
) ∩ γ(y, z)]. Since ωK
is oligarchic with the oligarchy K, we have K ⊆ H . So, for all i ∈ K we have zP τi y.
Note that {i ∈ N | zP τi y} = {i ∈ N | τ−1(z)Pix}. So, for all i ∈ K we have
τ−1(z)Pix, i.e., K ∈ β
(
x, τ−1(z);RN
)
. So, K ∈ [β(x, τ−1(z);RN) ∩ γ(x, τ−1(z))],
which contradicts with that x ∈ F (RN). Hence, τ(x) = y ∈ F
(
(RN)
τ
)
, i.e., F
satisfies neutrality. 
Propositions 9 and 12, together with Moulin (1983)’s result, imply that when
#N ≥ 3, if an SCR F is implementable via an oligarchic Rechtsstaat ωK then F
is Nash implementable.
3.6 Conclusion
We studied Nash implementation of an SCR which is implementable via a Rechtsstaat.
We introduced a condition on a Rechtsstaat which is referred to as the equal treatment
of equivalent alternatives (ETEA), and showed that if an SCR is implementable via
some Rechtsstaat satisfying ETEA then it is essentially monotonic, hence Nash im-
plementable via a mechanism when there are at least three agents in the society. We
defined oligarchic Rechtsstaats and showed that if an SCR is implementable via an
oligarchic Rechtsstaat then it is Nash implementable, and we also showed that such an
SCR also satisfies neutrality.
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CHAPTER 4
A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BORDA RULE
ON THE DOMAIN OF WEAK PREFERENCES
4.1 Introduction
We consider an environment with a non-empty finite set of alternatives and variable
number of finite sets of agents (voters). Each voter is endowed with weak preferences
over the set of alternatives, i.e., indifferences are allowed. The set of all such preference
profiles of a finite society of voters is referred to as the weak domain of preferences. A
social choice rule (SCR) chooses a nonempty subset of the set of alternatives at each
preference profile for a finite set of voters.
Many different social choice rules have been established to determine which alter-
native(s) should be selected when a preference profile of a society is considered. One
rule that has received a great deal of attention in the literature is attributed to Borda,
Borda (1781), which is also our line of interest in this chapter.
Young (1974) provided an axiomatic characterization of the Borda rule. He showed
that when players’ have strict preferences over alternatives, the Borda rule is charac-
terized by neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and Young’s cancellation property.
Hansson and Sahlquist (1976) provided another proof for Young’s characterization of
the Borda rule, again assuming that voters have strict preferences.
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The main purpose of this chapter is to give a characterization of the Borda rule
on the domain of weak preferences. We introduce a new property, referred to as the
degree equality, that an social choice rule (SCR) satisfies degree equality if, for any
two profiles of a finite set of voters, equality between the sums of the degrees of every
alternative under the two profiles implies that the same alternatives get chosen by the
SCR at these two profiles.
We show that the Borda rule is characterized by the conjunction of weak neutrality,
reinforcement, faithfulness and degree equality on the domain of weak preferences
(Theorem 2). Moreover, the Borda rule is the unique scoring rule which satisfies the
degree equality (Proposition 13). We also introduce a new cancellation property and
show that it characterizes the Borda rule among all scoring rules (Proposition 17).
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces basic notions. Our
characterization result and its proof are provided in section 4.3. We introduce a new
cancellation property in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Basic notions
Let A be a non-empty finite set of alternatives with #A = m ≥ 3. The universal set
of voters is denoted by positive integers N, and we let N denote all finite subsets of N
and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∈ N a finite set of voters.
Each voter i ∈ N has a complete, reflexive and transitive preference relation Ri
over A. Let W (A) denote the set of all preference relations over A. An n-tuple,
RN = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ W (A)N denote a preference profile for a finite set of voters N ,
where #N = n.
For any i ∈ N , let Pi denote the strict preference relation associated with Ri and Ii
denote the indifference relation associated with Ri. We let L(A) denote the set of all
strict preference relations over A. An n-tuple, PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ L(A)N denote a
strict preference profile for a finite set of voters N .
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Given any x ∈ A and any R ∈ W (A), we let
• U(x,R) = {y ∈ A | yRx} denote the upper contour set of x at R, and
• SU(x,R) = {y ∈ A | yPx} denote the strict upper contour set of x at R.
For any R ∈ W (A), let top(R) = {x ∈ A | xRy for all y ∈ A} denote the best
alternatives at R.
Definition 41 A social choice rule (SCR) is a map F :
⋃
N∈N W (A)
N → 2A \ {∅},
i.e., for every preference profile RN ∈ W (A)N of a finite set of voters N , an SCR F
assigns a nonempty subset F (RN) of A.
Thus, our social choice rule operates on a fixed set of alternatives and every finite
set of voters.
For any alternative x and any R ∈ W (A), we let d(x,R) ∈ R++ denote the degree
of x at R and is defined as follows:1
d(x,R) =
#SU(x,R) + #U(x,R) + 1
2
.
Let s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm denote a score vector, where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm
and s1 > sm.
Given a score vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm), x ∈ A and R ∈ W (A), we determine
the score of x at R, s(x,R) ∈ R, as follows:
s(x,R) =
{
sd(x,R) if d(x,R) ∈ Z++
(sbd(x,R)c + sbd(x,R)c+1)/2 otherwise
where for any δ ∈ R, bδc denote the maximal integer which is smaller than or equal to
δ.
Given any N ∈ N and any profile RN ∈ W (A)N , the total score of x ∈ A at RN ,
S(x,RN), is defined by S(x,RN) =
∑
i∈N s(x,Ri).
1I am grateful to my friend Serhat Dog˘an for suggesting this definition.
69
A scoring rule selects the alternatives with the maximal total score. Plurality rule
is a scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). Inverse plurality rule is a
scoring rule defined by the scoring vector (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0). Borda rule is a scoring rule
defined by the scoring vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) such that s1− s2 = s2− s3 = . . . =
sm−1 − sm, i.e., sk − sk+1 = sk+1 − sk+2 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 2.
We will now define some axioms.
Definition 42 We say that an SCR F satisfies neutrality (N) if for any finite set of
voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any permutation τ : A → A, we have F((RN)τ) =
τ
(
F (RN)
)
, where for each i ∈ N and x, y ∈ A, τ(x)Rτi τ(y)⇔ xRiy.
Definition 43 We say that an SCR F satisfies weak neutrality (WN) if for any finite
set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N , any x ∈ F (RN) and any permutation τ : A→ A
such that τ(x) = x, we have x ∈ F((RN)τ).
Definition 44 We say that an SCR F satisfies anonymity (A) if for any finite set
of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any permutation σ : N → N , we have
F
(
(Rσ(i))i∈N
)
= F
(
(Ri)i∈N
)
.
Definition 45 We say that an anonymous SCR F satisfies continuity (CO) if for any
finite sets of voters N and H , any RN ∈ W (A)N with #F (RN) = 1 and any RH ∈
W (A)H , there exists an integer k (k is sufficiently large) such that F (RkN + RH) =
F (RN), where RkN denote the k copies of RN .
Definition 46 We say that an SCR F satisfies reinforcement (RE) if for any finite sets
of voters N and H with N ∩ H = ∅, any RN ∈ W (A)N and any RH ∈ W (A)H ,
F (RN) ∩ F (RH) 6= ∅ implies that F (RN + RH) = F (RN) ∩ F (RH), where (RN +
RH) ∈ W (A)N∪H .
Definition 47 We say that an SCR F satisfies Young’s cancellation (Y-Ca) property
if for any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N such that for all pairs x and y,
#{i ∈ N | xPiy} = #{i ∈ N | yPix}, then we have F (RN) = A.
Definition 48 We say that an SCR F satisfies faithfulness (F) if whenever N = {i},
then for any Ri ∈ W (A), F (Ri) chooses agent i’s most preferred alternative(s), i.e.,
F (Ri) = top(Ri).
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We now give Young’s characterizations of scoring rules and the Borda rule.
• Theorem (Young (1975)). An SCR F : ⋃N∈N L(A)N → 2A \ {∅} is a scoring
rule if and only if it satisfies anonymity (A), neutrality (N), reinforcement (RE)
and continuity (CO), where agents have strict preference relations.
• Theorem (Young (1974), Hansson and Sahlquist (1976)). An SCR F :⋃
N∈N L(A)
N → 2A \ {∅} is the Borda rule if and only if it satisfies neutral-
ity (N), reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and Young’s cancellation (Y-Ca)
property, where agents have strict preference relations.
For any finite set of voterN , anyRN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A, we letD(x,RN) =∑
Ri∈RN d(x,Ri) denote the total degree of x at R
N .
We now define our degree equality axiom.
Definition 49 We say that an SCR F satisfies degree equality (DE) if, for any finite
sets of voters N and N´ with #N = #N´ and any RN , R´N´ ∈ W (A)N , D(x,RN) =
D(x, R´N´) for all x ∈ A implies F (RN) = F (R´N´).
An social choice rule (SCR) satisfies degree equality if, for any profiles of two
finite sets of voters with equal cardinality, equality between the total degree of every
alternative under these two profiles implies that the same alternatives get chosen by the
SCR at these two profiles.
Lemma 11 If an SCR satisfies degree equality (DE) then it satisfies anonymity (A).
Proof Let F be an SCR satisfying degree equality (DE). We will show that F satisfies
anonymity (A). Let RN ∈ W (A)N be a profile for a finite set of voters N and σ :
N → N be a permutation of N . Let Rσ(N) = (Rσ(i))i∈N ∈ W (A)N denote the
profile that is obtained from RN by the permutation σ. Now, for any x ∈ A and any
i ∈ N we have d(x,Ri) = d(x,Rσ(i)) because Ri = Rσ(i) for any i ∈ N . So, we
have D(x,RN) = D
(
x,Rσ(N)
)
for all x ∈ A. Since F satisfies degree equality (DE),
F
(
Rσ(N)
)
= F (RN), i.e., F satisfies anonymity (A). 
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We note that an SCR satisfying degree equality (DE) may violate Young’s can-
cellation property (Y-Ca). For instance, let F̂ denote the constant social choice rule
which is defined as follows: For any finite set of voters N and any RN ∈ W (A)N ,
F̂ (RN) = {a}, where a ∈ A. It is clear that F̂ satisfies degree equality (DE), but it
violates Young’s cancellation property (Y-Ca).2 Similarly, an SCR satisfying Young’s
cancellation property (Y-Ca) may violate degree equality (DE), such an SCR is pro-
vided in the Appendix.
We now show that degree equality (DE) characterizes the Borda rule among all
scoring rules.
Proposition 13 A scoring rule satisfies degree equality (DE) if and only if it is the
Borda rule.
Proof It is clear that the Borda rule satisfies degree equality (DE). For the other part
of the proof, let F be a scoring rule which satisfies degree equality (DE). Suppose that
F is not the Borda rule.
Let A = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2, 3}. We consider following profiles R˜N and R´N :
R˜1 R˜2 R˜3 R´1 R´2 R´3
a b, c a, b a, b, c a, b, c a, b
b, c a c c
Note that for all x ∈ A we have D(x, R˜N) = D(x, R´N). So, F (R˜N) = F (R´N)
since F satisfies degree equality (DE).
Let s = (s1, s2, s3), where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 and s1 > s3. Since it is supposed that F
is not the Borda rule, we have, s1 − s2 6= s2 − s3. Let t12 = s1 − s2 and t23 = s2 − s3.
So, s1 = s3 + t12 + t23 and s2 = s3 + t23.
2The constant social choice rule also satisfies reinforcement (RE) and weak neutrality (WN), and
violates faithfulness (F) and neutrality (N).
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We calculate the total score of every alternative at R˜N and R´N :
S(a, R˜N) = s1 + s3 +
s1+s2
2
= 3s3 +
3
2
t12 + 2t23,
S(b, R˜N) = s2+s3
2
+ 2( s1+s2
2
) = 3s3 + t12 +
5
2
t23,
S(c, R˜N) = s2+s3
2
+ s1+s2
2
+ s3 = 3s3 +
1
2
t12 +
3
2
t23,
S(a, R´N) = 2( s1+s2+s3
3
) + s1+s2
2
= 3s3 + t12 +
7
3
t23,
S(b, R´N) = 2( s1+s2+s3
3
) + s1+s2
2
= 3s3 + t12 +
7
3
t23,
S(c, R´N) = 2( s1+s2+s3
3
) + s3 = 3s3 +
2
3
t12 +
4
3
t23.
Note that S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N). This fact, together with s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 and
s1 > s3, implies that S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) > S(c, R´N). Then, F being a scoring rule
yields that F (R´N) = {a, b}. Hence, F (R˜N) = {a, b}. Since F is a scoring rule and
F (R˜N) = {a, b}, we have S(a, R˜N) = S(b, R˜N) which in turn yields that t12 = t23, a
contradiction. Hence, F is the Borda rule. 
4.3 Main theorem and its proof
We now state our main result which is a characterization of the Borda rule on the
domain of weak preferences, and provide its proof.
Theorem 2 An SCR F :
⋃
N∈N W (A)
N → 2A \ {∅} satisfies weak neutrality (WN),
reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE) if and only if it is the
Borda rule.
It is clear that the Borda rule satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). For the other part, let F be an SCR satisfying
the given axioms. We will show that F is the Borda rule. First, we will show that such
an SCR completely depends on the Borda scores. Second, we will show that the SCR
depends on the Borda scores in the right way, i.e., it chooses the alternatives with the
highest Borda score. Hence, our proof is similar to the one given in Hansson and
Sahlquist (1976).
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We take the Borda score sB = (m−1,m−3, . . . ,−(m−3),−(m−1)) as in Young
(1974) and Hansson and Sahlquist (1976),3 i.e., sBk − sBk+1 = 2 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
and
∑m
k=1 s
B
k = 0.
4
Notice that when the Borda score vector is sB, then for any R ∈ W (A) we have∑
x∈A s(x,R) = 0. So, for any finite set of voters N and any R
N ∈ W (A)N we have∑
x∈A S(x,R
N) = 0. It is straightforward to check that for any finite set of voters N
with #N = n, any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A, we have,5
S(x,RN) = 0 if and only if D(x,RN) = [(m+ 1)n]/2, (4.1)
S(x,RN) > 0 if and only if D(x,RN) < [(m+ 1)n]/2, (4.2)
S(x,RN) < 0 if and only if D(x,RN) > [(m+ 1)n]/2. (4.3)
We will prove that our SCR completely depends on the Borda scores without using
weak neutrality (WN).
For any x ∈ A, let Ψx denote the set of all permutations τ : A → A such that
τ(x) = x, i.e., x is kept fixed.
For any finite set of voters N and any RN ∈ W (A)N , we let R̂N ∈ W (A)N denote
the preference profile obtained from RN by reversing each voter’s preferences.
3So, if m is even then sB = (m − 1, . . . , 3, 1,−1,−3, . . . ,−(m − 1)), and if m is odd then sB =
(m− 1, . . . , 2, 0,−2, . . . ,−(m− 1)).
4Note that any positive affine transformation of sB is also a Borda score vector.
5For any R ∈W (A) and any x ∈ A,
• if m is even, then we have
– s(x,R) > 0 if and only if d(x,R) ≤ m2 ,
– s(x,R) = 0 if and only if d(x,R) = [m2 + (
m
2 + 1)]/2 =
m+1
2 ,
– s(x,R) < 0 if and only if d(x,R) ≥ m2 + 1,
• if m is odd, then we have
– s(x,R) > 0 if and only if d(x,R) < m+12 ,
– s(x,R) = 0 if and only if d(x,R) = m+12 ,
– s(x,R) < 0 if and only if d(x,R) > m+12 .
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Lemma 12 Let F be an SCR which satisfies faithfulness (F), reinforcement (RE) and
degree equality (DE). For any finite set of votersN , anyRN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A,
(i) F (RN + R̂N) = A, and
(ii) F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N + R̂N)τ
)
= A.
Proof It is given in the Appendix. 
Lemma 13 Let F be an SCR which satisfies faithfulness (F), reinforcement (RE)
and degree equality (DE). For any finite set of voters N and any RN ∈ W (A)N , if
D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
for all x ∈ A, then F (RN) = A.
Proof Let F be an SCR which satisfies faithfulness (F), reinforcement (RE) and degree
equality (DE). LetRN ∈ W (A)N be such that for any x ∈ A,D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
. We
will show that F (RN) = A. Consider 2(m−1)! copies of RN ,6 denoted by R2N(m−1)!.
Note that by reinforcement (RE) we have F (RN) = F (R2N(m−1)!).
For any R ∈ W (A) and any x ∈ A, we have d(x,R) + d(x, R̂) = m + 1.
So, for any x ∈ A and any RN ∈ W (A)N we have D(x,RN) + D(x, R̂N) =
(m + 1)n. For any x ∈ A, we now consider the profile ∑τ∈Ψx(RN + R̂N)τ =∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ +
∑
τ∈Ψx(R̂
N)τ = Rx + R̂x. For every a ∈ A, we have D(a,Rx + R̂x)
= D(a,R2N(m−1)!) =(m− 1)!(m+ 1)n. Then degree equality (DE) implies that
F (Rx + R̂x) = F (R2N(m−1)!). By Lemma 12-(ii), we have F (Rx + R̂x) = A.
So, F (R2N(m−1)!) = A = F (RN). 
We now show that our SCR completely depends on the Borda scores.
6We note that each copy is taken on a different voter set.
75
Lemma 14 Let F be an SCR satisfying reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and
degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite sets of voters N and H , any RN ∈ W (A)N
and any RH ∈ W (A)H , if for all x ∈ A, S(x,RN) = S(x,RH), then we have
F (RN) = F (RH).
Proof LetN andH be finite voter sets with #N = n and #H = h, andRN ∈ W (A)N
and RH ∈ W (A)H be such that for all x ∈ A, S(x,RN) = S(x,RH). We will show
that F (RN) = F (RH).
We know that for any x ∈ A, S(x,RN + R̂N) = S(x,RN) + S(x, R̂N) = 0.
Since for all x ∈ A, S(x,RN) = S(x,RH), we have S(x,RH) + S(x, R̂N) = 0
for all x ∈ A. So, S(x,RH + R̂N) = 0 for all x ∈ A. Then, by (4.1), we have
D(x,RH + R̂N) = [(m+ 1)(n+ h)]/2 for all x ∈ A, where there are n+ h voters at
the profileRH+R̂N . This fact together with Lemma 13 implies that F (R̂N+RH) = A.
Now we have that
F (RN) = F (RN) ∩ A,
= F (RN) ∩ F (R̂N +RH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
,
= F (RN + R̂N +RH),
= F (RN + R̂N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
∩F (RH),
= A ∩ F (RH),
= F (RH),
where F (RN + R̂N) = A by Lemma 12-(i). Hence, F (RN) = F (RH). 
Hence, an SCR satisfying reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality
(DE) completely depends on the Borda scores.
It is left to prove that an SCR satisfying weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE) depends on the Borda scores in the right way.
We will first prove some lemmata without using the weak neutrality axiom.
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Lemma 15 Let F be an SCR satisfying faithfulness (F), reinforcement (RE) and
degree equality (DE). For any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any
x ∈ A, followings are true:
(i) If D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, then F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
= A.
(ii) If D(x,RN) < (m+1)n
2
, then F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
= {x}.
(iii) If D(x,RN) > (m+1)n
2
, then F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
) ⊆ A \ {x}.
Proof It is given in the Appendix. 
For any x, y ∈ A with x 6= y, let Ψxy denote the set of all permutations τ : A→ A
such that τ(x) = x and τ(y) = y, i.e., x and y are kept fixed.
Lemma 16 Let F be an SCR which satisfies reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and
degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any
x, y ∈ A, if D(x,RN) = D(y,RN) < (m+1)n
2
, then F
(∑
τ∈Ψxy(R
N)τ
)
= {x, y}.
Proof It is given in the Appendix. 
Lemma 17 Let F be an SCR which satisfies reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and
degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and
any x, y ∈ A, if D(x,RN) < D(y,RN) < (m+1)n
2
, then y /∈ F(∑τ∈Ψxy(RN)τ) and
x ∈ F(∑τ∈Ψxy(RN)τ).
Proof It is given in the Appendix. 
We will now have some results by using weak neutrality (WN).
Proposition 14 Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement
(RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters N ,
any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A, if D(x,RN) > (m+1)n
2
then x /∈ F (RN).
Proof Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters. Let RN ∈
W (A)N and x ∈ A be such that D(x,RN) > (m+1)n
2
. Suppose that x ∈ F (RN).
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Since D(x,RN) > (m+1)n
2
, we have x /∈ F(∑τ∈Ψx(RN)τ) by Lemma 15-(iii).
However, x ∈ F((RN)τ) for each τ ∈ Ψx by weak neutrality (WN). Then, x ∈
F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
by reinforcement (RE), a contradiction. Hence, x /∈ F (RN). 
Lemma 18 Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement
(RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters
N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A, if x ∈ F (RN) and F (RN) 6= A then
D(x,RN) < (m+1)n
2
and hence F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
= {x}.
Proof Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters. Let
RN ∈ W (A)N and x ∈ A be such that x ∈ F (RN) and F (RN) 6= A. Suppose
that D(x,RN) ≥ (m+1)n
2
. Then Proposition 14 implies that D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
.
We now consider the profile
∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ = Rx. Since D(x,RN) = (m+1)n2 ,
we have F (Rx) = A by Lemma 15-(i). The profile Rx can be written as a sum of
the profiles Rx \ RN and RN ,7 i.e., Rx =
(Rx \ RN) + RN . Since F (Rx) = A
and F (RN) 6= A, F(Rx \ RN) ∩ F (RN) = ∅. Then, x ∈ F (RN) yields that x /∈
F
(Rx \ RN). However, x ∈ F((RN)τ) for any τ ∈ Ψx by weak neutrality (WN),
and then reinforcement (RE) implies that x ∈ F(Rx \ RN), a contradiction. Hence,
D(x,RN) < (m+1)n
2
. Then, F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
= {x} by Lemma 15-(ii). 
Lemma 19 Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement
(RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters N ,
any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x ∈ A, if x ∈ F (RN) and D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, then for
all y ∈ A we have D(y,RN) = (m+1)n
2
and hence F (RN) = A.
Proof Let N be a finite set of voters. Let RN ∈ W (A)N and x ∈ A be such that
x ∈ F (RN) and D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
. Suppose that D(y,RN) 6= (m+1)n
2
for some
y ∈ (A \ {x}). Then, there exists at least an alternative z ∈ (A \ {x}) such that
D(z,RN) > (m+1)n
2
. Proposition 14 implies that z /∈ F (RN), so F (RN) 6= A. Now,
since x ∈ F (RN) and F (RN) 6= A, we have, F(∑τ∈Ψx(RN)τ) = {x} by Lemma 18.
7That is, Rx \ RN =
∑
τ∈(Ψx\{τ¯})(R
N )τ and RN = (RN )τ¯ , where τ¯ ∈ Ψx is the identity
permutation over alternatives.
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However, the fact that D(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, together with Lemma 15-(i), implies that
F
(∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ
)
= A, a contradiction. So, for all y ∈ A we have D(y,RN) =
(m+1)n
2
. Hence, F (RN) = A by Lemma 13. 
For any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N , we let
M(RN) = {x ∈ A | D(x,RN) ≤ D(y,RN) for all y ∈ A}.
Proposition 15 Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement
(RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of voters N ,
any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x, y ∈ A, if D(y,RN) > D(x,RN) then y /∈ F (RN).
Proof Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters. Let RN ∈
W (A)N and x, y ∈ A be such that D(y,RN) > D(x,RN). Suppose that y ∈ F (RN).
Then, we have D(y,RN) ≤ (m+1)n
2
by Proposition 14. We will consider two cases.
Case 1. D(y,RN) = (m+1)n
2
.
Since y ∈ F (RN) and D(y,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, for all z ∈ A we have D(z, RN) =
(m+1)n
2
by Lemma 19. However, since (m+1)n
2
= D(y,RN) > D(x,RN), we have
D(x,RN) < (m+1)n
2
, a contradiction. Hence, y /∈ F (RN).
Case 2. D(y,RN) < (m+1)n
2
.
We consider the profile
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R
N)τ = Rxy. Weak neutrality (WN) and re-
inforcement (RE) imply that y ∈ F (Rxy). However, Lemma 17 implies that y /∈
F (Rxy), a contradiction. Hence, y /∈ F (RN). 
Proposition 15 implies that for an SCR F satisfying weak neutrality (WN), rein-
forcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE), we have F (RN) ⊆M(RN)
for any finite set of voters N and any RN ∈ W (A)N .
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Proposition 16 Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement
(RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Now, for any finite set of votersN , any
RN ∈ W (A)N and any x, y ∈ A, if x ∈M(RN) and y ∈ F (RN) then x ∈ F (RN).
Proof Let F be an SCR which satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE),
faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters. Let RN ∈
W (A)N and x, y ∈ A be such that x ∈ M(RN) and y ∈ F (RN). Since y ∈ F (RN),
we have y ∈M(RN) by Proposition 15. Hence, D(y,RN) = D(x,RN). Note that, by
Proposition 14, we have D(y,RN) ≤ (m+1)n
2
since y ∈ F (RN). We will consider two
cases.
Case 1. D(y,RN) = (m+1)n
2
.
Since y ∈ F (RN) and D(y,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, we have F (RN) = A by Lemma 19.
Hence, x ∈ F (RN).
Case 2. D(y,RN) < (m+1)n
2
.
We consider the profile
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R
N)τ = Rxy. Since D(y,RN) = D(x,RN) <
(m+1)n
2
, we have F (Rxy) = {x, y} by Lemma 16. Since y ∈ F (RN), y ∈ F
(
(RN)τ
)
for all τ ∈ Ψxy by weak neutrality (WN). Hence,
⋂
τ∈Ψxy(R
N)τ 6= ∅. This fact,
together with F (Rxy) = {x, y}, implies that x ∈ F
(
(RN)τ
)
for each τ ∈ Ψxy. Hence,
x ∈ F (RN). 
Proposition 16 implies that for any finite set of votersN and anyRN ∈ W (A)N , we
have M(RN) ⊆ F (RN). Propositions 15 and 16 imply that for an SCR F satisfying
weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE), faithfulness (F) and degree equality (DE),
we have F (RN) = M(RN) for any finite set of voters N and any RN ∈ W (A)N .
For any finite voter sets N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any x, y ∈ A, S(x,RN) >
S(y,RN) if and only if D(x,RN) < D(y,RN), and S(x,RN) = S(y,RN) if and only
if D(x,RN) = D(y,RN). So, M(RN) = {x ∈ A | D(x,RN) ≤ D(y,RN) for all
y ∈ A} = {x ∈ A | S(x,RN) ≥ S(y,RN) for all y ∈ A}. By Propositions 15 and 16
we have F (RN) = M(RN) showing that our SCR depends on the Borda scores in the
right way, completing the proof of Theorem 2.
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In order to show that the axioms used in Theorem 2 are independent, we need to
provide four SCRs at each of which it violates the given axiom but satisfies the other
three axioms. However, we could not provide an SCR which violates weak neutrality
and satisfies the other axioms.
(1) Degree equality (DE)
The plurality rule satisfies weak neutrality (WN), faithfulness (F) and reinforcement
(RE). However, plurality rule does not satisfy degree equality (DE) by Proposition 13.
(2) Faithfulness (F)
For any finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N , we define F¯ (RN) = A, i.e., F¯
always chooses the set of all alternatives. It is clear that F¯ violates faithfulness (F),
and satisfies weak neutrality (WN), reinforcement (RE) and degree equality (DE).
(3) Reinforcement (RE)
We define F´ as follows:
For #N = 1, F´ (R) = top(R) for any R ∈ W (A),
for #N ≥ 2, F´ (RN) = A for any RN ∈ W (A)N .
It is clear that F´ satisfies faithfulness (F), weak neutrality (WN), and degree equality
(DE). However, F´ violates reinforcement (RE).
4.4 The cancellation property
In this section, we will introduce a new cancellation property and show that the Borda
rule is the unique scoring rule which satisfies this property.
For any positive integer h, 1 ≤ h ≤ m, let rh(Ri) denote the hth level best alterna-
tives at Ri.8
8For any Ri, any 1 ≤ h ≤ m and any alternative x ∈ rh(Ri), an alternative way to determine the
score of x at Ri is as follows:
s(x,Ri) =
s#SU(x,Ri)+1 + . . .+ s#SU(x,Ri)+#rh(Ri)
#rh(Ri)
=
∑k=#SU(x,Ri)+#rh(Ri)
k=#SU(x,Ri)+1
sk
#rh(Ri)
.
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Let RN ∈ W (A)N be a profile such that there exist i, j ∈ N and α, β ∈
{1, . . . ,m− 1} such that rα(Ri) = rβ+1(Rj) and rα+1(Ri) = rβ(Rj), i.e.,
RN :
R1 . . . Ri . . . Rj . . . Rn
r1 r1(R1) . . . r1(Ri) . . . r1(Rj) . . . r1(Rn)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
rα rα(R1) . . . rα(Ri) = rβ+1(Rj) . . . rα(Rj) . . . rα(Rn)
rα+1 rα+1(R1) . . . rα+1(Ri) = rβ(Rj) . . . rα+1(Rj) . . . rα+1(Rn)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
rβ rβ(R1) . . . rβ(Ri) . . . rβ(Rj) = rα+1(Ri) . . . rβ(Rn)
rβ+1 rβ+1(R1) . . . rβ+1(Ri) . . . rβ+1(Rj) = rα(Ri) . . . rβ+1(Rn)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Now, we derive R´N from RN as follows:
• for all voters l ∈ (N \ {i, j}), R´l = Rl,
• for voter i, rα(R´i) = rα(Ri) ∪ rα+1(Ri),
for all h < α, rh(R´i) = rh(Ri),
for all h > α + 1, rh(R´i) = rh+1(Ri),
• for voter j, rβ(R´j) = rβ(Rj) ∪ rβ+1(Rj),
for all h < β, rh(R´j) = rh(Rj),
for all h > β + 1, rh(R´j) = rh+1(Rj),
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i.e., R´N :
∀l ∈ (N \ {i, j}) : R´l = Rl R´i R´j
r1 r1(R´l) = r1(Rl) r1(R´i) = r1(Ri) r1(R´j) = r1(Rj)
...
...
...
...
rα−1 rα−1(R´l) = rα−1(Rl) rα−1(R´i) = rα−1(Ri) rα−1(R´j) = rα−1(Rj)
rα rα(R´l) = rα(Rl) rα(R´i) = rα(Ri) ∪ rα+1(Ri) rα(R´j) = rα(Rj)
rα+1 rα+1(R´l) = rα+1(Rl) rα+1(R´i) = rα+2(Ri) rα+1(R´j) = rα+1(Rj)
...
...
...
...
rβ−1 rβ−1(R´l) = rβ−1(Rl) rβ−1(R´i) = rβ(Ri) rβ−1(R´j) = rβ−1(Rj)
rβ rβ(R´l) = rβ(Rl) rβ(R´i) = rβ+1(Ri) rβ(R´j) = rβ(Rj) ∪ rβ+1(Rj)
rβ+1 rβ+1(R´l) = rβ+1(Rl) rβ+1(R´i) = rβ+2(Ri) rβ+1(R´j) = rβ+2(Rj)
...
...
...
...
Given any profile RN ∈ W (A)N , let R´(RN) denote the set of all profiles which
are derived from RN for any i, j ∈ N and any α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1} as defined above.
Definition 50 We say that an SCR F satisfies the cancellation property (CA) if for any
finite set of voters N , any RN ∈ W (A)N and any R´N ∈ R´(RN), we have F (RN) =
F (R´N).
Proposition 17 A scoring rule satisfies the cancellation property (CA) if and only if it
is the Borda rule.
Proof It is clear that the Borda rule satisfies the cancellation property (CA). For the
other part of the proof, let F be a scoring rule which satisfies the cancellation property
(CA). Suppose that F is not the Borda rule.
Let A = {a, b, c} and N = {1, 2, 3}. We consider following profile RN :
R1 R2 R3
a c a, b
b b c
c a
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We now consider R´N ∈ R´(RN) for voters 1 and 2, and α = 1, β = 2, i.e., R´N is
as follows:
R´1 R´2 R´3 = R3
a, b c a, b
c a, b c
Since F is a scoring rule satisfying cancellation property (CA), we have F (RN) =
F (R´N). Let s = (s1, s2, s3), where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 and s1 > s3. Since we supposed that
F is not the Borda rule, we have s1−s2 6= s2−s3. Let t12 = s1−s2 and t23 = s2−s3.
So, s1 = s3 + t12 + t23 and s2 = s3 + t23.
We calculate the total score of every alternative at RN and R´N :
S(a,RN) = s1 + s3 +
s1+s2
2
= 3s3 +
3
2
t12 + 2t23,
S(b, RN) = 2s2 +
s1+s2
2
= 3s3 +
1
2
t12 + 3t23,
S(c, RN) = s1 + 2s3 = 3s3 + t12 + t23,
S(a, R´N) = 2( s1+s2
2
) + s2+s3
2
= 3s3 + t12 +
5
2
t23,
S(b, R´N) = 2( s1+s2
2
) + s1+s3
2
= 3s3 + t12 +
5
2
t23,
S(c, R´N) = 2s3 + s1 = 3s3 + t12 + t23.
Note that S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N). We will now show that S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) >
S(c, R´N). Since F is a scoring rule, we do not have t12 = t23 = 0. If t12 = 0 and
t23 > 0, then we have S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) > S(c, R´N). If t12 > 0 and t23 = 0, then
we have S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) = S(c, R´N) which implies that F (R´N) = {a, b, c}.
Hence, we have F (RN) = {a, b, c}. Therefore, S(a,RN) = S(b, RN) = S(c, RN) im-
plying that t12 = t23 = 0, a contradiction. Hence, S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) > S(c, R´N).
The fact that S(a, R´N) = S(b, R´N) > S(c, R´N), together with F being a scoring
rule, implies that F (R´N) = {a, b}. So, F (RN) = {a, b}. Hence, we have S(a,RN) =
S(b, RN) which implies that t12 = t23, a contradiction. Hence, F is the Borda rule. 
Propositions 13 and 17 imply that when we restrict ourselves to scoring rules
degree equality (DE) is equivalent to cancellation property (CA). However, in general,
degree equality (DE) is stronger than cancellation property (CA).
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Lemma 20 (i) If an SCR satisfies degree equality (DE) then it also satisfies the can-
cellation property (CA).
(ii) There exists an SCR which satisfies the cancellation property (CA) but violates
degree equality (DE).
Proof It is given in the Appendix. 
4.5 Conclusion
We studied a characterization of the Borda rule on the domain of weak preferences. We
introduced a new property which is referred to as degree equality, and showed that the
Borda rule is characterized by weak neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and degree
equality on the domain of weak preferences. We also showed that the Borda rule is the
unique scoring rule which satisfies degree equality. We introduced a new cancellation
property and shown that it characterizes the Borda rule among all scoring rules.
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CHAPTER 5
GRADUATE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM WITH
QUOTA AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
5.1 Introduction
A typical two-sided matching market consists of two disjoint finite sets, for example a
set of men and a set of women; colleges and students; firms and workers. A matching
is called a one-to-one matching if a member of one set is allowed to match with at
most one member of other set, for example a man (woman) can match with only one
woman (man). However, a firm hires many workers, but a worker works for one firm
only. This type of matching is called a many to one matching.
There is a rich literature on matching theory (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990b)
for an excellent survey for a period covering all classical results in the field and Roth
(2008) for a recent survey) including both theoretical and empirical studies. Even
though there is an extensive literature on matching theory, there were no study con-
sidering both quota and budget constraints simultaneously until Karakaya and Koray
(2003). There were studies where colleges (or firms) have either quota constraint or
budget constraint but not both. Karakaya and Koray (2003) studied the graduate ad-
missions problem under quota and budget constraints. There is a set of departments
belonging to one university and a set of students (applicants) who wish to enter these
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departments. Each department faces both quota and budget constraints which are de-
termined by the university.
Gale and Shapley (1962) described a model for college admissions problem.1 A
college admission problem consists of a finite set of students and a finite set of col-
leges where each college faces a quota constraint. Each student has a linear preference
relation over colleges and each college has a linear preference relation over sets of
students. A student matches with a college or with herself (i.e., stays unmatched) and
a college matches with a group of students whose size does not exceed its quota. A
matching is blocked by a student if and only if she prefers to match with herself to
getting matched with the college that she is assigned under that matching. A matching
is blocked by a college if and only if it prefers a proper subset of the group of students
that it matched under the given matching. A matching is blocked by a student-college
pair if and only if the student prefers that college to her match and the college prefers
the union of a subset of its match with the student to its present match. A matching is
stable if and only if it is not blocked by a student, by a college and by a student-college
pair. From each given set of students a college selects its most preferred such set of
students obeying the quota constraint. This most preferred set of students is referred as
the choice of that college from among the group of students it faces. A stable matching
is students-optimal if and only if each student likes this matching at least as well as
any other stable matching. A stable matching is colleges-optimal if and only if each
college likes this matching at least as well as any other stable matching.
The following algorithm is referred as the Gale-Shapley student optimal algorithm:
Step 1: Each student proposes to her most preferred college. Each college rejects all
but those who comprise its choice among its proposers.
In general, at step k,
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next pre-
ferred college. Each college rejects all but those who comprise its choice within the
students it has been holding together with its new proposers.
The algorithm stops if there is no student such that her proposal is rejected. Then each
student is matched with a college that she proposed at the last step and was not rejected
1See Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005a), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005b), Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(2002), Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Roth (1985), Roth (1986) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990a).
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by that college. The Gale-Shapley college optimal algorithm is similarly defined with
colleges proposing to group of students by obeying their quota constraints.
A college has substitutable preferences if it regards students as substitutes rather
than as complements, i.e., the college prefers to enroll a student who is in its choice
set even if some of the other students in its choice set become unavailable. When col-
leges have substitutable preferences the set of stable matchings is non-empty. That is
the Gale-Shapley student optimal algorithm produces a stable students-optimal match-
ing (similarly the Gale-Shapley college optimal algorithm produces a stable colleges-
optimal matching).2
Kelso and Crawford (1982) considered a model for labor markets as a many to one
matching market.3 There are a finite set of workers and a finite set of firms. Firms do
not face quota or budget constraints. It is assumed that all workers are gross substitutes
from the viewpoint of each firm. This assumption is referred as the gross substitutes
condition which states that “all workers be (weak) gross substitutes to each firm, in
the sense that increases in other workers’ salaries can never cause a firm to withdraw
an offer from a worker whose salary has not risen.” Thus the production technology
is such that workers are not complements. Kelso and Crawford (1982) showed the
existence of a core stable matching by an extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
That is, there is a matching such that there is no subgroup consisting of firms and
workers which blocks that matching. They also showed that there is a firms-optimal
core stable matching, i.e., there is a core stable matching that each firm likes at least as
well as any other core stable matching.4
Mongell and Roth (1986) considered the model of Kelso and Crawford together
with budget constraints for firms. They showed by an example that the set of core
stable matchings may be empty. They also gave an example to show that if the set of
core stable matchings is non-empty, it is possible that there be no firms-optimal core
2The Gale-Shapley algorithm has been used since 1951 in the United States to match medical resi-
dents to hospitals. See Crawford (2008), Roth (1984a), Roth (2002), Roth and Peranson (1999) for this
matching program.
3See also Crawford and Knoer (1981).
4Roth (1984b) considered the same labor market model as many to many matchings and showed that,
under the assumption that both firms and workers preferences satisfy the gross substitutes condition, the
set of core stable matchings is non-empty and there exist firms-optimal and workers-optimal core stable
matchings.
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stable matching.
Karakaya and Koray (2003) considered the graduate admissions problem as a two
sided many to one matching market. There are a set of students and a set of departments
which belong to one university. Each department faces quota and budget constraints
which are determined centrally by the university. Students apply to these departments
for their graduate studies and each student has a value added to each department. If
a student matches with a department she may be paid by the department or she may
pay to the department. If a student pays for her graduate study, that payment is not
added to the department’s budget for graduate admissions. That payment goes to the
university which gives some percentage of that payment to the department for its office
expenditures. Departments use their budgets for the payments to graduate students, and
if a department has some of its budget left after these payments, the remaining part is
used for office expenditures by the department. Each department gets a benefit from its
accepted students and its office expenditures. The total benefit of a department from its
accepted students is the sum of each accepted student’s value added to the department.
Each department wants to maximize its total benefit which is sum of the benefits from
accepted students and from office expenditures. It is assumed that, for any department,
the largest benefit from office expenditures is less than any qualified student’s benefit
to the department no matter how large the office expenditures are. Therefore, each
department wants to maximize its total benefit by accepting more qualified students
at a minimum cost. Each student wants to make graduate study at her most preferred
department.
This model differs from the previous models in the sense that departments face both
quota and budget constraints. Karakaya and Koray (2003) constructed the departments
proposing algorithm which is an extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and showed
that, if the algorithm stops then the resulting matching is core stable (and thus Pareto
optimal). They showed that the algorithm may not stop while there is a core stable
matching. They proved that the departments proposing algorithm stops if and only if
no cycle occurs in the algorithm, i.e., a finite sequence of matchings does not repeat
itself infinitely many times in the algorithm. The existence of either a departments-
optimal or a students-optimal matching is not guaranteed in the graduate admissions
problem with both quota and budget constraints.
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In this chapter, we will continue to study graduate admissions problem with quota
and budget constraints. Here we construct the students proposing algorithm, and show
that the students proposing algorithm ends up with a core stable matching if the al-
gorithm stops. However, there exist graduate admissions problems for which there
exist core stable matchings, while neither the departments proposing nor the students
proposing algorithm stops. We showed that the students proposing algorithm stops if
and only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm. Moreover, we show that there is no ran-
dom path to core stability for the graduate admissions problem, i.e., starting from an
arbitrary matching and satisfying a randomly chosen blocking coalition at each step,
a core stable matching can not be reached. We will also consider the model with the
assumption that the students care only about their reservation prices and do not derive
any further utility from money transfers over and above their reservation prices.
This chapter is organized as follows: We present the model and definitions in sec-
tion 5.2. Section 5.3 defines the algorithms and related results. Section 5.4 shows the
nonexistence of random paths to core stability in our model. Section 5.5 studies the
model where the students consider only their reservation prices. Section 5.6 concludes
the chapter.
5.2 Basic notions
We denote the finite non-empty set of departments of our university by D =
{d1, d2, . . . , dm}. A finite nonempty set of students denoted by S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, is
regarded as comprising the applicants to this university for graduate programs offered
by its departments.
Each department d ∈ D has a quota qd and a budget bd for its graduate program;
both of which are determined centrally by the university. A student can enroll to at
most one department, and each department accepts a group of students obeying its
quota and budget constraints.
We assume that each student s ∈ S has a qualification level for each department
d ∈ D. The qualification level of student s for department d is an integer and denoted
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by asd. The qualification levels of student s for the departments are denoted by a vector
asD = (a
s
d1
, asd2 , . . . , a
s
dm
). Also we assume that each department has a minimal quali-
fication level as a threshold for accepting students. The minimal qualification level of
department d is a positive integer and denoted by ad.
Each student yields a benefit (or adds a value) to each department if accepted to
that department. These values are independent of who the other accepted students are,
i.e., there are no externalities in this regard. The benefit of department d obtained
from accepting a group of students Sd ⊆ S is denoted by yd(Sd). We assume that
department d’s benefit yd(Sd) is additive, i.e., it is the sum of the accepted students’
benefits to the department. We assume that the benefit student s provides to department
d is equal to her qualification level for department d, i.e., yd({s}) = asd. Therefore the
total benefit of department d from accepting a group of students Sd ⊆ S is yd(Sd) =∑
s∈Sd a
s
d.
If a student gets enrolled to a department for graduate study, she may be paid by
the department or she may pay to the department. The amount of payment made by
department d to student s is an integer msd. In other words, student s is paid by
department d the amount msd if msd > 0; there is no payment if msd = 0; student s
pays to department d the amount msd if msd < 0. If an accepted student pays for her
graduate study at department d, this payment is not added to department d’s budget.
That payment is taken by the university and the university gives some fixed percentage
of this payment to department d, solely to be used, say, for its office expenditures.
We assume that each student s has a reservation price for each department d (the
lowest amount of money that student s will accept from department d) which will
be denoted by an integer σsd. We assume that for all s ∈ S and for all d ∈ D,
σsd ≤ bd. Student s’s reservation prices for departments will be denoted by a vector
σs = (σsd1 , . . . , σsdm). Note that a reservation price may also be negative, representing
the level of willingness on the part of the student to pay to the department in question
to get accepted.
If department d has some remaining budget after payments, the remaining money
is only used for office expenditures by the department. Let B be the total budget of
the university, and let student s be the least qualified student for department d among
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all students who are qualified for department d, i.e., asd ≥ ad and for all h ∈ (S \ {s})
with ahd ≥ ad, we have asd ≤ ahd . Let dB be the benefit of department d if it uses the
university’s entire budget B for its office expenditures. We assume that yd({s}) > d
B
.
Therefore, the benefit which is gained by spending B for the office expenditures is
less than any qualified student’s benefit to department d. This means that one can take
ad = 1 and 0 < d
B
< 1 for each d ∈ D.
The total benefit of department d is denoted by Y d and it is the sum of benefits from
accepted students and office expenditures. Therefore when Sd ⊆ S is the accepted
group of students by department d and d is the benefit that department d gets from
office expenditures, we have that Y d(Sd, d) = yd(Sd) + d.
Definition 51 A graduate admission problem is a list (D,S, q, b, aS , σ) where
1. D is a finite nonempty set of departments,
2. S is a finite nonempty set of students,
3. q = (qd)d∈D is the departments’ quotas with qd ∈ N for each d ∈ D,
4. b = (bd)d∈D is the departments’ budgets with bd ∈ N0 for each d ∈ D,5
5. aS = (asD)s∈S is the students’ qualification levels for departments with a
s
d ∈ Z
for each s ∈ S, d ∈ D,
6. σ = (σs)s∈S is the students’ reservation prices for departments with σsd ∈ Z and
σsd ≤ bd for each s ∈ S, d ∈ D.
Now, we will define the preferences of departments and students.
Let 2S × R|S| = {S × R|S| | S ∈ 2S} denote the set of all pairs where a pair
consists of a group of students S = {s1, . . . , sh} ∈ 2S and an associated transfer
vector mSd = {ms1d, . . . ,mshd} ∈ R|S| of students S for department d ∈ D.
The strict preference relation of department d is denoted by Pd. For any d ∈ D, Pd
is a linear order 6 on 2S × R|S|.
5N0 = N ∪ {0}.
6A linear order on a set X is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric (binary) relation.
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Consider two group of students T = {s1, . . . , sh} and T̂ = {ŝ1, . . . , ŝk} with
associated transfer vectors mTd = {ms1d, . . . ,mshd} and mT̂d = {mŝ1d, . . . ,mŝkd} for
department d, respectively, where | T |= h and | T̂ |= k. Let cTd denote the cost of
group of students T to department d when the associated transfer vector is mTd , i.e.,
cTd =
∑
s∈T msd with T = {s ∈ T | msd > 0}, and cT̂d the cost of group of students
T̂ to department d when the associated transfer vector is mT̂d , i.e., c
T̂
d =
∑
ŝ∈T̂ mŝd
with T̂ = {ŝ ∈ T̂ | mŝd > 0}. Let Td denote the benefit of office expenditures that
department d obtains by accepting the group of students T with transfers mTd at cost
cTd , and 
T̂
d the benefit of office expenditures that department d obtains by accepting the
group of students T̂ with transfers mT̂d at cost c
T̂
d .
Now we can define Pd formally as follows: For any (T,mTd ), (T̂ ,m
T̂
d ) ∈ 2S ×R|S|
with T 6= T̂ , we have [(T,mTd )Pd(T̂ ,mT̂d )] if and only if
• [Y d(T, Td ) > Y d(T̂ , T̂d )], or
• [Y d(T, Td ) = Y d(T̂ , T̂d ) and cTd < cT̂d ], or
• [Y d(T, Td ) = Y d(T̂ , T̂d ), cTd = cT̂d and T leximin preferred7 to T̂ ].
That is, department d strictly prefers T (with mTd ) to T̂ (with m
T̂
d ) if Y
d(T, Td ) >
Y d(T̂ , T̂d ). If Y
d(T, Td ) = Y
d(T̂ , T̂d ) then department d considers the associated costs
of T and T̂ . That is, whenever Y d(T, Td ) = Y
d(T̂ , T̂d ), department d strictly prefers T
(with mTd ) to T̂ (with m
T̂
d ) if c
T
d < c
T̂
d . If Y
d(T, Td ) = Y
d(T̂ , T̂d ) and c
T
d = c
T̂
d , then
department d strictly prefers T (with mTd ) to T̂ (with m
T̂
d ) if T leximin preferred to T̂ .
Let Rd denote a preference relation of department d induced from Pd, and defined
as follows: For any (T,mTd ), (T̂ ,m
T̂
d ) ∈ 2S × R|S|,
• [(T,mTd )Rd(T̂ ,mT̂d )] if and only if [not (T̂ ,mT̂d )Pd(T,mTd )].
7If Y d(T, Td ) = Y
d(T̂ , T̂d ), and c
T
d = c
T̂
d , then department d makes a lexicographic comparison
among T and T̂ in the following way: Remember that | T |= h and | T̂ |= k. Let f : {1, . . . , h} →
{i | si ∈ T} be a function such that f(1) < f(2) < . . . < f(h). Let g : {1, . . . , k} → {j | ŝj ∈ T̂}
be a function such that g(1) < g(2) < . . . < g(k). We say that department d leximin prefers T to
T̂ if and only if f(1) < g(1) or there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n˜} where n˜ < min{h, k} such that for all
t ∈ {1, . . . , n˜}, f(t) = g(t) but f(t+ 1) < g(t+ 1).
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We note that for any (T,mTd ), (T̂ ,m
T̂
d ) ∈ 2S × R|S| with T 6= T̂ , we have either
[(T,mTd )Pd(T̂ ,m
T̂
d )] or [(T̂ ,m
T̂
d )Pd(T,m
T
d )].
The strict preference relation of student s is denoted by Ps. For all s ∈ S , Ps is a
linear order on (D × R)⋃{(∅, 0)}.
We assume that, given any s ∈ S , σsd = σsd˜ if and only if d = d˜. We also assume
that (d, σsd)Ps(∅, 0) for all s ∈ S and all d ∈ D, where (∅, 0) stands for the situation
that student s is unmatched (or she is matched with herself).8
For all s ∈ S, Ps is defined as follows:
For any (d,msd), (d˜,msd˜) ∈ (D × R)
⋃{(∅, 0)},
[(d,msd)Ps(d˜,msd˜)] if and only if
• [msd − σsd > msd˜ − σsd˜], or
• [msd − σsd = msd˜ − σsd˜ and σsd < σsd˜].
Let Rs denote a preference relation of student s induced from Ps and defined as
follows: For any (d,msd), (d˜,msd˜) ∈ (D × R)
⋃{(∅, 0)},
• [(d,msd)Rs(d˜,msd˜)] if and only if [not (d˜,msd˜)Ps(d,msd)].
Note that for any (d,msd), (d˜,msd˜) ∈ [(D × R)
⋃{(∅, 0)}] with d 6= d˜, we have
either [(d,msd)Ps(d˜,msd˜)] or [(d˜,msd˜)Ps(d,msd)]. And being unmatched is not the
worst situation for a student s ∈ S, because for any student s ∈ S, any department
d ∈ D and any transfer msd < σsd we have [(∅, 0)Ps(d,msd)] .
8We assume that for all s ∈ S, σs∅ = 0.
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Now we will define what we mean by a matching.
Definition 52 By a matching we mean a function µ : S −→ (D × R)⋃{(∅, 0)}
which matches each student s with a member µ1(s) of D
⋃{∅} and also specifies the
amount of transfer µ2(s) made from µ1(s) to s such that the following are satisfied:
1. (Quota constraint) For all d ∈ D, | Sdµ |≤ qd, where Sdµ = {s ∈ S | µ1(s) = d},
2. (Budget constraint) For all d ∈ D, cdµ ≤ bd, where cdµ =
∑
s∈Sdµm
µ
sd with
mµsd = µ2(s) for µ1(s) = d and S
d
µ={s ∈ Sdµ | mµsd > 0}.
Student s is matched with a department if µ1(s) ∈ D, she is unmatched if µ1(s) = ∅
under µ. Let µ(s) = (µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
) denote the department that student s is matched
and the associated transfer under µ.
Let Y dµ denote the total benefit of department d under µ. Let y
d
µ denote the benefit of
department d that it obtains by accepting the group of students Sdµ and 
d
µ the benefit of
department d that it gets from office expenditures under µ. When Sdµ = {s1, . . . , sh},
we let mdµ = (m
µ
s1d
, . . . ,mµshd) denote the associated transfer vector.
Department d’s preference relation Rd induces a preference relation R
µ
d over
matchings in a natural fashion as follows: For any matchings µ and µ˜,
• µRµd µ˜ if and only if (Sdµ,mdµ)Rd(Sdµ˜,mdµ˜).
We abuse notation and we use Rd for R
µ
d .
Students s’s preference relation Rs similarly induces a preference relation Rµs over
matchings as follows: For any matchings µ and µ˜,
• µRµs µ˜ if and only if (µ1(s),mµsµ1(s))Rs(µ˜1(s),m
µ˜
sµ˜1(s)
).
We abuse notation and we use Rs for Rµs .
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To present a matching µ, we will use a matrix consisting of three rows and n
columns, where n =| S |. The first row lists the set of students respecting their original
labelling; the second row specifies the departments the students are assigned to and the
third row consists of the associated money transfers. That is,
µ =

s1 s2 . . . sn
µ1(s1) µ1(s2) . . . µ1(sn)
mµs1µ1(s1) m
µ
s2µ1(s2)
. . . mµsnµ1(sn)
 .
Now, we define what we mean for a matching to be individually rational.
Definition 53 A matching µ is individually rational if and only if it satisfies the fol-
lowing properties
1. For all s ∈ S, (µ1(s),mµsµ1(s))Rs(∅, 0), that is mµsµ1(s) ≥ σsµ1(s), and
2. For all d ∈ D, for all S $ Sdµ, (Sdµ,mdµ)Rd(S,mSd ), i.e., Y dµ (Sdµ, dµ) ≥ Y d(S, ),
where mSd denote the transfer vector for S with m
µ
sd for each s ∈ S and  denote
the benefit that department d gets from office expenditures by accepting set of
students S with mSd .
We say that a matching µ is not individually rational for student s, or student s
blocks µ, if
(∅, 0)Ps(µ1(s),mµsµ1(s)). So, student s blocks µ if the associated transfer
mµsµ1(s) between student s and department µ1(s) is smaller than her reservation price
for department µ1(s), i.e., m
µ
sµ1(s)
< σsµ1(s). Hence, we say that µ is individually
rational for student s if mµsµ1(s) ≥ σsµ1(s).
We say that a matching µ is not individually rational for department d, or depart-
ment d blocks µ, if (S,mSd )Pd(S
d
µ,m
d
µ) for any S $ Sdµ. We note that for each stu-
dent s ∈ S with whom department d does not break its tie, the amount of transfer
mµsd between student s and department d which is determined by matching µ does
not change. So, department d blocks µ if for any set of students S $ Sdµ we have
Y dµ (S
d
µ, 
d
µ) < Y
d(S, ). Hence, we say that µ is individually rational for department d
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if Y dµ (S
d
µ, 
d
µ) ≥ Y d(S, ) for any S $ Sdµ.9
We say that a matching µ is individually rational if and only if it is individually
rational for all students and all departments.
Definition 54 We say that a matching µ is blocked by a student - department pair
(s, d) ∈ S × D with µ1(s) 6= d if and only if there exists a transfer m˜sd such that
1.
(
d, m˜sd
)
Ps
(
µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
)
, and
2. [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ {s}, m̂d]Pd[Sdµ,mdµ], for some T ⊆ Sdµ,
where m̂d denote the transfer vector for the set of students [(Sdµ \ T )∪ {s}] with
mµhd for each student h ∈ (Sdµ \ T ) and m˜sd for student s, such that the group
of students [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ {s}] with transfers m̂d satisfies the quota and budget
constraints of department d, i.e., | (Sdµ \ T ) ∪ {s} |≤ qd and ĉd ≤ bd, where
ĉd =

(∑
h∈(Sdµ\T ) m
µ
hd
)
+ m˜sd if m˜sd > 0∑
h∈(Sdµ\T ) m
µ
hd otherwise.
A pair (s, d) that satisfies above two conditions is called a blocking pair for matching
µ.
Thus, a matching µ is blocked by a pair (s, d) where student s and department
d is not matched under µ, if there exists a transfer m˜sd between s and d such that
student s strictly prefers d with transfer m˜sd to her match µ(s) =
(
µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
)
,
and department d strictly prefers the set of students [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ {s}] with m̂d to Sdµ
with mdµ such that the group of students [(S
d
µ \ T ) ∪ {s}] with transfers m̂d satisfies
its quota and budget constraints. Note that department d may break its ties with a set
of students T ⊆ Sdµ in order to form a blocking pair with student s. For each student
h ∈ (Sdµ \ T ) with whom department d does not break its tie while forming a blocking
pair with student s, the amount of transfer mµhd between student h and department d
which is determined by matching µ does not change.
9So, a matching µ is not individually rational for department d if there exists a student s ∈ Sdµ such
that [asd < 0] or [a
s
d = 0 and m
µ
sd > 0].
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Definition 55 A matching µ is pairwise stable if and only if it is individually rational
and there does not exist a pair (s, d) ∈ S × D which blocks it.
Now we will define group blocking of a matching µ.
Definition 56 We say that a matching µ is blocked by a group (D˜, S˜) with ∅ 6= D˜ ⊆
D and ∅ 6= S˜ ⊆ S if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. For all s ∈ Ŝd ⊆ S˜, (d, m˜sd)Ps(µ1(s),mµsµ1(s)),
where d ∈ D˜, Ŝd ⊆ S˜ denote the group of students who matched with depart-
ment d ∈ D˜ by group blocking of µ with for all s ∈ Ŝd, µ1(s) 6= d, such that⋃
d∈D˜ Ŝ
d = S˜, and m˜sd denote the transfer between department d ∈ D˜ and a
student s ∈ Ŝd ⊆ S˜,
2. For all d ∈ D˜, [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ Ŝd, m̂d]Pd[Sdµ,mdµ], for some T ⊆ Sdµ,
where m̂d denote the transfer vector for the set of students [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ Ŝd] with
mµhd for each student h ∈ (Sdµ \ T ) and m˜sd for each student s ∈ Ŝd, such that
the group of students [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ Ŝd] with transfers m̂d satisfies the quota and
budget constraints of department d, i.e., | (Sdµ \T )∪ Ŝd |≤ qd and ĉd ≤ bd, where
ĉd =
∑
h∈(Sdµ\T ) m
µ
hd +
∑
s∈Ŝ
d m˜sd with Ŝ
d
= {s ∈ Ŝd | m˜sd > 0}.
Definition 57 We say that a matching µ is core stable if and only if µ is individually
rational and there does not exist a group (D˜, S˜) which blocks µ.
Since a student can match with at most one department, whenever a matching µ is
blocked by a group (D˜, S˜), we can consider the group (D˜, S˜) as a collection of groups,
where each group consists of a department d ∈ D˜ and a set of students Ŝd ⊆ S˜ who
matched with department d ∈ D˜ by group blocking of µ such that ⋃d∈D˜ Ŝd = S˜. So,
if the group (D˜, S˜) blocks a matching µ then each group (d, Ŝd) also blocks µ. That
is, as shown in Karakaya and Koray (2003), an essential coalition for group blocking
of a matching consists of a department and a group of students.
• Proposition (Karakaya and Koray (2003)). A matching µ is core stable if and
only if µ is individually rational and there does not exist a group (consisting of a
department d and a group of students S˜ ⊆ S) (d, S˜) which blocks µ.
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We say that a core stable matching is departments-optimal if every department
likes it at least as well as any other core stable matching, and a core stable matching
is students-optimal if every student likes it at least as well as any other core stable
matching.
Karakaya and Koray (2003) showed that there exists neither a departments-optimal
nor a students-optimal matching for the graduate admissions problem with quota and
budget constraints.
Definition 58 We say that a matching µ is Pareto dominated by another matching µ˜ if
and only if
1. for all i ∈ (S ∪ D), µ˜Riµ, and
2. for some i ∈ (S ∪ D), µ˜Piµ.
Definition 59 A matching µ is Pareto optimal if and only if there does not exist
another matching which Pareto dominates µ.
Relations between core stability, pairwise stability and Pareto optimality
It is clear that if a matching is core stable then it is both pairwise stable and Pareto
optimal. However, a matching which is both pairwise stable and Pareto optimal may
not be core stable. We note that a pairwise stable matching need not be Pareto optimal,
and a Pareto optimal matching need not be pairwise stable.
5.3 Graduate admission algorithms
Karakaya and Koray (2003) constructed the departments proposing graduate admis-
sion algorithm (DPGAA), and showed that when the algorithm DPGAA stops then
the resulting matching is core stable. They proved that the departments proposing al-
gorithm stops for a given problem if and only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm, i.e.,
a finite sequence of matchings does not repeat itself infinitely many times in the algo-
rithm. They also showed that the algorithm DPGAA may not stop while there exists
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a core stable matching.
In this section we will define the students proposing algorithm, to which we will
refer to as the students proposing graduate admission algorithm (SPGAA). We note
that the departments proposing and the students proposing algorithms are extensions
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the graduate admissions problem. Each algorithm is
a centralized algorithm, i.e., the departments’ and students’ preferences are assumed to
be known to a planner (or to a computer program) who matches students with depart-
ments according to the rule of the algorithms. Hence, there is no agent who behaves
strategically to manipulate the algorithm.
We will show that when the algorithm SPGAA stops then the resulting matching
is core stable (Proposition 19). However the departments proposing and the students
proposing algorithms may not stop for some graduate admissions problems. To clarify
this situation, we will give three examples. In Example 6, the algorithmsDPGAA and
SPGAA do not stop and there is no core stable matching. In Example 7, the algorithm
DPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm SPGAA stops (hence there is a core stable
matching). In Example 8, the algorithm SPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm
DPGAA stops (hence there is a core stable matching).
We will show that the students proposing algorithm stops for a given problem if and
only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm (Proposition 21). We will also show that the
algorithms DPGAA and SPGAA are not complementary in the sense that for a given
graduate admission problem if its core is non-empty then at least one of the algorithms
stops, i.e., there exist graduate admissions problems for which there are core stable
matchings, while neither of the two algorithms stops (Example 9).
We will also define another algorithm which is a mix of the algorithms DPGAA
and SPGAA, referred to as the mix algorithm. We show that there exists a graduate
admission problem with non-empty set of core stable matchings, but by using the mix
algorithm we reach a matching which is not core stable (Example 10), and there is a
graduate admission problem such that by using the mix algorithm we reach a problem
at some period which is equal to the one that we have from previous period, but there
is a core stable matching for the given problem. (Example 11).
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5.3.1 The departments proposing graduate admission algorithm
We will now define the departments proposing algorithm following Karakaya and Ko-
ray (2003).
Time is measured discretely in the algorithm. Let msd(t) denote the offer that
department d makes to student s at time t.
According to the scenario behind the algorithm, given a graduate admission prob-
lem and what offers are permitted, at each time t, department d will maximize its
total benefit Y dt = y
d(Sdt ) + 
d
t when it makes a permitted offer to a group of stu-
dents Sdt such that its quota and budget constraints are satisfied, i.e., | (Sdt ) |≤ qd and∑
s∈Sdt msd(t) ≤ bd. Students who have taken offer(s) accept at most one offer and
reject the others. Then, at the end of time t, department d is tentatively matched with
the group of students who accepted its offers.
Now we can give the details of how the algorithm DPGAA works.
t = 1. a) Each department d determines the group of students Sd1 that maximizes
its total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints with msd(1) = σsd for all
s ∈ Sd1 . That is, department d offers to students in Sd1 first their reservation prices.
b) Each students who has taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and
reject the others.
c) Each department d tentatively accepts the group of students who accepted its
offers. Let T d1 denote the group of students who accepted department d’s offers at time
t = 1, T d1 ⊆ Sd1 .10
Now, at the end of time t = 1 we have a matching µ1 with Sdµ1 = T
d
1 for all d ∈ D.
t = 2. a) Again each department d determines the group of students Sd2 that maxi-
mizes its total benefit subject to its constraints where the offers now be of the form:
msd(2) =
{
σsd + 1 if s ∈ (Sd1 \ T d1 )
σsd otherwise.
10Sd1 \ T d1 is now the group of students who took an offer from department d and rejected it at t = 1.
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b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and reject
the others.
c) Department d tentatively accepts the group of students T d2 ⊆ Sd2 who accepted
its offers.
In general, at time k,
t = k. a) Consider a student s to whom department d made offers before period
k the last of which took place in period t˜s < k. In case this offer was rejected by s
because she accepted department d̂’s offer with which she got again matched at the end
of period k − 1, i.e., s ∈ S d̂µk−1 , call such a student a rejector of d prior to k. Let F dk
denote the group of all rejectors of d prior to k.11
Each department d determines the group of students Sdk solving the same kind of
optimization problem as before, where the offers are now of the following form:
msd(k) =

σsd if s /∈
⋃t=k−1
t=1 S
d
t
msd(t˜s) + 1 if s ∈ F dk
msd(t˜s) otherwise
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept at most one offer and reject
the others.
c) Department d tentatively accepts the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk who accepted
its offers.
Stopping Rule
t = t?. The algorithm stops at time t? if each department d makes offers to exactly
the set of students who accepted its offers in the preceding period, i.e., if we have for
all d ∈ D, Sdt? = T dt?−1 then the algorithm stops at time t?.
If the algorithm stops at t? the final matching µt? is regarded as the outcome of the
algorithm.
11Note that at t = 1, we have F d1 = ∅ for all d ∈ D, and at t = 2, we have F d2 = Sd1 \ T d1 for all
d ∈ D.
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Proposition 18 (Karakaya and Koray (2003)). If the algorithm DPGAA stops, then
the final matching of the algorithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
5.3.2 The students proposing graduate admission algorithm
Time is measured discretely in the algorithm. Let msd(t) denote the offer that student
s makes to department d at time t.
First note that the algorithm SPGAA does not permit a student s to make offers to
department d if [asd < 0] or [a
s
d = 0 and σsd > 0].
Second, let us make a distinction between a new offer and a holding offer.
Let student s offered msd(t) to department d at period t and department d accepted
this offer. At the next period t+ 1, if s makes an offer msd(t+ 1) = msd(t) to depart-
ment d, this offer is called a new offer. Let student s offered msd(t) to department d
at period t and department d rejected this offer. At the next period t+ 1, if s makes an
offer msd˜(t + 1) to a department d˜ ∈ (D \ {d}), this offer is called a new offer, and
student s’s offer msd(t) made to department d and got rejected remains valid at this
period t+ 1 as a holding offer m¨sd(t+ 1) = msd(t) to department d.
Let us explain why student s makes a new offer msd˜(t+ 1) to department d˜ but not
to department d at period t + 1. If student s would make a new offer msd(t + 1) to
department d at period t + 1, the algorithm SPGAA may require that msd(t + 1) =
msd(t)−1. However, student smay prefer department d˜ withmsd˜(t+1) to department
d with msd(t+ 1), i.e., [d˜,msd˜(t+ 1)]Ps[d,msd(t+ 1)].
12 So, in such a case, student s
makes a new offer msd˜(t+ 1) to department d˜ but not to department d at period t+ 1.
Hence, student s makes following offers at period t+ 1:
- Student s makes a new offer msd˜(t+ 1) to department d˜ ∈ (D \ {d}), and
- her last new offer msd(t) made to department d and got rejected remains valid as
a holding offer m¨sd(t+ 1) = msd(t) to department d.
12Also note that we have [d, m¨sd(t+ 1)]Ps[d˜,msd˜(t+ 1)] where m¨sd(t+ 1) = msd(t) is a holding
offer to department d at period t+ 1.
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According to the scenario behind our algorithm SPGAA, given what offers are
permitted, at each time t, students s makes at most one new offer to a department
which is best for her given the permitted offers, and her last new offer made to a
different department and got rejected stays valid as a holding offer. Note that a student
s does not make an offer msd(t) to department d at any time t in the algorithm if
msd(t) < σsd. So, the minimal offer if student s makes to department d is equal to
σsd. Note that if student s made offers to all departments her reservation prices and got
rejected, then her last new offer remains valid as a holding offer.
Once students made offers to departments, each department d considers the group
of students Sdt who made offers to department d at period t, and accepts the offers
of the group of students T dt ⊆ Sdt that maximizes its total benefit subject to its quota
and budget constraints. Note that department d does not have any discrimination be-
tween new offers and holding offers. Then, each student swho has taken acceptance(s)
tentatively accepts at most one of them and rejects the others.
Now we can give the details of how the algorithm SPGAA works.
t = 1. a) Each student s makes an offer to her most preferred department d to
which she is permitted to make offers, where msd(1) = bd. That is, student s offers
msd(1) = bd to department d, where (d, bd)Ps(d˜, bd˜) for any d˜ 6= d to which she can
make offers. Note that at t = 1, there is no holding offer and each student s makes a
new offer.
b) Let Sd1 denote the group of students who offered department d at t = 1. Each
department d accepts the offers of the group of students T d1 ⊆ Sd1 that maximizes its
total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints.
As we have msd(1) = bd if s offers to d at t = 1, department d accepts the offer of
student s ∈ Sd1 with (s, bd)Pd(ŝ, bd) for any ŝ ∈ (Sd1 \ {s}).
c) Student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of them
and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of time t = 1 we have a matching µ1 with Sdµ1 ⊆ T d1 . We have
Sdµ1 = T
d
1 for all d ∈ D at period t = 1, since a student s can get at most one acceptance
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at t = 1.
t = 2. a) Each student s makes at most one new offer where the new offers be of
the form:
msd(2) =
{
bd − 1 if s ∈ (Sd1 \ T d1 )
bd otherwise
Note that if student s offered to department d and was rejected at period t = 1,
and now (at t = 2) if she offers to another department d˜, her offer msd(1) made to d
and got rejected remains valid at period t = 2 as a holding offer m¨sd(2) = msd(1) to
department d.
b) Each department d considers the group of students Sd2 who made new and hold-
ing offers to department d at period 2, and accepts the offers of the group of students
T d2 ⊆ Sd2 that maximizes its total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints.
c) Each student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of
them and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of period t = 2 we have a matching µ2 such that for each depart-
ment d, Sdµ2 ⊆ T d2 .
In general, at time k,
t = k. a) Consider a department d that student s made some offers before period
k, and the last new offer was made at period t˜d by s to d, t˜d < k. In case this offer
was rejected by department d because of the group of students T d
t˜d
and department d
matched with T d
t˜d
at the end of period k − 1, i.e., Sdµk−1 = T dt˜d .
We call such a department d a rejector of student s prior to period k. Let F sk denote
all rejectors of student s prior to period k.13
Each student s makes at most one new offer where the new offers be of the form:
13For all s ∈ S, F s1 = ∅, and F s2 =
{
d if s ∈ (Sd1 \ T d1 )
∅ otherwise.
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msd(k) =

bd if s /∈
⋃t=k−1
t=1 S
d
t
msd(t˜d)− 1 if d ∈ F sk
msd(t˜d) otherwise
Note that the last new offer student s made to some department and got rejected
remains valid as a holding offer if she makes a new offer to another department at this
period k.
b) Each department d accepts the offers of the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk that
maximizes its total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints.
c) Each student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of
them and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of time t = k we have a matching µk with Sdµk ⊆ T dk .
Stopping Rule
t = t?: The algorithm stops at time t? if each student s makes same offer(s) (new
and/or holding) to exactly the same department(s) that she offered in the preceding
period. That is the algorithm stops at t? if for all d ∈ D we have Sdt? = Sdt?−1 with for
any s ∈ Sdt? , msd(t?) = msd(t? − 1) if s made new offers to d at periods t? − 1 and t?,
and m¨sd(t?) = m¨sd(t? − 1) if s made holding offers to d at periods t? − 1 and t?.
If the algorithm stops at t? the final matching µt? is regarded as the outcome of the
algorithm.
Proposition 19 If the algorithm SPGAA stops, then the final matching of the algo-
rithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
Proof Assume that the algorithm SPGAA stops. Let the algorithm stop at time t?
with µt? denoting the final matching of the algorithm. So we have that, for all d ∈ D,
Sdt? = S
d
t?−1 such that for any d ∈ D and for any s ∈ Sdt? we havemsd(t?) = msd(t?−1)
if s made new offers to d at periods t?− 1 and t?, and m¨sd(t?) = m¨sd(t?− 1) if s made
holding offers to d at periods t? − 1 and t?. We abuse notation that we use µ? for µt? .
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It is clear that µ? is individually rational. Now suppose that µ? is not core stable.
So, there is a group (d, S˜) which blocks µ?. So we have that
1. for all s ∈ S˜, µ?1(s) 6= d,
2. for all s ∈ S˜, (d, m˜sd)Ps(µ?1(s),mµ
?
sµ?1(s)
),
3. [(Sdµ? \ T ) ∪ S˜, m̂d]Pd[Sdµ? ,mdµ? ] for some T ⊆ Sdµ? .
Note that the algorithm requires that each student s ∈ S˜ make the offers m˜sd to
department d at period t?. Now, there are three possible cases.
Case 1. If there is a student s ∈ S˜ such that s /∈ ⋃t=t?−1t=1 Sdt , then we have
m˜sd = bd.
Case 2. If d ∈ F st? (that is department d is a rejector of student s ∈ S˜ prior to
period t?), and let t˜d denote the period that student s made a new offer to department d
the last time before period t?. Now m˜sd = msd(t˜d) − 1 if s makes a new offer to d at
t? and m˜sd = msd(t˜d) if s makes a holding offer to d at t?.
Case 3. If d /∈ F st? and let s ∈ S˜ made a new offer to d at period t˜d the last time
before t?. Now, m˜sd = msd(t˜d).
Therefore each student s ∈ S˜ would make the offers m˜sd to department d (by 2),
and department d would accept the offers of the group of students (Sdµ? \ T ) ∪ S˜
(by 3), i.e., T dt? = (S
d
µ? \ T ) ∪ S˜, and each student in T dt? would accept department d’s
acceptance. So, the group of students S˜ and department d would match at the end of
period t?, in contradiction with (1). Hence µ? is core stable. 
Proposition 18 (and respectively, Proposition 19) shows that if the algorithm
DPGAA stops (respectively, if the algorithm SPGAA stops) then the resulting match-
ing is core stable. However, Karakaya and Koray (2003) provided a graduate admis-
sion problem for which the algorithm DPGAA does not stop. We will now see that
for the same problem the algorithm SPGAA does not stop. Hence, there is a gradu-
ate admission problem that neither the algorithm DPGAA nor the algorithm SPGAA
107
stops. The following example taken from Karakaya and Koray (2003) demonstrates
this situation.14
Example 6 Neither DPGAA nor SPGAA stops and there is no core stable
matching
Let D = {A,B}, S = {1, 2, 3}, qA = 1, qB = 2, bA = 440, bB = 1075, and the
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.1.
a1A= 7 a
1
B= 11
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 12
σ1A=400 σ1B= 300
σ2A=440 σ2B=1075
σ3A=400 σ3B= 700
Table 5.1: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 6
If we apply either the algorithm DPGAA or the algorithm SPGAA, then follow-
ing finite sequence of matchings (µt¯, µt¯+1, µt¯+2, µt¯+3) repeats itself infinitely many
times in the algorithms (for different periods t¯ for DPGAA and SPGAA):15
µt¯ =

1 2 3
A ∅ B
435 0 741
 , µt¯+1 =

1 2 3
A B ∅
435 1075 0
 ,
µt¯+2 =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 , µt¯+3 =

1 2 3
B ∅ B
334 0 741
 .
Hence neither the algorithm DPGAA nor the algorithm SPGAA stops in this
example. We note that there is no core stable matching in this example, since there
14This example is a modification of the example of Mongell and Roth (1986).
15How the algorithm DPGAA works for this example can be found in Karakaya and Koray (2003),
and how the algorithm SPGAA works for this example is provided in the Appendix.
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exists neither a core stable matching such that student 2 is matched with a department,
nor a core stable matching under which she is unmatched.
In Example 6, both the algorithmsDPGAA and SPGAA do not stop since a finite
sequence of matchings repeats itself infinitely many times in the algorithms, that is a
cycle occurs both in DPGAA and SPGAA.
Definition 60 We say that a cycle occurs in the algorithm if there is a finite sequence
of matchings (µt0 , µt0+1, . . . , µt¯−1) (t0 < t¯) such that, for every t > t0, µt = µt0+r,
where 0 ≤ r < t¯− t0 and t ≡ r (mod t¯− t0).
Proposition 20 (Karakaya and Koray (2003)). The algorithm DPGAA stops if and
only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm.
We have seen it is possible that the algorithm SPGAA does not stop. But is it
also possible that the algorithm SPGAA does not stop while no cycle occurs in the
algorithm?
Proposition 21 The algorithm SPGAA stops if and only if no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
Proof It is obvious that if the algorithm SPGAA stops, then no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
For the other part of the proof, assume that the algorithm SPGAA does not stop.
Let MSPGAA denote the set of all matchings that occur in the algorithm. Since the
set of all individually rational matchings for a given graduate admission problem is
finite and we have an individually rational matching in the end of every period in the
algorithm SPGAA, we haveMSPGAA is finite.
Let OSPGAA denote the set of all pairs (s, d) ∈ S × D such that s makes an offer
to d in the algorithm. In the algorithm, there is a period t such that for any (s, d) ∈ O,
student s proposes its minimal offer to department d at any t < t such that s makes
an offer to d in period t. We let msd denote the minimal offer that student s makes to
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department d in the algorithm. So, for any t > t, we have msd(t) = msd, if s makes an
offer to d at period t.
SinceMSPGAA is finite and the algorithm does not stop, there is a matching µ such
that it occurs infinitely many times in the algorithm. Let tk be a period such that tk > t
and µtk = µ.
Claim 1. It is impossible that for all periods t > tk, µt = µ.
Proof of claim 1. Suppose not, i.e., suppose that for all times t > tk, µt = µ. Since
the algorithm does not stop, at each period t, there is at least one department d such
that Sdt 6= Sdt−1. Moreover, for all times t > tk, we have, for any (s, d) ∈ OSPGAA,
msd(t) = msd if d gets an offer from s at t. However, this fact together with the
finiteness of D and S implies that there is some time t? > tk such that for all d ∈
D, Sdt? = Sdt?−1, in contradiction with that the algorithm does not stop. Hence it is
impossible for all times t > tk to have µt = µ. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 implies that there is a matching µ˜ which is different than µ such that
µtk+1 = µ˜. A claim for µ˜ similar to Claim 1 can be proved, so we can say that it is
impossible for all times t > tk + 1 to have µt = µ˜. So, there is another matching µ̂
which is different than µ˜ such that µtk+2 = µ̂. As matching µ occurs infinitely many
times in the algorithm, at some further time, again we have matching µ. That is, there
is a time tl > tk such that µtl = µ. Hence, we get a finite sequence of matchings
(µ,µ˜,µ̂,. . .,µtl−1). Let C denote this finite sequence of matchings.
Claim 2. µtl+1 = µ˜.
Proof of claim 2. Note that µtk = µ and µtk+1 = µ˜ such that µ˜ is different than
µ. So, there exists at least a department d and a student s such that µ1(s) 6= d but
µ˜1(s) = d. That is, student s makes an offer to department d at period tk + 1 and d
accepts this offer, i.e., s ∈ T d(tk+1), and student s accepts department d’s acceptance,
so that we have µ˜1(s) = d in the end of period tk + 1.
We will show that the algorithm requires that student s makes an offer to depart-
ment d at period tl + 1. We have two cases to consider that either student s makes a
new offer or a holding offer to department d at period tk + 1.
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If student s makes a new offer to department d at period tk + 1, then we have
d /∈ F stk+1. Since µtk = µtl = µ and d /∈ F stk+1, we have d /∈ F stl+1, i.e., the algorithm
requires that student s makes a new offer to department d at period tl + 1. So, student
s makes a new offer to department d at period tl + 1 and d accepts this offer, i.e.,
s ∈ T d(tl + 1), and student s accepts department d’s acceptance.
If student s makes a holding offer to department d at period tk + 1, then we have
d ∈ F stk+1. Since µtk = µtl = µ and d ∈ F stk+1, we have d ∈ F stl+1, i.e., the algorithm
requires that student s makes a holding offer to department d at period tl + 1. So, at
period tl + 1, student s makes a holding offer to department d and d accepts this offer,
i.e., s ∈ T d(tl + 1), and student s accepts department d’s acceptance.
Note that this is true for all pairs (s, d) such that µ1(s) 6= d but µ˜1(s) = d. So, we
have µtl+1 = µtk+1 = µ˜, which completes the proof of Claim 2.
A claim for each matching in C similar to Claim 2 can be proved. Hence, C repeats
itself infinitely many times in the algorithm SPGAA. This completes the proof of
proposition. 
In Example 6, the algorithm DPGAA does not stop and there is no core stable
matching. The following example taken from Karakaya and Koray (2003) shows that
it is possible the algorithm DPGAA does not stop but the algorithm SPGAA stops
and hence there is a core stable matching.
Example 7 The algorithm DPGAA does not stop but the algorithm SPGAA
stops
Let D = {A,B,C,D} be the set of departments, S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} the set of
students, where the quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qA = 1,
qB = 2, qC = 1, qD = 2; bA = 440, bB = 1075, bC = 440, bD = 1075. The
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.2.
It is shown in Karakaya and Koray (2003) that if we apply the algorithm DPGAA,
then a cycle occurs consisting of the following three matchings:
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a1A= 7 a
1
B= 11 a
1
C= 4 a
1
D= 0
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 2
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 12 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 1
a4A= 4 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 7 a
4
D= 11
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 2 a
5
C= 0 a
5
D= 15
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 1 a
6
C= 8 a
6
D= 12
σ1A= 400 σ1B= 300 σ1C=−500 σ1D= 440
σ2A= 440 σ2B= 1075 σ2C= 400 σ2D=−500
σ3A= 400 σ3B= 700 σ3C= 420 σ3D=−500
σ4A=−500 σ4B= 450 σ4C= 400 σ4D= 300
σ5A= 400 σ5B=−500 σ5C= 440 σ5D= 1075
σ6A= 420 σ6B=−500 σ6C= 400 σ6D= 700
Table 5.2: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 7
µt¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C ∅ D
435 0 741 435 0 741
 , µt¯+1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A D ∅ C B ∅
435 −500 0 435 −500 0
 ,
µt¯+2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ D B ∅ B D
0 −500 741 0 −500 741
 .
So, the algorithm DPGAA does not stop for this problem. Although the algorithm
DPGAA does not stop, the algorithm SPGAA stops and the following matching µ̂ is
the outcome of the algorithm SPGAA:
µ̂ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
440 1075 0 440 1075 0
 .
Note that the matching µ̂ is core stable since there is no student who wants
to form a blocking coalition with any department, i.e., for all s ∈ S we have(
µ̂1(s),m
µ̂
sµ̂1(s)
)
Ps(d, bd) for any d ∈ (D \ {µ̂1(s)}). Hence, it is possible that the
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algorithm DPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm SPGAA stops and hence there is
a core stable matching.
The algorithm SPGAA does not stop and there is no core stable matching in Ex-
ample 6. The following example shows it is also possible that the algorithm SPGAA
does not stop but the algorithm DPGAA stops and hence there is a core stable match-
ing.
Example 8 The algorithm SPGAA does not stop but the algorithm DPGAA
stops
Let D = {E,F,G,H} be the set of departments, S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} the set
of students, where the quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qE = 1,
qF = 2, qG = 1, qH = 2; bE = 440, bF = 1075, bG = 440, bH = 1075. The
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.3.
a7E= 7 a
7
F= 6 a
7
G= 10 a
7
H= 0
a8E= 0 a
8
F= 15 a
8
G= 6 a
8
H= 0
a9E= 8 a
9
F= 11 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H= 27
a10E = 10 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G = 7 a
10
H= 6
a11E = 6 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 0 a
11
H= 15
a12E = 0 a
12
F = 27 a
12
G = 8 a
12
H= 11
σ7E=400 σ7F= 300 σ7G=440 σ7H=1075
σ8E=400 σ8F=1000 σ8G=440 σ8H=1075
σ9E=400 σ9F= 700 σ9G=440 σ9H=1075
σ10E=440 σ10F=1075 σ10G=400 σ10H= 300
σ11E=440 σ11F=1075 σ11G=400 σ11H=1000
σ12E=440 σ12F=1075 σ12G=400 σ12H= 700
Table 5.3: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 8
If we apply the algorithm SPGAA, then a cycle occurs consisting of the following
four matchings:
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µk¯ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
E ∅ F G ∅ H
435 0 741 435 0 741
 , µk¯+1 =

7 8 9 10 11 12
E F ∅ G H ∅
435 1001 0 435 1001 0
 ,
µk¯+2 =

7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ F E ∅ H G
0 1001 440 0 1001 440
 , µk¯+3 =

7 8 9 10 11 12
F ∅ F H ∅ H
334 0 741 334 0 741
 .
However, if we apply the algorithm DPGAA it stops at the end of period two and
following matching µ˜ is the outcome of the algorithm DPGAA:
µ˜ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
Note that each department is matched with its best group of students among all
groups satisfying its constraints under matching µ˜, so there is no department which
forms a blocking coalition with any set of students. Hence, µ˜ is core stable.
Hence, it is possible that the algorithm SPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm
DPGAA stops and hence there is a core stable matching. Therefore, we cannot say
that if the algorithm SPGAA does not stop, then the set of core stable matchings is
empty.
We have seen in Example 7 that the algorithm DPGAA does not stop but the
algorithm SPGAA stops (hence there is a core stable matching), and in Example 8
that the algorithm SPGAA does not stop but the algorithm DPGAA stops (hence
there is a core stable matching). Because of these examples we ask following question:
Whether the departments proposing (DPGAA) and the students proposing (SPGAA)
algorithms are complementary in the sense that for a given graduate admission problem
if there is a core stable matching then at least one of the two algorithms stops? The
next example answers this question that it is possible neither the algorithm DPGAA
nor the algorithm SPGAA stops and there is a core stable matching.
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Example 9 Neither DPGAA nor SPGAA stops and there is a core stable
matching
We will construct an example of a graduate admission problem where its set of
core stable matchings is non-empty and neither of the algorithms stops. Our ex-
ample will be a union of previously constructed two examples: Examples 7 and
8. That is, we let D = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H} be the set of departments and
S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} the set of students, where the quotas and bud-
gets of the departments are as follows: qA = 1, qB = 2, qC = 1, qD = 2, qE = 1,
qF = 2, qG = 1, qH = 2; bA = 440, bB = 1075, bC = 440, bD = 1075, bE = 440,
bF = 1075, bG = 440, bH = 1075. The qualification levels and reservation prices of
the students are as given at examples 7 and 8, and we assume that
for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any d ∈ {E,F,G,H}, we have asd < 0, and
for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D}, we have asd < 0.16
So, the qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in
table 5.4.
Now we apply the algorithm DPGAA to this problem:
Note that a department d ∈ {A,B,C,D} does not make any offer to a student
s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} since asd < 0 for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any
d ∈ {A,B,C,D}, and a department d ∈ {E,F,G,H} does not make any offer to
a student s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} since asd < 0 for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any
d ∈ {E,F,G,H}. Therefore, applying the algorithm DPGAA to this problem is
equivalent to applying it to examples 7 and 8 separately. We know that the algorithm
DPGAA does not stop for Example 7 and it stops for Example 8. So, it does not stop
for this problem, i.e., if we apply the algorithm DPGAA to this problem then a cycle
occurs consisting of the following three matchings:
16Note that for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any d ∈ {E,F,G,H} (and for any s ∈
{7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D}), we let σsd be any integer satisfying our model as-
sumptions that for each s ∈ S and each d ∈ D, σsd ≤ bd, and for any s ∈ S , σsd = σsd˜ if and only if
d = d˜.
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a1A= 7 a
1
B= 11 a
1
C= 4 a
1
D= 0
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 2
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 12 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 1
a4A= 4 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 7 a
4
D= 11
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 2 a
5
C= 0 a
5
D= 15
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 1 a
6
C= 8 a
6
D= 12
σ1A= 400 σ1B= 300 σ1C=−500 σ1D= 440
σ2A= 440 σ2B= 1075 σ2C= 400 σ2D=−500
σ3A= 400 σ3B= 700 σ3C= 420 σ3D=−500
σ4A=−500 σ4B= 450 σ4C= 400 σ4D= 300
σ5A= 400 σ5B=−500 σ5C= 440 σ5D= 1075
σ6A= 420 σ6B=−500 σ6C= 400 σ6D= 700
a7E= 7 a
7
F= 6 a
7
G= 10 a
7
H= 0
a8E= 0 a
8
F= 15 a
8
G= 6 a
8
H= 0
a9E= 8 a
9
F= 11 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H= 27
a10E = 10 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G = 7 a
10
H= 6
a11E = 6 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 0 a
11
H= 15
a12E = 0 a
12
F = 27 a
12
G = 8 a
12
H= 11
σ7E= 400 σ7F= 300 σ7G= 440 σ7H= 1075
σ8E= 400 σ8F= 1000 σ8G= 440 σ8H= 1075
σ9E= 400 σ9F= 700 σ9G= 440 σ9H= 1075
σ10E= 440 σ10F= 1075 σ10G= 400 σ10H= 300
σ11E= 440 σ11F= 1075 σ11G= 400 σ11H= 1000
σ12E= 440 σ12F= 1075 σ12G= 400 σ12H= 700
Table 5.4: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 9
µt¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A ∅ B C ∅ D G ∅ H E ∅ F
435 0 741 435 0 741 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 ,
µt¯+1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A D ∅ C B ∅ G ∅ H E ∅ F
435 −500 0 435 −500 0 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 ,
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µt¯+2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ D B ∅ B D G ∅ H E ∅ F
0 −500 741 0 −500 741 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
Hence, the algorithm DPGAA does not stop for this problem.
We now apply the algorithm SPGAA to this problem:
A student s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is not permitted to make an offer to a department d ∈
{E,F,G,H} in the algorithm SPGAA since for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any d ∈
{E,F,G,H}we have asd < 0, and a student s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} is not permitted to
make an offer to a department d ∈ {A,B,C,D} since for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D} we have asd < 0. Hence applying the algorithm SPGAA to
this problem is equivalent to applying it to examples 7 and 8 separately. We know that
the algorithm SPGAA stops for Example 7 and it does not stop for Example 8. So, it
does not stop for this problem, i.e., if we apply the algorithm SPGAA to this problem
then a cycle occurs consisting of the following four matchings:
µk¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E ∅ F G ∅ H
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 435 0 741 435 0 741
 ,
µk¯+1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E F ∅ G H ∅
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 435 1001 0 435 1001 0
 ,
µk¯+2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B ∅ F E ∅ H G
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 0 1001 440 0 1001 440
 ,
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µk¯+3 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B F ∅ F H ∅ H
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 334 0 741 334 0 741
 .
Hence, the algorithm SPGAA does not stop for this problem.
Now, consider the following matching:
µ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
We will show that the matching µ is core stable.17 Suppose that µ is not core stable.
Then there is a group (d˜, S˜) which blocks µ, where d˜ ∈ D and S˜ ⊆ S . Note that each
department d ∈ {E,F,G,H} is matched with its best group of students among all
groups satisfying its constraints under µ. So, there is no department d ∈ {E,F,G,H}
which forms a blocking coalition with any set of students. Hence, d˜ /∈ {E,F,G,H}.
So, d˜ ∈ {A,B,C,D}. There is no department d ∈ {A,B,C,D} which forms a
blocking coalition with any group of students S ⊆ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, since for any
s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D}, we have asd < 0. So, we have
that S˜ ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. However, for each student s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} we have(
µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
)
Ps(d, bd) for any d ∈
({A,B,C,D} \ {µ1(s)}). So, there does not
exist a student s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} which forms a blocking coalition with any d ∈
{A,B,C,D}. Hence, we also have d˜ /∈ {A,B,C,D}, contradiction. So, the matching
µ is core stable.
Hence, the algorithms DPGAA and SPGAA are not complementary in the sense
that given a graduate admission problem if it has a core stable matching then at least
one of the two algorithms stops, i.e., it is possible that neither DPGAA nor SPGAA
stops for a given graduate admission problem while it has a core stable matching.
17Note that µ = µ̂ ∪ µ˜ where µ̂ is the outcome of the algorithm SPGAA when applied to Example
7 and µ˜ is the outcome of the algorithm DPGAA when applied to Example 8.
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Notice that that for any student s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} we have µt¯(s) = µt¯+1(s) =
µt¯+2(s), and for any department d ∈ {E,F,G,H} we have Sdµt¯ = Sdµt¯+1 = Sdµt¯+2 ,
where (µt¯, µt¯+1, µt¯+2) is the set of matchings which repeats infinitely many times if
we apply the algorithm DPGAA to Example 9. That is, we can say that the positions
of the set of students {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and the set of departments {E,F,G,H} are
constant in the cycle that occurs in the algorithm DPGAA. Let S $ S denote the
set of students such that their positions are constant in the cycle and S˜ ⊆ S the set
of students such that their positions are inconstant in the cycle.18 In Example 9, we
have S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and S˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} when we apply the algorithm
DPGAA. Similarly, we let D $ D denote the set of departments such that their
positions are constant in the cycle and D˜ ⊆ D the set of departments such that their
positions are inconstant in the cycle.19 In Example 9, we have D = {E,F,G,H} and
D˜ = {A,B,C,D} when we apply the algorithm DPGAA.
When the algorithm SPGAA is applied to Example 9, we have S =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, S˜ = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, D = {A,B,C,D} and D˜ = {E,F,G,H}.
Hence, given a problem ifDPGAA or SPGAA does not stop then we can partition
the given problem into the constant part (S,D) and the inconstant part (S˜, D˜) by using
the cycle that occurs in the algorithm.
We know that there is a core stable matching for Example 9, however both
DPGAA and SPGAA do not stop. Now observe that we can find the core stable
matching µ by applying an algorithm which is a mix of the algorithms DPGAA and
SPGAA.
First, we apply the algorithm DPGAA to Example 9 which we know that it does
not stop, then we determine the constant part of the cycle that occurs in DPGAA.
18It is possible that S = ∅ and S˜ = S, e.g., Example 6.
19There may exist a department d such that for some non-empty group of students S¯ $ S we have
µt(s¯) = (d,ms¯d(t)) for all s¯ ∈ S¯ and all periods t in the cycle, and for some periods t in the cycle
we also have S¯ $ Sdµt . That is, in all periods of the cycle department d is matched with a group
students such that their positions are constant, and at some periods of the cycle department d is matched
with some students whose positions are inconstant. If such a case occurs, we consider department d as
two departments d¯ and d´ where the quotas and budgets are as follows: For department d¯, qd¯ =| S¯ |,
bd¯ =
∑
s¯∈S¯ms¯d(t) where S¯ = {s¯ ∈ S¯ | ms¯d(t) > 0}, and for department d´, qd´ = qd−qd¯, bd´ = bd−bd¯.
Now, d¯ ∈ D and d´ ∈ D˜.
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The constant part consists of the set students S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and the set of
departments D = {E,F,G,H}, and this constant part has a matching
µ˜ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 0 1075 440 0 1075
. Note that the matching µ˜ is core stable
for the constant part (S¯, D¯), i.e., there is no department d ∈ D¯ and group of students
S ⊆ S¯ such that (d, S) blocks the matching µ˜. Secondly, we determine the inconstant
part of the cycle which occurs in DPGAA. The inconstant part consists of the set
students S˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the set of departments D˜ = {A,B,C,D}. Now, we
apply the algorithm SPGAA to this inconstant part (S˜, D˜). It stops and the resulting
matching is µ̂ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
440 1075 0 440 1075 0
 which is core stable for the
inconstant part (S˜, D˜). Now, the union of the matchings µ˜ and µ̂ gives us the matching
µ which is core stable for Example 9. That is, we found the core stable matching µ by
using an algorithm which is a mix of the algorithms DPGAA and SPGAA.
Similarly, we can reach the core stable matching µ by first applying SPGAA. That
is, we first apply the algorithm SPGAA to Example 9 and determine the constant part
of the cycle which consists of S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and D = {A,B,C,D}.
This constant part has a matching µ̂ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
440 1075 0 440 1075 0
 which
is core stable for (S,D). Secondly, we determine the inconstant part of the cycle
which consists of S˜ = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and D˜ = {E,F,G,H}, and apply the
algorithm DPGAA to this inconstant part. It stops, and the outcome is the matching
µ˜ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 which is core stable for the inconstant part
(S˜, D˜). Now, we have µ = µ̂ ∪ µ˜.
We formally define the mix algorithm at the next section.
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5.3.3 The mix algorithm
We know that for a given graduate admission problem if the algorithm DPGAA does
not stop then a cycle occurs in the algorithm, and a cycle consists of two parts, a con-
stant part (possibly empty) and an inconstant part. So, we construct another algorithm
which is a mix of the algorithms DPGAA and SPGAA, referred to as the mix algo-
rithm by applying DPGAA first, that works as follows: In the first period, we apply
the algorithm DPGAA to the given problem, if it stops then the mix algorithm stops,
and the resulting matching is core stable. If it does not stop, then a cycle occurs in the
algorithm DPGAA. We determine the constant part (with a matching for this part)
and the inconstant part of the cycle that occurs in DPGAA, and move to next period.
Now, in the second period, we apply the algorithm SPGAA to the inconstant part that
comes from the first period. If SPGAA stops for this inconstant part then the mix
algorithm stops, and the resulting matching for the mix algorithm is the union of the
matchings that we have from first period (the matching for the constant part of the cy-
cle which occurs in DPGAA) and second period (the matching we obtain by applying
SPGAA to the inconstant part). If SPGAA does not stop for the inconstant part, then
we determine the constant part (with a matching for this part) and the inconstant part of
the cycle that occurs in SPGAA. If this inconstant part is equal to the one that we have
from first period, then the mix algorithm stops. Otherwise, we move to next period.
In the third period, we apply the algorithm DPGAA to the inconstant part that we
have from second period. That is, in general, we apply the algorithms DPGAA and
SPGAA recursively to the problems that we have from inconstant parts of the cycles.
By this algorithm, we either end up with a matching which is the union of all matchings
that we have from constant parts, or a problem (inconstant part) which is equal to the
one that we have from previous period. Similarly, by applying the algorithm SPGAA
in the first period, we can define the mix algorithm by applying SPGAA first.
Now, we formally define the mix algorithm.
Let θ = (D,S) simply denote a graduate admission problem. Given a graduate
admission problem θ = (D,S), the mix algorithm works as follows:
t = 1. Apply the algorithm DPGAA to the problem θ = (D,S). If it stops, then
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the mix algorithm stops and the resulting matching is core stable. If it does not stop
then we go to next period.
t = 2. From the first period, the original problem θ = (D,S) is partitioned into
two problems which we get from constant and inconstant parts of the cycle that occurs
in DPGAA. Let θ1 = (S,D) denote the problem that we get from constant part and
θ˜1 = (S˜, D˜) from the inconstant part. Let also that µ¯1 denote the matching for the
constant part θ1 = (S,D). Now we apply the algorithm SPGAA to the inconstant
part θ˜1 = (S˜, D˜) that we obtained from the cycle which occurs in DPGAA.
If SPGAA stops for θ˜1 = (S˜, D˜), then the mix algorithm stops. Let µ˜2 denote the
resulting matching of the algorithm SPGAA for the problem θ˜1 = (S˜, D˜). Now we
have a matching µ?2 = µ¯1 ∪ µ˜2 as an outcome of the mix algorithm.
If SPGAA does not stop for θ˜1 = (S˜, D˜), then a cycle occurs in the algorithm and
we determine the constant and inconstant parts of the cycle. Let θ2 denote the constant
part of the cycle with associated matching µ¯2 and θ˜2 the inconstant part. If θ˜2 = θ˜1
then the mix algorithm stops. Otherwise, we go to next period.
t = 3. We apply the algorithm DPGAA to the problem θ˜2 that we get from
previous period. If DPGAA stops for θ˜2, then the mix algorithm stops. Let µ˜3 denote
the resulting matching of the algorithm DPGAA for the problem θ˜2. Now we have a
matching µ?3 = µ¯1 ∪ µ¯2 ∪ µ˜3 as an outcome of the mix algorithm.
IfDPGAA does not stop for θ˜2, then a cycle occurs in the algorithm. Let θ3 denote
the constant part of the cycle that occurs in DPGAA with associated matching µ¯3 and
θ˜3 denote the inconstant part. If θ˜3 = θ˜2 then the mix algorithm stops. Otherwise, we
go to next period.
In general, at period k > 1 we have following:
t = k. If k is odd we apply the algorithm DPGAA to the problem θ˜k−1 that we
get from previous period. If k is even we apply the algorithm SPGAA to the problem
θ˜k−1. If the applied algorithm stops for θ˜k−1, then the mix algorithm stops. Let µ˜k
denote the resulting matching of the applied algorithm for the problem θ˜k−1. Now we
have a matching µ?k = (
⋃t=k−1
t=1 µ¯t) ∪ µ˜k as an outcome of the mix algorithm. If the
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applied algorithm does not stop for θ˜k−1, then we determine the constant part θk (with
associated matching µ¯k) and the inconstant part θ˜k of the cycle. If θ˜k = θ˜k−1 then the
mix algorithm stops. Otherwise, we go to next period.
Note that in the above mix algorithm, we apply the algorithm DPGAA in the first
period, so we call it the mix algorithm applying DPGAA first. Similarly, we can
define the mix algorithm applying SPGAA first by applying the algorithm SPGAA
in the first period.
By using the mix algorithm, at some period t¯, we have, either obtain a matching
µ?t¯ = (
⋃t=t¯−1
t=1 µ¯t) ∪ µ˜t¯ as an outcome, or a problem θ˜t¯ such that θ˜t¯ = θ˜t¯−1. For
instance, for Example 9 we obtain a core stable matching by using the mix algorithm
independent of which algorithm is applied first. For Example 6, if we use the mix
algorithm by applying first either DPGAA or SPGAA then at period t = 2 we reach
a problem θ˜2 which is equivalent to the given problem and note that there is no core
stable matching for Example 6. These observations lead us following conjectures:
Conjecture 1 If we obtain a matching µ?t¯ = (
⋃t=t¯−1
t=1 µ¯t)∪ µ˜t¯ as an outcome of the mix
algorithm at some period t¯, then the matching µ?t¯ is core stable.
Conjecture 2 If we reach a problem θ˜t¯ such that θ˜t¯ = θ˜t¯−1 by using the mix algorithm
at some period t¯, then there is no core stable matching for the given problem.
Following example shows that Conjecture 1 is not correct.
Example 10 The mix algorithm produces a matching which is not core stable
We know that for Example 9 neither DPGAA nor SPGAA stops and there is
a core stable matching. We also know that for the same problem the mix algorithm
produces a core stable matching regardless of which algorithm is applied first. Now
we construct an example where neither DPGAA nor SPGAA stops, but the mix
algorithm produces a matching which is not core stable. The set of departments and
their quotas and budgets are as in Example 9. The set of students and their qualification
levels and reservation prices are again as in Example 9 except that the qualification
level of student 10 for department A is 5, i.e., a10A = 5, and the reservation price of
student 10 for department A is 420, i.e., σ10A = 420.
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We now apply the mix algorithm by applying DPGAA first.
t = 1. We apply the algorithm DPGAA to this problem. We will show that all
departments behave in this example as they behaved in Example 9. Note that this is
true for all departments other than department A since for this example everything is
same to that of Example 9 except that we now have a10A = 5 and σ10A = 420. So, we
only need to show that department A behaves in DPGAA for this example as it did in
Example 9. To do so, we will show that department A never makes an offer to student
10 in DPGAA for this example. Note that in Example 9, department A makes offers
only to students 1 and 3 in DPGAA, and the maximal offer that department A makes
to student 1 is m1A = 435 and the maximal offer that department A makes to student
3 is m3A = 440. Now, for department A we have ({1},m1A)PA({10}, σ10A) since
a1A > a
10
A , and ({3},m3A)PA({10}, σ10A) since a3A > a10A . So, department A never
makes an offer to student 10 for this example in DPGAA.
Hence, the algorithm DPGAA for this problem gives us the same result as that
of Example 9, i.e., DPGAA does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting of three
matchings µt¯, µt¯+1 and µt¯+2 that are given in Example 9.
Since the algorithm DPGAA does not stop, we determine the constant and incon-
stant parts of the cycle. We know that the constant part consists of the set of depart-
ments D = {E,F,G,H} and the set of students S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and this
constant part has a matching µ˜ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 0 1075 440 0 1075
. The incon-
stant part consists of the set students S˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the set of departments
D˜ = {A,B,C,D}.
t = 2. We apply the algorithm SPGAA to the inconstant part (S˜, D˜). It stops and
the resulting matching is µ̂ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
440 1075 0 440 1075 0
. Hence the mix
algorithm by applying first DPGAA stops in the end of period 2, and its outcome is
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the union of the matchings µ˜ and µ̂ which is the matching µ given in example 9, i.e.,
µ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 1075 0 440 1075 0 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
The matching µ is not core stable for this example, i.e., (A, {10}) blocks
the matching µ with m˜10A = bA = 440 since (A, 440)P10(E, 440)20 and
({10}, 440)PA({4}, 440)21.
Hence, the mix algorithm by applying DPGAA first produces a matching which
is not core stable.
Now, let us see what happens if we apply the algorithm SPGAA first.
t = 1. We apply the algorithm SPGAA to this problem. We will show that all
students behave in this example as they behaved in Example 9. Note that this is true for
all students other than student 10. So, we only need to show that student 10 behaves in
SPGAA for this example as she behaved in Example 9, i.e., we will show that student
10 never makes an offer to department A in SPGAA for this example. Note that in
Example 9, student 10 makes offers only to departments H and G in SPGAA, and the
minimal offer that student 10 makes to department H is m10H = 334 and the minimal
offer that student 10 makes to department G is m10G = 435. For student 10 we have
(H,m10H)P10(A, bA)
22 and (G,m10G)P10(A, bA)
23. So, student 10 never makes an
offer to department A for this example in SPGAA.
Hence, the algorithm SPGAA for this problem gives us the same result as that
of Example 9, i.e., SPGAA does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting of four
matchings µk¯, µk¯+1, µk¯+2 and µk¯+3 that are given in Example 9. Since the algorithm
SPGAA does not stop, we determine the constant and inconstant parts of the cycle.
We know that the constant part consists of the set of departments D = {A,B,C,D}
and the set of students S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and this constant part has a matching
20Since bA − σ10A = 440− 420 = 20 > 0 = 440− 440 = mµ10E − σ10E .
21Since a10A = 5 > 4 = a
4
A
22Since m10H − σ10H = 334− 300 = 34 > 20 = 440− 420 = bA − σ10A.
23Since m10G − σ10G = 435− 400 = 35 > 20 = 440− 420 = bA − σ10A.
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µ̂ =

1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
440 1075 0 440 1075 0
. The inconstant part consists of the set
students S˜ = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and the set of departments D˜ = {E,F,G,H}.
t = 2. We apply the algorithm DPGAA to the inconstant part (S˜, D˜). It stops
and the resulting matching is µ˜ =

7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 0 1075 440 0 1075
. Hence the
mix algorithm by applying first SPGAA stops and its outcome is the union of the
matchings µ̂ and µ˜ which is again the matching µ. We know that the matching µ
is not core stable for this example. Hence, the mix algorithm by applying SPGAA
first produces a matching which is not core stable. However, the set of core stable
matchings is non-empty for this problem, e.g., the following matching µ¯ is core stable:
µ¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A D B D B C G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 500 741 575 334 440 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
We will now show that Conjecture 2 is not correct, i.e., we will construct an ex-
ample where it has a core stable matching, but by using the mix algorithm we reach a
problem θ˜t¯ such that θ˜t¯ = θ˜t¯−1.
Example 11 The mix algorithm reaches a problem θ˜t¯ such that θ˜t¯ = θ˜t¯−1 and
there is a core stable matching
Let D = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H} be the set of departments and the set of stu-
dents be S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} where the quotas and budgets of the
departments are as follows: qA = 1, qB = 2, qC = 1, qD = 2, qE = 1, qF = 2,
qG = 1, qH = 2; bA = 440, bB = 1075, bC = 440, bD = 1000, bE = 440,
bF = 1075, bG = 440, bH = 1075. We assume that for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
and any d ∈ {E,F,G,H} we have asd < 0, and for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and
any d ∈ {A,B,C,D} we have asd < 0. So, the qualification levels and reservation
prices of the students are as given in table 5.5.
We apply the mix algorithm by applying DPGAA first.
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a1A= 7 a
1
B= 11 a
1
C= 1 a
1
D= 0
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 5
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 12 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 5
a4A= 2 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 10 a
4
D= 0
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 2 a
5
C= 0 a
5
D= 15
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 2 a
6
C= 0 a
6
D= 16
σ1A=400 σ1B= 300 σ1C=−500 σ1D= 440
σ2A=440 σ2B=1075 σ2C= 400 σ2D=−500
σ3A=400 σ3B= 700 σ3C= 420 σ3D=−500
σ4A=100 σ4B= 450 σ4C= 440 σ4D= 300
σ5A=400 σ5B= 1 σ5C= 440 σ5D= 500
σ6A=420 σ6B= 1 σ6C= 400 σ6D= 500
a7E= 7 a
7
F= 11 a
7
G= 10 a
7
H= 0
a8E= 0 a
8
F= 15 a
8
G= 0 a
8
H= 0
a9E= 8 a
9
F= 12 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H= 15
a10E = 15 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G = 7 a
10
H= 0
a11E = 0 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 0 a
11
H= 6
a12E = 0 a
12
F = 30 a
12
G = 0 a
12
H= 6
σ7E=400 σ7F= 300 σ7G= 440 σ7H= 1075
σ8E=440 σ8F=1075 σ8G= 400 σ8H= 1075
σ9E=400 σ9F= 700 σ9G= 440 σ9H= 1075
σ10E=440 σ10F=1075 σ10G= 100 σ10H= 300
σ11E=440 σ11F=1075 σ11G= 400 σ11H= 100
σ12E=440 σ12F=1075 σ12G= 400 σ12H= 100
Table 5.5: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 11
t = 1. We apply the algorithm DPGAA. It does not stop and a cycle occurs
consisting of following four matchings:
µr¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A ∅ B C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
435 0 741 440 500 500 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 ,
µr¯+1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A B ∅ C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
435 1075 0 440 500 500 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 ,
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µr¯+2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ B A C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
0 1075 440 440 500 500 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 ,
µr¯+3 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B ∅ B C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
334 0 741 440 500 500 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
The constant part consists of the set of departments D = {C,D,E, F,G,H} and
the set of students S = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. The inconstant part consists of the
set of departments D˜ = {A,B} and the set students S˜ = {1, 2, 3}, so θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜).
t = 2. We apply the algorithm SPGAA to the problem θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜). Note that θ˜1
is equal to the problem given in Example 6 and we know that the algorithm SPGAA
does not stop for that problem. So, SPGAA does not stop for θ˜1 and a cycle occurs
consisting of the matchings µt¯, µt¯+1, µt¯+2, µt¯+3 that are given in Example 6. For the
cycle consisting of these four matchings we have D = ∅ and S = ∅, and D˜ = {A,B}
and S˜ = {1, 2, 3}. So, θ˜2 = θ˜1 and the mix algorithm stops. Hence by using the mix
algorithm by applying DPGAA first, at the end of period 2 we reach a problem θ˜2
such that θ˜2 = θ˜1.
We now apply the mix algorithm by applying SPGAA first.
t = 1. We apply the algorithm SPGAA. It does not stop and a cycle occurs
consisting of following four matchings:
µl¯ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E ∅ F G H H
440 500 500 440 538 537 435 0 741 440 538 537
 ,
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µl¯+1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E F ∅ G H H
440 500 500 440 538 537 435 1075 0 440 538 537
 ,
µl¯+2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B ∅ F E G H H
440 500 500 440 538 537 0 1075 440 440 538 537
 ,
µl¯+3 =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B F ∅ F G H H
440 500 500 440 538 537 334 0 741 440 538 537
 .
The constant part consists of the set of departments D = {A,B,C,D,G,H} and
the set of students S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12}. The inconstant part consists of the
set of departments D˜ = {E,F} and the set students S˜ = {7, 8, 9}, so θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜).
t = 2. We apply the algorithm DPGAA to the problem θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜). Note that
θ˜1 is equivalent to the problem given in Example 6 and we know that the algorithm
DPGAA does not stop for that problem. So, DPGAA does not stop for θ˜1 and a
cycle occurs consisting of the matchings µt¯, µt¯+1, µt¯+2, µt¯+3 that are given in Example
6.24 We have D = ∅ and S = ∅, and D˜ = {E,F} and S˜ = {7, 8, 9}. So, θ˜2 = θ˜1 and
the mix algorithm stops. Hence by using the mix algorithm by applying SPGAA first,
at the end of period 2 we reach a problem θ˜2 such that θ˜2 = θ˜1.
Now, consider the following matching:
µ =

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
440 500 500 440 538 537 440 0 1075 440 0 1075
 .
24We replace the names of A and B with E and F , respectively, and the names of 1,2 and 3 with 7, 8
and 9, respectively.
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We will show that the matching µ is core stable. Suppose that µ is not core
stable. Then there is a group (d˜, S˜) which blocks µ, where d˜ ∈ D and S˜ ⊆ S .
Note that each department d ∈ {E,F,G,H} is matched with its best group of stu-
dents among all groups satisfying its constraints under µ. So, there is no department
d ∈ {E,F,G,H} which forms a blocking coalition with any set of students. Hence,
d˜ /∈ {E,F,G,H}. So, d˜ ∈ {A,B,C,D}. There is no department d ∈ {A,B,C,D}
which forms a blocking coalition with any group of students S ⊆ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12},
since for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D} we have asd < 0. So,
we have S˜ ⊆ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. However, for each student s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} we have(
µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
)
Ps(d, bd) for any d ∈
({A,B,C,D} \ {µ1(s)}). So, there is no stu-
dent s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} which forms a blocking coalition with any d ∈ {A,B,C,D}.
Hence, we also have d˜ /∈ {A,B,C,D}, a contradiction. So, the matching µ is core
stable.
5.4 Nonexistence of random paths to core stability
Gale and Shapley (1962) also described a one to one matching model which is known
as the marriage problem,25 and showed by a centralized algorithm (the Gale-Shapley
algorithm) that the set of stable matchings is nonempty for any marriage problem (see
Sotomayor (1996) for a nonconstructive proof).26 Knuth (1976) gave an example that
25A marriage problem consists of a triplet (M,W,R), whereM denote a finite set of men,W denote
a finite set of women, and R = (Ri)i∈(M∪W ) denote a preference profile for the set of agents. Every
manm ∈M has a complete, reflexive and transitive preference relationRm over (W ∪{m}), and every
woman w ∈W has a complete, reflexive and transitive preference relation Rw over (M ∪ {w}).
26A matching for the marriage problem is the function µ : M ∪W →M ∪W such that
• for all m ∈M , µ(m) ∈ (W ∪ {m}),
• for all w ∈W , µ(w) ∈ (M ∪ {w}), and
• for all m ∈M and all w ∈W , µ(m) = w if and only if µ(w) = m.
A matching µ is blocked by an agent i ∈ (M ∪W ) at preference profile R if iPiµ(i), where Pi denote
the strict preference relation of agent i associated with Ri. A matching µ is individually rational at
preference profile R if it is not blocked by any agent, i.e., for all i ∈ (M ∪W ) we have µ(i)Rii. A
matching µ is blocked by a pair (m,w) ∈M ×W at preference profile R if wPmµ(m) and mPwµ(w).
A matching µ is stable at preference profile R if it is individually rational and there is no pair which
blocks it at R. We note that for the marriage problem, the set of stable matchings coincide with the set
of core stable matchings (Roth and Sotomayor (1990b)).
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the process of allowing blocking pairs to match may have cycles and may not lead to a
stable matching, and raised the question that whether there exists a decentralized pro-
cedure which converges to a stable matching. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) solved this
question by showing that starting from an arbitrary matching and satisfying a randomly
chosen blocking pair at each step, we reach a stable matching.27 That is, they showed
that given an arbitrary matching µ for a marriage problem (M,W,R), there exists a
finite sequence of matchings µ1, µ2, . . . , µr such that µ = µ1, µr is stable at preference
profile R, and for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}, there is a blocking pair (mj, wj) for µj
such that µj+1 is obtained from µj by satisfying the blocking pair (mj, wj). Such a
decentralized procedure is called as random paths to stability.28
We will show that there does not exist a random path to core stability for the grad-
uate admissions problem. That is, we will provide an example of graduate admission
problem such that its set of core stable matchings is nonempty and an individually
rational matching for this problem, and show that starting with this matching and satis-
fying a blocking coalition at each step, a core stable matching can not be reached. Let
us first define what we mean by satisfying a blocking coalition.
Definition 61 We say that matching µ´ is obtained from matching µ by satisfying a
blocking coalition (d, S), where d ∈ D and ∅ 6= S ⊆ S, with for all s ∈ S, µ1(s) 6= d,
if and only if
• for any s ∈ S, µ´(s) = (d, m˜sd) with (d, m˜sd)Ps
(
µ1(s),m
µ
sµ1(s)
)
,
27Let (M,W,R) be a marriage problem and µ be a matching with a blocking pair (m´, w´) ∈M ×W .
We say that matching µ̂ is obtained from µ by satisfying the blocking pair (m´, w´) if and only if
• µ̂(m´) = w´,
• for all m ∈ [M \ {m´, µ(w´)}], µ̂(m) = µ(m), and for all w ∈ [W \ {w´, µ(m´)}], µ̂(w) = µ(w),
and
• if µ(w´) = m for some m ∈ M then µ̂(m) = m, and if µ(m´) = w for some w ∈ W then
µ̂(w) = w.
28See Ma (1996) and Klaus and Klijn (2007a) for a detailed explanation of random paths to stability
for the marriage problem. For other studies of random paths to stability, see Chung (2000), Diamantoudi
et al. (2004) and Inarra et al. (2008) for the roommate problem, Klaus and Klijn (2007b) for matching
markets with couples, and Kojima and U¨nver (2008) for many to many matching problems.
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• for department d, Sdµ´ = [(Sdµ \ T ) ∪ S] for some T ⊆ Sdµ, with
(Sdµ´,m
d
µ´)Pd(S
d
µ,m
d
µ), where the transfer vector m
d
µ´ is as follows: for any stu-
dent s ∈ Sdµ´,
mµ´sd =
{
mµsd if s ∈ (Sdµ \ T )
m˜sd if s ∈ S,
(of course, the quota and budget constraints of department d under matching
µ´ are satisfied, i.e., | Sdµ´ |≤ qd and cdµ´ ≤ bd, where cdµ´ =
∑
h∈(Sdµ\T ) m
µ
hd +∑
s∈S m˜sd with S
d
µ = {k ∈ Sdµ | mµkd > 0} and S = {s ∈ S | m˜sd > 0}),
• for all students l ∈ T ⊆ Sdµ with whom department d break ties, µ´(l) = (∅, 0),
i.e., each student in T is unmatched under µ´,
• for any student ŝ ∈ [S \ (S ∪ T )], µ´(ŝ) = µ(ŝ), i.e., each student not in (S ∪ T )
is matched with the same department under µ´ as she was matched under µ,
• for any department d̂ ∈ (D \ {d}), S d̂µ´ = (S d̂µ \ S).
Example 12 There does not exist a random path to core stability for the graduate
admissions problem
LetD = {A,B,C,D} be the set of departments and S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} the set of
students. The quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows: qA = 1, qB = 2,
qC = 1, qD = 2; bA = 440, bB = 1075, bC = 440, bD = 1000. The qualification levels
and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.6.
The set of core stable matchings is non-empty for this problem, e.g., following
matching µ? is core stable:
µ? =

1 2 3 4 5 6
D ∅ A C D B
500 0 440 440 500 1075
 .
We consider the following individually rational matching µ1,
µ1 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ B A C D D
0 1075 440 440 100 800
 .
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a1A= 7 a
1
B= 11 a
1
C= 10 a
1
D= 1
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 0
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 12 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 15
a4A= 15 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 11 a
4
D= 0
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 0 a
5
C= 0 a
5
D= 9
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 30 a
6
C= 0 a
6
D= 6
σ1A=434 σ1B= 334 σ1C=440 σ1D= 500
σ2A=440 σ2B=1075 σ2C=400 σ2D=1000
σ3A=440 σ3B= 740 σ3C=420 σ3D=1000
σ4A=440 σ4B=1075 σ4C=100 σ4D= 300
σ5A=440 σ5B=1075 σ5C=400 σ5D= 100
σ6A=440 σ6B=1075 σ6C=400 σ6D= 600
Table 5.6: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 12
We will show that starting with this matching µ1 and at each time satisfying a
blocking coalition, a core stable matching can not be reached.
The unique coalition which blocks µ1 is (B, {1, 3}) where m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and
m˜3B = 741. We reach matching µ2 by satisfying this blocking coalition, where
µ2 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ B C D D
334 0 741 440 100 800
 .
Now, the coalition (A, {1}) blocks µ2 with bA = 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 435, and there
is no other coalition which blocks µ2. By satisfying this blocking coalition we reach
six different matchings for each integer value of the transfer m˜1A. Let µ3 denote these
matchings that we reach by satisfying this blocking coalition, so
µ3 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
mµ31A 0 741 440 100 800
, where 440 ≥ mµ31A ≥ 435.
The unique coalition which blocks µ3 is (B, {2}) where m˜2B = σ2B = 1075.
When we satisfy this blocking coalition we reach matching µ4,
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µ4 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D D
mµ41A 1075 0 440 100 800
, where 440 ≥ mµ41A ≥ 435.
We now consider two cases:
Case 1. 440 ≥ mµ41A ≥ 436.
Case 2. mµ41A = 435.
First, we consider case 1. When 440 ≥ mµ41A ≥ 436, we denote this matching by
µ4,
µ4 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D D
m
µ4
1A 1075 0 440 100 800
, where 440 ≥ mµ41A ≥ 436.
The unique coalition which blocks µ4 is (A, {3}) where m˜3A = σ3A = 440.29
When we satisfy this blocking coalition for µ4 we reach matching µ1.
Second, we consider case 2 that mµ41A = 435. We denote this matching by µ̂4,
µ̂4 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D D
435 1075 0 440 100 800
 .
There are two blocking coalitions for µ̂4. The pair (A, {3}) blocks µ̂4 with m˜3A =
σ3A = 440, and when we satisfy this blocking coalition we reach matching µ1. The
coalition (B, {1, 3}) also blocks µ̂4 with m˜1B = 335 and m˜3B = σ3B = 740. By
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ5, where
µ5 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ B C D D
335 0 740 440 100 800
 .
29Note that the coalition (B, {1, 3}) cannot block µ4. If we suppose that mµ41A = 436, then the
minimal amount that department B should pay to student 1 is equal to m˜1B = 336, and department
B has to pay student 3 at least her reservation price m˜3B = σ3B = 740. However, m˜1B + m˜3B =
336 + 740 = 1076 > 1075 = bB .
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The pair (A, {3}) blocks µ5 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440. (See part I.)
The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ5 with 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 436. By satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching
µ6 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
mµ61A 0 740 440 100 800
, where 440 ≥ mµ61A ≥ 436.
The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ6 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and by satisfying this
blocking pair we reach matching µ4.
The pair (A, {3}) also blocks µ6 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440, and by satisfying this
blocking pair we reach
µ7 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ ∅ A C D D
0 0 440 440 100 800
 .
Now we have following blocking coalitions for µ7:
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ7 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and by satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching µ1.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ7 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and m˜3B = 741, and by
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ2.
- The pair (B, {1}) blocks µ7 with bB = 1075 ≥ m˜1B ≥ 334 = σ1B. (See part II.)
- The pair (B, {3}) blocks µ7 with bB = 1075 ≥ m˜3B ≥ 741. By satisfying this
blocking pair we reach matching µ8,
µ8 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ ∅ B C D D
0 0 mµ83B 440 100 800
, where 1075 ≥ mµ83B ≥ 741.
Following coalitions block µ8:
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ8 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075. (See part III.)
- If mµ83B = 741, then the pair (B, {1}) blocks µ8 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334. Note that
department B does not break its tie with student 3 while forming this blocking pair.
By satisfying this blocking pair we reach matching µ2.
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- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ8 with 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 435. (See part IV.)
- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ8 with m˜1A = σ1A = 434. When we satisfy this blocking
pair we reach matching µ9,
µ9 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
434 0 mµ93B 440 100 800
, where 1075 ≥ mµ93B ≥ 741.
Blocking coalitions for µ9:
- If mµ93B = 741, then the pair (B, {1}) blocks µ9 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334, and
department B does not break its tie with student 3 while forming this blocking pair.
By satisfying this blocking pair we reach matching µ2.
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ9 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and we reach matching µ10 by
satisfying this blocking pair where
µ10 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D D
434 1075 0 440 100 800
 .
Blocking coalitions for µ10:
- The pair (A, {3}) blocks µ10 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440, and by satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching µ1.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ10 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and m˜3B = 741, and by
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ2.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ10 with m˜1B = 335 and m˜3B = σ3B = 740, and by
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ5.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ10 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and m˜3B = σ3B = 740,
and by satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ11, where
µ11 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ B C D D
334 0 740 440 100 800
 .
Blocking coalitions for µ11:
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- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ11 with 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 436, and by satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching µ6.
- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ11 with m˜1A = 435. (See part V.)
- The pair (A, {3}) blocks µ11 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440, and by satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching µ12 where
µ12 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ A C D D
334 0 0 440 100 800
 .
Blocking coalitions for µ12:
- The pair (B, {3}) blocks µ12 with m˜3B = 741 and department B does not break its
tie with student 1. By satisfying this blocking pair we reach matching µ2.
- The pair (B, {3}) blocks µ12 with 1075 ≥ m˜3B ≥ 741 and department B breaks its
tie with student 1 while forming this blocking pair. By satisfying this blocking pair we
reach matching µ8.
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ12 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and we reach matching µ1 by
satisfying this blocking pair.
We now complete parts I, II, III, IV and V.
Part I. The pair (A, {3}) blocks matching µ5 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440, and we
reach matching µ6 by satisfying this blocking pair where
µ6 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ A C D D
335 0 440 440 100 800
 .
The pair (B, {3}) blocks µ6 with 1075 ≥ m˜3B ≥ 741 and department B breaks its
tie with student 1 while forming this blocking pair. By satisfying this blocking pair we
reach matching µ8.
The pair (B, {2}) also blocks µ6 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and we reach match-
ing µ1 by satisfying this blocking coalition. We note that there is no other blocking
coalition for µ6.
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Part II. The pair (B, {1}) blocks µ7 with bB = 1075 ≥ m˜1B ≥ 334 = σ1B, and
by satisfying this blocking pair we reach matching µ8,
µ8 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ A C D D
m
µ8
1B 0 440 440 100 800
 where 1075 ≥ mµ81B ≥ 334.
Blocking coalitions for µ8:
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ8 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and we reach matching µ1 by
satisfying this blocking pair.
- If mµ81B = 334, then the pair (B, {3}) blocks µ8 with m˜3B = 741, and department
B does not break its tie with student 1 while forming this blocking pair. By satisfying
this blocking pair we reach matching µ2.
- The pair (B, {3}) blocks µ8 with 1075 ≥ m˜3B ≥ 741 and department B breaks its
tie with student 1 while forming this blocking pair. By satisfying this blocking pair we
reach matching µ8.
Part III. The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ8 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and by satisfying
this blocking pair we reach matching µ9, where
µ9 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ B ∅ C D D
0 1075 0 440 100 800
 .
Blocking coalitions for µ9:
- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ9 with 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 435, and by satisfying this blocking
pair we reach matching µ4.
- The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ9 with m˜1A = σ1A = 434. When we satisfy this blocking
pair we reach matching µ10.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ9 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and m˜3B = 741, and by
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ2.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ9 with m˜1B = 335 and m˜3B = σ3B = 740, and by
satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ5.
- The coalition (B, {1, 3}) blocks µ9 with m˜1B = σ1B = 334 and m˜3B = σ3B = 740,
and by satisfying this blocking coalition we reach matching µ11.
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Part IV. The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ8 with 440 ≥ m˜1A ≥ 435, and by satisfying
this blocking pair we reach matching µ̂9,
µ̂9 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
mµ̂91A 0 m
µ̂9
3B 440 100 800
 ,
where 440 ≥ mµ̂91A ≥ 435 and 1075 ≥ mµ̂93B ≥ 741.30
The unique coalition which blocks µ̂9 is (B, {2}) where m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and
we reach matching µ4 by satisfying this blocking coalition.
Part V. The pair (A, {1}) blocks µ11 with m˜1A = 435, and we reach matching µ12
by satisfying this blocking pair, where
µ12 =

1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
435 0 740 440 100 800
 .
Blocking coalitions for µ12:
- The pair (A, {3}) blocks µ12 with m˜3A = σ3A = 440, and we reach matching µ7 by
satisfying this blocking pair.
- The pair (B, {2}) blocks µ12 with m˜2B = σ2B = 1075, and we reach matching µ̂4 by
satisfying this blocking pair.
- The pair (B, {1}) blocks µ12 with m˜1B = 335 and department B does not break its
tie with student 3 while forming this blocking pair. By satisfying this blocking pair we
reach matching µ5.
Hence, for the graduate admissions problem with quota and budget constraints
there does not exist a random path to core stability (see figure 5.1).
30Note that if mµ̂93B = 741 then matching µ̂9 is equal to matching µ3.
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5.5 Students consider only their reservation prices
Karakaya and Koray (2003) also studied the model under restrictions on students’ pref-
erences. The main restriction they imposed to that end is the assumption that the stu-
dents care only about their reservation prices and do not derive any further utility from
money transfers over and above their reservation prices. They constructed another
departments proposing graduate admission algorithm ( ˜DPGAA) by taking the reser-
vation prices of students equal to the money transfers from the department to which
they are accepted. They showed that if the algorithm ˜DPGAA stops then the resulting
matching is core stable. However, like DPGAA, ˜DPGAA does not always stop, and
it is possible that there exists a core stable matching although ˜DPGAA does not stop.
In this section we will construct the students proposing graduate admission algo-
rithm ( ˜SPGAA) when students consider only their reservation prices. We will study
whether the mix algorithm works for this new model, i.e., we will check whether con-
jectures 1 and 2 are correct if students consider only their reservation prices. Random
paths to core stability will also be studied.
We will first define the departments proposing algorithm ( ˜DPGAA) following
Karakaya and Koray (2003).
The Departments Proposing Algorithm
The structure of ˜DPGAA is the same as that of DPGAA, the only difference
being that a department dwhich makes an offer to a student s is ready to pay σsd to s no
matter at what stage of the algorithm this offer is made. In other words, msd(t) = σsd
for all s ∈ S, all d ∈ D and all times t at which d makes an offer to s.
At each time t in the algorithm ˜DPGAA, each department d chooses a group of
admissible students Sdt satisfying its quota and budget constraints so as to maximize
its total benefit Y dt .
We now explain the details of how the algorithm ˜DPGAA works.
t = 1. a) Each department d determines a group of students Sd1 ⊆ S as denoted
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above and offers to each student s ∈ Sd1 .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and reject
the others.
c) Department d accepts the group of students who accepted its offers. Let T d1
denote the group of students who accepted department d’s offers at time t = 1, where
clearly T d1 ⊆ Sd1 .
Now, at the end of period t = 1 we have a matching µ1, and so Sdµ1 = T
d
1 .
t = 2. a) Each department d determines a group of students Sd2 ⊆ S \ (Sd1 \ T d1 )
and makes an offer to each student s ∈ Sd2 .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and reject
the others.
c) Department d accepts the group of students who accepted its offers.
In general, at time k, the algorithm works as follows.
t = k. a) Now we will define an admissible group of students for department d, i.e,
we will define the set F dk ⊆ S for department d at time k.
Assume that t˜ < k was the last time that dmade an offer to s before time k where s
rejected d’s offer because of another department d̂’s offer. Department d cannot make
an offer to student s at time k, if s ∈ S d̂µk−1 . The set F dk denote the group of all such
students for department d at time k, i.e., the group of students to whom department d
cannot make offers at time k.31
Each department d chooses its group of students Sdk from S \F dk and offers to each
student s ∈ Sdk .
b) Students who have taken one or more offers accept exactly one offer and reject
the others.
31At time t = 1, F d1 = ∅ for all d ∈ D, so each department d determines its group of students Sd1
over the set of all students S. At time t = 2, for all d ∈ D, F d2 = Sd1 \ T d1 , so the admissible group for
department d at time 2 is S \ (Sd1 \ T d1 ).
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c) Department d accepts the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk who accepted its offers.
Stopping Rule
t = t?: The algorithm stops at time t? if each department d makes offers exactly to
the group of students who accepted its offers at t? − 1, i.e., if we have Sdt? = T dt?−1 for
all d ∈ D.
If the algorithm stops at time t?, the matching µt? is regarded as the outcome of the
algorithm.
Proposition 22 (Karakaya and Koray (2003)) If the algorithm ˜DPGAA stops, then
the final matching of the algorithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
We now define the students proposing graduate admission algorithm ( ˜SPGAA).
The Students Proposing Algorithm
The structure of ˜SPGAA is the same as that of SPGAA, the only difference is
that a student s offers her reservation price σsd to a department d at any stages of the
algorithm if she makes an offer to department d. That is, for all s ∈ S, all d ∈ D and
all periods t we have msd(t) = σsd.
The algorithm ˜SPGAA does not permit a student s to make offers to department
d if she is unqualified for department d. At every period in the algorithm, students s
makes at most one new offer to a department which is best for her, and her last new
offer made to a different department and got rejected stays valid as a holding offer.
t = 1. a) Each student s makes an offer to her most preferred department d to
which she is permitted to make offers. That is, student s offers σsd to department d,
where (d, σsd)Ps(d˜, σsd˜) for any d˜ 6= d to which she can make offers. Note that at
t = 1, there is no holding offer and each student s makes a new offer.
b) Let Sd1 denote the group of students who offered department d at t = 1. Each
department d accepts the offers of the group of students T d1 ⊆ Sd1 that maximizes its
total benefit subject to its quota and budget constraints.
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c) Each student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of
them and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of time t = 1 we have a matching µ1 with Sdµ1 = T
d
1 for all d ∈ D
since a student s can get at most one acceptance at t = 1.
t = 2. a) Each student s makes at most one new offer. Student s cannot make a
new offer to a department d if she offered to d and got rejected at time t = 1. In such a
case, she makes a new offer to another department at this period, and her offer made to
d and got rejected in the preceding period remains valid at period 2 as a holding offer.
b) Each department d considers the group of students Sd2 who made new and hold-
ing offers to department d at period 2, and accepts the offers of the group of students
T d2 ⊆ Sd2 that maximizes its total benefit subject to its constraints.
c) Each student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of
them and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of period t = 2 we have a matching µ2 such that for each depart-
ment d, Sdµ2 ⊆ T d2 .
In general, at time k, the algorithm works as follows.
t = k. a) We will define the set F sk ⊆ D for student s at period k.
Assume that t˜ was the last period such that student s made a new offer to depart-
ment d before period k, where this offer was rejected by department d because of the
group of students T d
t˜
. Student s cannot make a new offer to department d at period k if
Sdµk−1 = T
d
t˜
. The set F sk denote the set of all such departments for student s at period
k, i.e., student s cannot make a new offer to a department d ∈ F sk .
Each student s makes at most one new offer to a department d ∈ (D \ F sk ), and the
last new offer student s made to some department and got rejected remains valid as a
holding offer if she makes a new offer to another department at this period k.
b) Each department d accepts the offers of the group of students T dk ⊆ Sdk that
maximizes its total benefit subject to its constraints.
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c) Each student s who has taken acceptance(s) tentatively accepts at most one of
them and rejects the others.
Now, at the end of time t = k we have a matching µk with Sdµk ⊆ T dk .
Stopping Rule
t = t?: The algorithm stops at time t? if each student s makes offer(s) (new and/or
holding) to exactly the same department(s) that she offered in the preceding period.
That is the algorithm stops at t? if for all d ∈ D we have Sdt? = Sdt?−1 with for any
s ∈ Sdt? , if s made new offers to d at periods t?− 1 and t?, and if s made holding offers
to d at periods t? − 1 and t?.
If the algorithm stops at t? the final matching µt? is regarded as the outcome of the
algorithm.
Proposition 23 If the algorithm ˜SPGAA stops, then the final matching of the algo-
rithm is core stable (and thus Pareto optimal).
Proof Analogous to the proof of Proposition 19. 
Following example taken from Karakaya and Koray (2003) shows that there exists
a graduate admission problem when students consider only their reservation prices
such that neither ˜DPGAA nor ˜SPGAA stops and there is no core stable matching.
Example 13 Neither ˜DPGAA nor ˜SPGAA stops and there is no core stable
matching
Let D = {A,B}, S = {1, 2, 3}, qA = 1, qB = 2, bA = 50, bB = 70, and the
qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in in table 5.7.
As shown in Karakaya and Koray (2003), the algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop
and a cycle occurs consisting of following matchings µ1, µ2, µ3 and µ4:32
µ1 =
(
1 2 3
B ∅ B
)
, µ2 =
(
1 2 3
B ∅ A
)
, µ3 =
(
1 2 3
∅ B A
)
, µ4 =
(
1 2 3
A B ∅
)
.
32When writing a matching, we will not write the money transfers between matched agents, since all
money transfers between matched agents are the reservation prices of the students.
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a1A=10 a
1
B=10
a2A= 1 a
2
B=15
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 9
σ1A=40 σ1B=30
σ2A=50 σ2B=45
σ3A=30 σ3B=40
Table 5.7: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 13
If we apply the algorithm ˜SPGAA, it does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting
of following matchings µ˜1, µ˜2 and µ˜3:
µ˜1 =
(
1 2 3
∅ B A
)
, µ˜2 =
(
1 2 3
A B ∅
)
, µ˜3 =
(
1 2 3
B ∅ B
)
.
Hence, neither ˜DPGAA nor ˜SPGAA stops for this example. We note that there is
no core stable matching for this example, since there is neither a core stable matching
such that student 2 is matched with a department, nor a core stable matching under
which she is unmatched.
Karakaya and Koray (2003) showed that it is impossible that the algorithm
˜DPGAA does not stop and no cycle occurs in the algorithm.
Proposition 24 (Karakaya and Koray (2003)) The algorithm ˜DPGAA stops if and
only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm.
Following result shows that the same is also true for the algorithm ˜SPGAA.
Proposition 25 The algorithm ˜SPGAA stops if and only if no cycle occurs in the
algorithm.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Proposition 21. 
The following example taken from Karakaya and Koray (2003) shows that it is
possible that the algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop but the algorithm ˜SPGAA stops
and hence there is a core stable matching.
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Example 14 The algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop but the algorithm ˜SPGAA
stops
Let D = {A,B,C,D} be the set of departments, S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} the set of
students and the quotas and budgets of the departments are given by qA = 1, qB = 2,
qC = 1, qD = 2; bA = 50, bB = 70, bC = 50, bD = 70. The qualification levels and
reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.8.
a1A=10 a
1
B=10 a
1
C= 5 a
1
D= 0
a2A= 1 a
2
B=15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 3
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 9 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 3
a4A= 6 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C=10 a
4
D=10
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 3 a
5
C= 1 a
5
D=15
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 3 a
6
C= 8 a
6
D= 9
σ1A=50 σ1B=30 σ1C=20 σ1D=40
σ2A=50 σ2B=45 σ2C=40 σ2D=30
σ3A=30 σ3B=40 σ3C=45 σ3D=28
σ4A=20 σ4B=40 σ4C=50 σ4D=30
σ5A=40 σ5B=30 σ5C=50 σ5D=45
σ6A=45 σ6B=28 σ6C=30 σ6D=40
Table 5.8: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 14
Karakaya and Koray (2003) showed that when the algorithm ˜DPGAA is applied,
a cycle occurs in the algorithm consisting of matchings µ1, µ2, µ3 and µ4:
µ1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ B D ∅ D
)
, µ2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ A D ∅ C
)
,
µ3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ B A ∅ D C
)
, µ4 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D ∅
)
.
Hence, the algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop for this example. When we apply the
algorithm ˜SPGAA, it stops at the end of period 2, and matching µ˜ is the outcome of
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the algorithm, where
µ˜ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
)
.
The matching µ˜ is core stable by Proposition 23. Hence, it is possible that the
algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm ˜SPGAA stops.
Example 15 The algorithm ˜SPGAA does not stop but the algorithm ˜DPGAA
stops
Let D = {E,F,G,H} be the set of departments, S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} the set
of students and the quotas and budgets of the departments are given by qE = 1, qF = 2,
qG = 1, qH = 2; bE = 50, bF = 70, bG = 50, bH = 70. The qualification levels and
reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.9.
a7E=10 a
7
F=10 a
7
G=13 a
7
H= 0
a8E= 1 a
8
F=15 a
8
G= 0 a
8
H= 0
a9E= 8 a
9
F= 9 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H=28
a10E =15 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G =10 a
10
H=10
a11E = 0 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 1 a
11
H=15
a12E = 0 a
12
F =27 a
12
G = 8 a
12
H= 9
σ7E=40 σ7F=30 σ7G=50 σ7H=45
σ8E=50 σ8F=45 σ8G=30 σ8H=40
σ9E=30 σ9F=40 σ9G=45 σ9H=50
σ10E=50 σ10F=45 σ10G=40 σ10H=30
σ11E=30 σ11F=40 σ11G=50 σ11H=45
σ12E=45 σ12F=50 σ12G=30 σ12H=40
Table 5.9: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 15
When we apply the algorithm ˜SPGAA, a cycle occurs in the algorithm consisting
of three matchings µ1, µ2 and µ3:
µ1 =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ F E ∅ H G
)
, µ2 =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
E F ∅ G H ∅
)
,
µ3 =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
F ∅ F H ∅ H
)
.
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So, the algorithm ˜SPGAA does not stop for this example. However, the algorithm
˜DPGAA stops at the end of period 2, and matching µ̂ is the outcome of the algorithm,
where
µ̂ =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
The matching µ̂ is core stable by Proposition 22. Hence, it is possible that the
algorithm ˜SPGAA does not stop, but the algorithm ˜DPGAA stops.
Example 16 Neither ˜DPGAA nor ˜SPGAA stops and there exists a core stable
matching
Our example is the union of examples 14 and 15. That is, we let D = {A,B,C,
D,E, F,G,H} be the set of departments and S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
the set of students, where the quotas and budgets of the departments are as follows:
qA = 1, qB = 2, qC = 1, qD = 2, qE = 1, qF = 2, qG = 1, qH = 2; bA = 50,
bB = 70, bC = 50, bD = 70, bE = 50, bF = 70, bG = 50, bH = 70. The qualification
levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in examples 14 and 15, and we
assume that for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any d ∈ {E,F,G,H} we have asd < 0,
and for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D} we have asd < 0. So,
the qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.10.
a1A=10 a
1
B=10 a
1
C= 5 a
1
D= 0 a
7
E=10 a
7
F=10 a
7
G=13 a
7
H= 0
a2A= 1 a
2
B=15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 3 a
8
E= 1 a
8
F=15 a
8
G= 0 a
8
H= 0
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 9 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 3 a
9
E= 8 a
9
F= 9 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H=28
a4A= 6 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C=10 a
4
D=10 a
10
E =15 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G =10 a
10
H=10
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 3 a
5
C= 1 a
5
D=15 a
11
E = 0 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 1 a
11
H=15
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 3 a
6
C= 8 a
6
D= 9 a
12
E = 0 a
12
F =27 a
12
G = 8 a
12
H= 9
σ1A=50 σ1B=30 σ1C=20 σ1D=40 σ7E=40 σ7F=30 σ7G=50 σ7H=45
σ2A=50 σ2B=45 σ2C=40 σ2D=30 σ8E=50 σ8F=45 σ8G=30 σ8H=40
σ3A=30 σ3B=40 σ3C=45 σ3D=28 σ9E=30 σ9F=40 σ9G=45 σ9H=50
σ4A=20 σ4B=40 σ4C=50 σ4D=30 σ10E=50 σ10F=45 σ10G=40 σ10H=30
σ5A=40 σ5B=30 σ5C=50 σ5D=45 σ11E=30 σ11F=40 σ11G=50 σ11H=45
σ6A=45 σ6B=28 σ6C=30 σ6D=40 σ12E=45 σ12F=50 σ12G=30 σ12H=40
Table 5.10: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 16
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When we apply the departments proposing algorithm ˜DPGAA, a cycle occurs in
the algorithm consisting of matchings µ1, µ2, µ3 and µ4:
µ1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B ∅ B D ∅ D G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B ∅ A D ∅ C G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ B A ∅ D C G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ4 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A B ∅ C D ∅ G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
Hence, the departments proposing algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop for this ex-
ample.
When we apply the students proposing algorithm ˜SPGAA, a cycle occurs in the
algorithm consisting of three matchings µ˜1, µ˜2 and µ˜3:
µ˜1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B ∅ F E ∅ H G
)
,
µ˜2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E F ∅ G H ∅
)
,
µ˜3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B F ∅ F H ∅ H
)
.
So, the students proposing algorithm ˜SPGAA does not stop for this example.
Consider following matching µ:
µ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
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Note that µ = µ˜ ∪ µ̂, where µ˜ is the resulting matching of the algorithm ˜SPGAA
when applied to Example 14, and µ̂ is the resulting matching of the algorithm ˜DPGAA
when applied to Example 15. It is easy to check that the matching µ is core stable.
Hence, it is possible that neither ˜DPGAA nor ˜SPGAA stops, but there is a core
stable matching. So, the algorithms ˜DPGAA and ˜SPGAA are not complementary
in the sense that for a given graduate admission problem if the set of its core stable
matching is non-empty, then either ˜DPGAA or ˜SPGAA stops.
We note that for the graduate admission problem given in Example 16, the core
stable matching µ can be reached by using the mix algorithm independent of whether
˜DPGAA or ˜SPGAA is applied first. Because of this observation, the question of
whether Conjecture 1 is correct when students consider only their reservation prices is
asked. Following example shows that it is not correct.
Example 17 The mix algorithm produces a matching which is not core stable
The set of departments and their quotas and budgets are as in Example 16. The set
of students and their qualification levels and reservation prices are again as in Example
16 except that the qualification level of student 10 for department A is now 7, and the
reservation price of student 10 for department A is now 42, i.e., a10A = 7 and σ10A = 42.
We now apply the mix algorithm by applying first ˜DPGAA.
t = 1. All departments behave in this example as they behaved in Example 16.33
Hence, the algorithm ˜DPGAA does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting of match-
ings µ1, µ2, µ3 and µ4 which are given in Example 16. The constant part consists of the
set of departments D = {E,F,G,H} and the set of students S = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}
with a matching µ̂ =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
. The inconstant part consists of the
set students S˜ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the set of departments D˜ = {A,B,C,D}.
33We note that department A makes offers only to students 1 and 3 in Example 16, and we now have
a10A = 7 which is smaller than a
1
A = 10 and a
3
A = 8. So, department A does not make any offer to
student 10 in this example, showing that departmentA behaves in this example as it behaved in Example
16.
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t = 2. We apply the algorithm ˜SPGAA to the inconstant part (S˜, D˜). It stops and
the resulting matching is µ˜ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
)
. Hence the mix algorithm
by applying first ˜DPGAA stops at the end of period 2, and its outcome is the union of
the matchings µ̂ and µ˜ which is the matching µ given in Example 16, i.e.,
µ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
However, the matching µ is not core stable for this example, since (A, {10}) blocks
the matching µ.34
Hence, the mix algorithm by applying first ˜DPGAA produces a matching which
is not core stable.
We now apply the mix algorithm by applying first ˜SPGAA.
t = 1. All students behave in this example as they behaved in Example 16.35
Hence, the algorithm ˜SPGAA does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting of match-
ings µ˜1, µ˜2 and µ˜3 which are given in Example 16. The constant part consists of the
set of departmentsD = {A,B,C,D} and the set of students S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with
a matching µ˜ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
C D D A B B
)
. The inconstant part consists of the set
students S˜ = {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and the set of departments D˜ = {E,F,G,H}.
t = 2. We apply the algorithm ˜DPGAA to the inconstant part (S˜, D˜). It stops and
the resulting matching is µ̂ =
(
7 8 9 10 11 12
G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
. Hence the mix algorithm
by applying first ˜SPGAA stops, and its outcome is the union of the matchings µ˜ and
µ̂ which is the matching µ given in Example 16. We know that the matching µ is not
core stable for this example.
34Note that ({10}, σ10A)PA({4}, σ4A) since a10A > a4A, and (A, σ10A)P10(E, σ10E) since σ10A <
σ10E .
35We note that student 10 makes offers only to departments H and G in Example 16, and we now
have σ10A = 42 which is greater than σ10H = 30 and σ10G = 40. So, student 10 does not make any
offer to department A in this example, showing that student 10 behaves in this example as she behaved
in Example 16.
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Hence, it is possible that the mix algorithm produces a matching which is not core
stable, i.e., Conjecture 1 is not correct when students consider only their reservation
prices.
We note that for the graduate admission problem given in Example 13, by using
the mix algorithm regardless of which type of algorithm is applied first, we reach the
same problem, and we know that there is no core stable matching for Example 13. This
observation leads us to the question that whether Conjecture 2 is correct when students
consider only their reservation prices. Following example shows that it is not correct.
Example 18 The mix algorithm reaches a problem θ˜t¯ such that θ˜t¯ = θ˜t¯−1 and
there is a core stable matching
Let D = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H} be the set of departments and S =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} the set of students, where the quotas and budgets of
the departments are as follows: qA = 1, qB = 2, qC = 1, qD = 2, qE = 1, qF = 2,
qG = 1, qH = 2; bA = 50, bB = 70, bC = 50, bD = 70, bE = 50, bF = 70, bG = 50,
bH = 70. We assume that for any s ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and any d ∈ {E,F,G,H} we
have asd < 0, and for any s ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12} and any d ∈ {A,B,C,D} we have
asd < 0. So, the qualification levels and reservation prices of the students are as given
in table 5.11.
a1A=10 a
1
B=10 a
1
C= 2 a
1
D= 0 a
7
E=10 a
7
F=10 a
7
G= 8 a
7
H= 0
a2A= 1 a
2
B=15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 5 a
8
E= 1 a
8
F=15 a
8
G= 0 a
8
H= 0
a3A= 8 a
3
B= 9 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 5 a
9
E= 8 a
9
F= 9 a
9
G= 0 a
9
H=10
a4A= 3 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 5 a
4
D= 0 a
10
E =12 a
10
F = 0 a
10
G = 5 a
10
H= 0
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 3 a
5
C= 0 a
5
D=10 a
11
E = 0 a
11
F = 0 a
11
G = 0 a
11
H= 4
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 3 a
6
C= 0 a
6
D=10 a
12
E = 0 a
12
F =20 a
12
G = 0 a
12
H= 4
σ1A=40 σ1B=30 σ1C=20 σ1D=50 σ7E=40 σ7F=30 σ7G=50 σ7H=70
σ2A=50 σ2B=45 σ2C=30 σ2D=20 σ8E=50 σ8F=45 σ8G=40 σ8H=70
σ3A=30 σ3B=40 σ3C=50 σ3D=20 σ9E=30 σ9F=40 σ9G=50 σ9H=60
σ4A=20 σ4B=30 σ4C=40 σ4D=50 σ10E=50 σ10F=40 σ10G=30 σ10H=45
σ5A=45 σ5B=30 σ5C=40 σ5D=35 σ11E=40 σ11F=50 σ11G=45 σ11H=30
σ6A=40 σ6B=30 σ6C=50 σ6D=35 σ12E=45 σ12F=70 σ12G=50 σ12H=35
Table 5.11: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 18
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Now, we apply the mix algorithm by applying ˜DPGAA first.
t = 1. We apply the algorithm ˜DPGAA. It does not stop and a cycle occurs
consisting of following four matchings:
µ1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B ∅ B C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
B ∅ A C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
∅ B A C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
,
µ4 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
A B ∅ C D D G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
The constant part consists of the set of departments D = {C,D,E, F,G,H} and
the set of students S = {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}. The inconstant part consists of the
set of departments D˜ = {A,B} and the set students S˜ = {1, 2, 3}, so θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜).
t = 2. We apply the algorithm ˜SPGAA to the problem θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜). Note that θ˜1
is equal to the problem given in Example 13 and we know that the algorithm ˜SPGAA
does not stop for that problem. So, ˜SPGAA does not stop for θ˜1 and a cycle occurs
consisting of the matchings µ˜1, µ˜2 and µ˜3 that are given in Example 13. For the cycle
consisting of these three matchings we have D = ∅ and S = ∅, and D˜ = {A,B}
and S˜ = {1, 2, 3}. So, θ˜2 = θ˜1 and the mix algorithm stops. Hence by using the mix
algorithm by applying ˜DPGAA first, at the end of period 2 we reach a problem θ˜2
such that θ˜2 = θ˜1.
We now apply the mix algorithm by applying ˜SPGAA first.
t = 1. We apply the algorithm ˜SPGAA. It does not stop and a cycle occurs
consisting of following three matchings:
µ˜1 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B ∅ F E G H H
)
,
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µ˜2 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B E F ∅ G H H
)
,
µ˜3 =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B F ∅ F G H H
)
.
The constant part consists of the set of departments D = {A,B,C,D,G,H} and
the set of students S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12}. The inconstant part consists of the
set of departments D˜ = {E,F} and the set students S˜ = {7, 8, 9}, so θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜).
t = 2. We apply the algorithm ˜DPGAA to the problem θ˜1 = (D˜, S˜). Note that
θ˜1 is equivalent to the problem given in Example 13 and we know that the algorithm
˜DPGAA does not stop for that problem.36 So, ˜DPGAA does not stop for θ˜1 and a
cycle occurs consisting of the matchings µ1, µ2, µ3 and µ4 which are given in Example
13. We have D = ∅ and S = ∅, and D˜ = {E,F} and S˜ = {7, 8, 9}. So, θ˜2 = θ˜1 and
the mix algorithm stops. Hence by using the mix algorithm by applying ˜SPGAA first,
at the end of period 2 we reach a problem θ˜2 such that θ˜2 = θ˜1.
We now consider matching µ, where
µ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
C D D A B B G ∅ H E ∅ F
)
.
It is easy to check that the matching µ is core stable. Hence, Conjecture 2 is not
correct when students consider only their reservation prices.
Example 19 There does not exist a random path to core stability when students
consider only their reservation prices
Let D = {A,B,C,D} be the set of departments, S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} the set of
students and the quotas and budgets of the departments are given by qA = 1, qB = 2,
qC = 1, qD = 2; bA = 400, bB = 1000, bC = 400, bD = 1000. The qualification levels
and reservation prices of the students are as given in table 5.12.
36We replace the names of A and B with E and F , respectively, and the names of 1, 2 and 3 with 7,
8 and 9, respectively.
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a1A= 8 a
1
B= 8 a
1
C= 0 a
1
D= 8
a2A= 0 a
2
B= 15 a
2
C= 0 a
2
D= 0
a3A= 10 a
3
B= 10 a
3
C= 0 a
3
D= 0
a4A= 0 a
4
B= 0 a
4
C= 5 a
4
D= 15
a5A= 0 a
5
B= 0 a
5
C= 10 a
5
D= 10
a6A= 0 a
6
B= 20 a
6
C= 7 a
6
D= 12
σ1A=200 σ1B= 300 σ1C=150 σ1D=100
σ2A=300 σ2B= 900 σ2C=200 σ2D=500
σ3A=400 σ3B= 300 σ3C=100 σ3D=600
σ4A=200 σ4B= 600 σ4C=400 σ4D=900
σ5A=100 σ5B= 800 σ5C=300 σ5D=200
σ6A=200 σ6B=1000 σ6C=400 σ6D=300
Table 5.12: Qualification levels and reservation prices of students for example 19
The set of core stable matchings is nonempty for this problem, e.g., following
matching µ∗ is core stable:
µ∗ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
D ∅ A D C B
)
.
We consider the following individually rational matching µ̂:
µ̂ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
∅ B A C D D
)
.
We will show that starting from this matching µ̂ and at each time satisfying a block-
ing coalition, a core stable matching will not be reached.
The unique coalition which blocks µ̂ is (B, {1, 3}), and by satisfying this blocking
coalition we reach matching µ˜,
µ˜ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
B ∅ B C D D
)
.
The unique coalition which blocks µ˜ is (A, {1}). We reach matching µ by satisfy-
ing this blocking coalition, where
µ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
A ∅ B C D D
)
.
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The unique coalition which blocks µ is (B, {2}), and by satisfying this blocking
coalition we reach matching µ´,
µ´ =
(
1 2 3 4 5 6
A B ∅ C D D
)
.
The unique coalition which blocks µ´ is (A, {3}), and by satisfying this blocking
coalition we reach the matching µ̂ that we started with.
Hence for the graduate admission problem with quota and budget constraints when
students consider only their reservation prices, there does not exist a random path to
core stability.
We close this section by noting that Karakaya and Koray (2003) also showed that
there exists neither a departments-optimal matching nor a students-optimal matching
if students consider only their reservation prices.
5.6 Concluding remarks
As a continuation of Karakaya and Koray (2003), we studied the graduate admissions
problem with quota and budget constraints as a two sided many to one matching mar-
ket. We constructed the students proposing algorithm which is an extension of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm. We showed that the algorithm ends up with a core stable
matching if the algorithm stops. However, the algorithm may not stop for some grad-
uate admission problems. Also it is possible that the departments proposing algorithm
(constructed in Karakaya and Koray (2003)) or the students proposing algorithm does
not stop and there is a core stable matching. We proved that the students proposing
algorithm stops for a given problem if and only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm.
We showed that the departments proposing and the students proposing algorithms are
not complementary in the sense that for a given graduate admission problem if its core
is non-empty then at least one of the two algorithms stops, i.e., we showed that there
exist graduate admissions problems for which there exist core stable matchings, while
neither of the two algorithms stops. Moreover, we showed that there does not exist
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a random path to core stability for the graduate admissions problem. We continued
our study by modifying students’ preferences in such a way that the students care only
about their reservation prices. Under this model we got results similar to those obtained
in the general model.
Hence, we can say that for the model defined in this paper (two sided matching
market with quota and budget constraints), straightforward extensions of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm do not function as well as it works for college admissions and labor
market models without budget constraints. That is, the picture changes entirely when
one imposes the two constraints simultaneously.
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Figure 5.1: Nonexistence of random path to core stability (Example 12)
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters, we dealt with different economic environments as hedonic
coalition formation games or cover formation games, implementation via codes of
rights, a characterization of the Borda rule or graduate admissions problem with quota
and budget constraints. Although the environments considered exhibit a wide variety,
what combines them is the efficiency-stability or the invisible hand-design axes along
which they are dealt with.
In the first main part, we introduced the framework of “membership rights” of Ser-
tel (1992) into the context of hedonic games. We proposed a new stability notion under
free exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, which had
not been studied earlier. We provided sufficient conditions for a hedonic game to have
a strongly Nash stable partition, and studied varying versions of strong Nash stabil-
ity under different membership rights. We gave a unitary flavor to our work using
the membership rights approach and thus classified all existing and newly proposed
stability concepts in terms of approved vs free entry or exit. This study completes
the picture on the myopic concepts of stability in hedonic games. We also extended
hedonic games to cover formation games where a player can be a member of several
different coalitions, and studied these games. In the second main part, we studied Nash
implementation of social choice rules which are implementable via a Rechtsstaat. We
showed that if a social choice rule is implementable via some Rechtsstaat satisfying
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equal treatment of equivalent alternatives then it is Nash implementable via a mech-
anism when there are three or more agents in the society. In the third main part, we
studied the question of which set of axioms characterizes the Borda rule when agents
have weak preferences over the set of alternatives. We showed that an social choice
rule satisfies weak neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and degree equality if and
only if it is the Borda rule. In the fourth main part, we studied the graduate admis-
sions problem with quota and budget constraints as a two sided many to one matching
market as a continuation of Karakaya and Koray (2003). Given a graduate admission
problem, the main concern is to determine whether the set of core stable matchings is
empty or not. If it is non-empty, then the natural question is how one can obtain a core
stable matching. We constructed algorithms which are extensions of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm and showed that if the algorithms stops then the resulting matchings are core
stable. However, there are problems for which there exist core stable matchings, while
none of the algorithms stops. Moreover, no random path to core stability exists, and
the existence of either a departments-optimal or a students-optimal matching is not
guaranteed in the graduate admissions problem.
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APPENDIX
We will provide omitted proofs and examples.
We now show that the weak top-choice property and the weak top-coalition prop-
erty are independent of each other.
Lemma 21 The weak top-choice property neither implies nor is implied by the weak
top-coalition property.
Proof [the weak top-choice property; the weak top-coalition property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players’ preferences are as follows:
{1, 2, 3, 4} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1} 1 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 2 {2, 3} 2 {2} 2 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 3 {1, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {3} 3 . . .,
{1, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {3, 4} 4 {1, 2, 3, 4} 4 {4} 4 . . ..
This hedonic game satisfies the weak top-choice property, i.e., W (N) = {{N}}
with H1 = {1, 2, 3} and H2 = {4}. However, it fails to satisfy the weak top-coalition
property, since there is no weak top-coalition of {1, 2, 3}.
[the weak top-coalition property; the weak top-choice property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players’ preferences are as follows:
{1, 4} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2, 4} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 2, 3, 4} 1 {1, 2, 3} 1
{1, 3, 4} 1 {1},
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{2, 3, 4} 2 {2, 3} 2 {2, 4} 2 {1, 2} 2 {1, 2, 4} 2 {1, 2, 3, 4} 2
{1, 2, 3} 2 {2},
{2, 3, 4} 3 {1, 3, 4} 3 {2, 3} 3 {3, 4} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {1, 3} 3
{1, 2, 3, 4} 3 {3},
{1, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {3, 4} 4 {2, 3, 4} 4 {1, 2, 3, 4} 4 {1, 2, 4} 4
{1, 3, 4} 4 {4}.
This hedonic game satisfies the weak top-coalition property, where
the weak top-coalition of {1, 2, 3, 4} is {1, 4} with H1 = {1, 4},
the weak top-coalition of {1, 2, 3} is {2, 3} with H1 = {2, 3},
the weak top-coalition of {1, 2, 4} is {1, 4} with H1 = {1, 4},
the weak top-coalition of {1, 3, 4} is {1, 4} with H1 = {1, 4},
the weak top-coalition of {2, 3, 4} is {2, 3, 4} with H1 = {2, 3} and H2 = {4},
and for any remaining coalition N˜ , the weak top-coalition of N˜ is equal to itself with
H1 = N˜ .1
However, this hedonic game fails to satisfy the weak top-choice property, since
W (N) = {{1, 4}} which is not a partition for N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.2 
We introduce following notation:
For each i ∈ N and H ∈ σi, let Chi(H) = {T ∈ (2H ∩ σi) | T i T´ for each
T´ ∈ (2H ∩ σi)} denote the set of maximals of i on H under i. Hence for any
player i, Chi(N) denote the set of best coalitions of player i over σi under i, i.e.,
Chi(N) = {H ∈ σi | H i T for each T ∈ σi}.
1Note that that there is no top-coalition of {2, 3, 4}, since for all i ∈ {2, 3} we have {2, 3, 4} i T
for any T $ {2, 3, 4} with i ∈ T , however {2, 4} 4 {2, 3, 4}. Hence, this game does not satisfy the
top-coalition property.
2The unique core stable partition for this game is pi = {{1, 4}, {2, 3}}. However pi is not strongly
Nash stable, since player 3 strongly Nash blocks the partition pi by joining {1, 4}, i.e., pi {3}−−→ p´i =
{{1, 3, 4}, {2}}, and p´i(3) 3 pi(3). So, there does not exist a strongly Nash stable partition for this
game. Hence, the weak top-coalition property does not guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable
partition.
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We now construct a hedonic game such that players have strict preferences and
the weak top-choice property is satisfied, and such that the game has more than one
strongly Nash stable partition.
Example 20 Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and players’ preferences
are as follows:
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 1 {1, 6} 1 {1} 1 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 2 {2, 5} 2 {1, 2} 2 {2} 2 . . .,
{1, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 3 {3, 4} 3 {3} 3 . . .,
{3, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {1, 4} 4 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 4 {4} 4 . . .,
{2, 5} 5 {4, 5} 5 {3, 5} 5 {1, 5} 5 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 5 {5} 5 . . .,
{1, 6} 6 {5, 6} 6 {4, 6} 6 {3, 6} 6 {2, 6} 6 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} 6 {6} 6
. . ..
Note that W (N) = {{N}} with H1 = {1, 2}, H2 = {3}, H3 = {4}, H4 =
{5} and H5 = {6}, i.e., this game satisfies the weak top-choice property. So, pi? =
W (N) = {{N}} is a strongly Nash stable partition.
Now we will show that the partition pi = {{1, 6}, {2, 5}, {3, 4}} is also a strongly
Nash stable partition. Suppose that pi = {{1, 6}, {2, 5}, {3, 4}} is not strongly Nash
stable. Then, there exist a nonempty set of players H ⊆ N and a partition pi ∈
(Π(N) \ {pi}) such that pi H−→ pi, and pi(i) i pi(i) for all i ∈ H .
Note that Ch4(N) = pi(4) = {3, 4}, Ch5(N) = pi(5) = {2, 5} and Ch6(N) =
pi(6) = {1, 6}, so for any nonempty set of players H which strongly Nash blocks the
partition pi we have H ∩ {4, 5, 6} = ∅. So, the candidates for H which strongly Nash
blocks the partition pi are {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}.
The only partition pi ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}) for player 1 that satisfies pi(1) 1 pi(1) is
the partition p¯i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, i.e., for all partitions p˜i ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi, p¯i}) we have
pi(1) 1 p˜i(1), and the only partition pi ∈ (Π(N) \ {pi}) for player 2 that satisfies
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pi(2) 2 pi(2) is the partition p¯i = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
Now, the partition p¯i cannot be reachable from pi by any of the candidates of H that
contains player 1 or player 2 or both of them which strongly Nash blocks the partition
pi, that is p¯i cannot be reachable from pi by {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}.
Hence, 1 /∈ H and 2 /∈ H for any H which strongly Nash blocks the partition pi. So,
the only remaining candidate for H is the singleton {3}. Now, we have that
pi
{3}−−→ {{1, 6}, {2, 5}, {3}, {4}}, but pi(3) = {3, 4} 3 {3};
pi
{3}−−→ {{1, 3, 6}, {2, 5}, {4}}, but pi(3) = {3, 4} 3 {1, 3, 6};
pi
{3}−−→ {{1, 6}, {2, 3, 5}, {4}}, but pi(3) = {3, 4} 3 {2, 3, 5}.
So, H 6= {3}.
So, there is no subset of players H which strongly Nash blocks the partition pi,
contradiction. Hence, pi is strongly Nash stable.
We will prove that if a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property and every
player’s best coalition is unique then there exists a unique strongly Nash stable partition
which consists of the top-coalitions of N .
Proposition 26 If a hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property and | Chi(N) |= 1
is satisfied for each player i ∈ N , then there exists a unique strongly Nash stable
partition pi? with pi? = R(N), where R(N) denote the top-coalitions of the grand
coalition N .
Proof Let G = (N,) be a hedonic game which satisfies the top-choice property
and | Chi(N) |= 1 for each player i ∈ N . Let R(N) = {H1, . . . , HK} denote top-
coalitions of N . R(N) is a partition since the game satisfies the top-choice property.
Let R(N) = pi?. We will show that pi? is strongly Nash stable. Since the game
satisfies the top-choice property and | Chi(N) |= 1 is satisfied for any player i ∈ N ,
each player is in her unique best coalition under pi?, that is we have Chi(N) = pi?(i)
for all i ∈ N . So, for all i ∈ N , we have pi?(i) i pi(i) for any pi ∈ Π(N). Hence pi?
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is strongly Nash stable.
For uniqueness, notice that a strongly Nash stable partition must include H1, oth-
erwise H1 blocks the partition since for all i ∈ H1 we have that H1 i T for any
T ∈ (σi \ {H1}). With the same argument we say that a strongly Nash stable parti-
tion must include H2, . . . , HK−1 and HK . Hence pi? is the unique strongly Nash stable
partition. 
We now show that the top-choice property and the top-coalition property are inde-
pendent of each other.
Lemma 22 The top-choice property neither implies nor is implied by the top-coalition
property.
Proof [the top-choice property; the top-coalition property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players’ preferences are as follows:
{1, 2, 3, 4} 1 {1, 2} 1 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 2 {2, 3} 2 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 3 {1, 3} 3 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 4 {4} 4 . . ..
This hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property, i.e., R(N) = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}.
However, it fails to satisfy the top-coalition property, since there is no top-coalition of
N˜ = {1, 2, 3}.
[the top-coalition property; the top-choice property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences are as follows:
{1} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2, 3},
{2} 2 {1, 2} 2 {2, 3} 2 {1, 2, 3},
170
{1, 2, 3} 3 {1, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {3}.
This hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property, where for any nonempty set
of players N˜ ⊆ N with 1 ∈ N˜ and 2 /∈ N˜ , the top coalition of N˜ is {1}, and for any
nonempty set of players N̂ ⊆ N with 2 ∈ N̂ and 1 /∈ N̂ , the top coalition of N̂ is {2}.
For any nonempty set of players N´ ⊆ N containing players 1 and 2, the top coalition
of N´ is both {1} and {2}.
However, this game does not satisfy the top-choice property, since R(N) =
{{1}, {2}} which is not a partition for N = {1, 2, 3}.3 
We now show that the top-choice property and the weak top-coalition property are
independent of each other.
Lemma 23 The top-choice property neither implies nor is implied by the weak top-
coalition property.
Proof [the top-choice property; the weak top-coalition property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players’ preferences are as follows:4
{1, 2, 3, 4} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1} 1 {1, 2, 3} 1 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 3} 2 {1, 2} 2 {2} 2 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {1, 3} 3 {3} 3 . . .,
{1, 2, 3, 4} 4 {4} 4 . . ..
This hedonic game satisfies the top-choice property, i.e., R(N) = {{1, 2, 3, 4}}.
However, it fails to satisfy the weak top-coalition property since there does not exist a
weak top-coalition of N˜ = {1, 2, 3}.
3The unique core stable partition for this game is pi = {{1}, {2}, {3}}. However pi is not strongly
Nash stable, since player 3 strongly Nash blocks the partition pi by joining {1}, i.e., pi {3}−−→ p´i =
{{1, 3}, {2}}, and p´i(3) 3 pi(3). So, there is no strongly Nash stable partition for this game. Hence,
the top-coalition property does not guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition.
4This example is a modification of an example given in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
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[the weak top-coalition property; the top-choice property]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences are as follows:5
{1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1},
{2, 3} 2 {1, 2} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2},
{1, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {3}.
This hedonic game satisfies the weak top-coalition property. A weak top-coalition
of N is {1, 2, 3} with corresponding partition H1 = {1}, H2 = {3} and H3 = {2}. A
weak top-coalition of any N˜ which is a strict subset ofN is N˜ withH1 = N˜ . However,
this game does not satisfy the top-choice property since R(N) = ∅.6 
We will show that preferences are descending separable and the weak top-choice
properties are independent of each other.
Lemma 24 Preferences being descending separable and the weak top-choice property
are independent of each other.
Proof [preferences being descending separable; the weak top-choice property]7
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and the profile of purely cardinal preferences gener-
ated by the following individual weights: w(1) = 6, w(i) = 1 for i = 2, 3, and
w(j) = −2 for j = 4, 5, 6, 7. Players 1, 2 and 3 are each indifferent between coali-
tions {1, 2, 3, 4, 7} and {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}. Now, modify these agents’ preferences by mak-
ing {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} 1 {1, 2, 3, 4, 7} and {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} 3 {1, 2, 3, 4, 7}, and making
{1, 2, 3, 4, 7} 2 {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}, without changing any other relationships.
5This examle is taken from Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
6The partition pi? = {{1, 2, 3}} is strongly Nash stable for this game. Hence, this example also
shows that the top-choice property is not necessary for a hedonic game to have a strongly Nash stable
partition.
7We will take the example of Burani and Zwicker (2003, page 43), and apply their methods (given
in page 42) to this example.
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The resulting preference profile is not purely cardinal,8 but it is descending separa-
ble with the identity function p.
Now, the analysis of Burani and Zwicker (2003, page 43) given in the proof of their
proposition 4 applies here, to show that there is no weak top-coalition of N . Hence,
this game fails to satisfy the weak top-choice property.
[the weak top-choice property; preferences being descending separable]
Let G = (N,), where N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences be as follows:
{1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1},
{1, 2} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 3} 2 {2},
{2, 3} 3 {1, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {3}.
This hedonic game satisfies the weak top-choice property, i.e., W (N) =
{{1, 2, 3}} with H1 = {1}, H2 = {2} and H3 = {3}. Suppose that there exists a
reference ranking p such that CRI is satisfied. Then, {2, 3} 3 {1, 3} implies that we
have 2 > 1 under p, and {1, 3} 1 {1, 2} implies that we have 3 > 2 under p. So, p
is such that 3 > 2 > 1. However, for agent 2 we have {1, 2} 2 {2, 3}, a contradic-
tion. So, there is no p such that CRI is satisfied. Hence, players’ preferences are not
descending separable. 
We now provide an example showing that purely cardinal preferences are not nec-
essary for a hedonic game to have a strongly Nash stable partition.
Example 21 Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences are as
follows:
{1, 2} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2, 3} 1 {1},
{1, 2} 2 {2} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 3},
{3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {1, 3}.
8Since the resulting profile is not additively separable, i.e., for agent 2 we have {2, 3, 4, 7} ∼2
{2, 3, 5, 6} and also {1, 2, 3, 4, 7} 2 {1, 2, 3, 5, 6}.
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Now, pi? = {{1, 2}, {3}} is a strongly Nash stable partition. Suppose that players’
preferences are purely cardinal. Since {1, 3} 1 {1}, we have v(1, 3) = w(1)+w(3) >
0 = v(1, 1). Since {3} 3 {1, 3}, we have that v(3, 3) = 0 > w(1) + w(3) = v(1, 3),
a contradiction. So, players’ preferences are not purely cardinal.9
We now show that preferences being purely cardinal and the weak top-choice prop-
erty are independent of each other.
Lemma 25 Purely cardinal preferences neither implies nor is implied by the weak
top-choice property.
Proof [purely cardinal preferences; the weak top-choice property]
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and players’ preferences are purely cardinal with indi-
vidual weights w(1) = 6, w(i) = 1 for i = 2, 3, and w(j) = −2 for j = 4, 5, 6, 7.10
Now, additively separable and symmetric preferences is represented by the following
functions v = (vi)i∈N :
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
v1 0 7 7 4 4 4 4
v2 7 0 2 −1 −1 −1 −1
v3 7 2 0 −1 −1 −1 −1
v4 4 −1 −1 0 −4 −4 −4
v5 4 −1 −1 −4 0 −4 −4
v6 4 −1 −1 −4 −4 0 −4
v7 4 −1 −1 −4 −4 −4 0
Each of the following partition is a top-segment partition and is strongly Nash
stable:
pi1 = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5}, {6}, {7}}, pi2 = {{1, 2, 3, 5}, {4}, {6}, {7}},
pi3 = {{1, 2, 3, 6}, {4}, {5}, {7}}, pi4 = {{1, 2, 3, 7}, {4}, {5}, {6}}.
9In fact, this hedonic game is not representable with additively separable and symmetric preferences,
since for player 1 we have {1, 3} 1 {1} and for player 3 we have {3} 3 {1, 3}.
10This example is taken from Burani and Zwicker (2003) which is used to show that a game with
purely cardinal preferences need not satisfy the weak top-coalition property.
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Burani and Zwicker (2003) showed that there is no weak top-coalition of N for
this game, so we have that W (N) = ∅. Hence, this game fails to satisfy the weak
top-choice property.
[the weak top-choice property; purely cardinal preferences]
Let G = (N,) where N = {1, 2, 3} and players’ preferences are as follows:
{1, 2, 3} 1 {1} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 3},
{1, 2} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2} 2 {2, 3},
{2, 3} 3 {1, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3} 3 {3}.
This game satisfies the weak top-choice property, i.e., W (N) = {{1, 2, 3}} with
H1 = {1}, H2 = {2} and H3 = {3}.
Suppose that players’ preferences are purely cardinal. We have {1} 1 {1, 2},
so v(1, 1) = 0 > w(1) + w(2) = v(1, 2). Since {1, 2} 2 {2}, we have v(1, 2) =
w(1) + w(2) > 0 = v(2, 2), a contradiction. So, players’ preferences are not purely
cardinal. 
We will now construct an example showing that neither the weak top-choice prop-
erty nor the preferences being descending separable is necessary for a hedonic game
to have a strongly Nash stable partition.
Example 22 LetG = (N,), whereN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the preferences of players
are as follows:
{1, 3, 5} 1 {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 4} 1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2} 1 {1, 2, 5} 1 {1} 1
{N} 1 . . .,
{1, 2, 5} 2 {1, 2} 2 {N} 2 {2, 3, 4, 5} 2 {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 3} 2 {2, 4, 5} 2
{2, 4} 2 {2} 2 . . .,
{1, 2, 3} 3 {2, 3} 3 {1, 3, 5} 3 {2, 3, 4, 5} 3 {1, 3} 3 {3, 4} 3
{3, 4, 5} 3 {3} 3 . . .,
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{2, 3, 4, 5} 4 {4, 5} 4 {N} 4 {3, 4} 4 {2, 4} 4 {4} 4 . . .,
{N} 5 {2, 3, 4, 5} 5 {1, 2, 5} 5 {1, 3, 5} 5 {2, 4, 5} 5 {4, 5} 5 {5} 5
. . ..
Claim 1. The partition pi? = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}} is strongly Nash stable.
Proof of Claim 1. Notice that Ch3(N) = {1, 2, 3} = pi?(3), so player 3 is not a
member of any subset of players H that strongly Nash blocks the partition pi?.
Also note that pi? is Nash stable, that is for all i ∈ N we have pi?(i) i H ∪ {i} for
any H ∈ (pi? ∪ {∅}).
Now, we will show that pi? is core stable. Since 3 /∈ H for anyH that blocks pi?, we
have that neither the grand coalitionN nor the coalition {2, 3, 4, 5} blocks the partition
pi?. Note that Ch4(N) = {2, 3, 4, 5} and pi?(4) = {4, 5} is the second best alternative
for player 4. So, we have that 4 /∈ H for any H that blocks pi?. Remaining candidates
of coalitions that block pi? are as follows:
H = {1, 2, 5} cannot block pi?, since we have {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 2, 5} for player 1;
H = {1, 2} cannot block pi?, since we have {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 2} for player 1;
H = {1, 5} cannot block pi?, since we have {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 5} for player 1;
H = {2, 5} cannot block pi?, since we have {4, 5} 5 {2, 5} for player 5.
So, there is no coalition which blocks pi?, that is pi? is core stable.
Hence, the partition pi? is both Nash and core stable. Now, we will check other
cases to show that pi? is also strongly Nash stable.
Players 1 and 2 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by joining {4, 5}, pi? {1,2}−−−→
{{1, 2, 4, 5}, {3}}, since {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 2, 4, 5}.
Players 4 and 5 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by joining {1, 2, 3},
pi?
{4,5}−−−→ {{N}}, since {4, 5} 4 {N}.
Players 1 and 4 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by exchanging their current
coalitions, pi?
{1,4}−−−→ {{1, 5}, {2, 3, 4}}, since {4, 5} 4 {2, 3, 4}.
Players 1 and 5 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by exchanging their current
coalitions, pi?
{1,5}−−−→ {{1, 4}, {2, 3, 5}}, since {1, 2, 3} 1 {1, 4}.
Players 2 and 4 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by exchanging their current
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coalitions, pi?
{2,4}−−−→ {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}}, since {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 5}.
Players 2 and 5 cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? by exchanging their current
coalitions, pi?
{2,5}−−−→ {{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4}}, since {1, 2, 3} 2 {2, 4}.
H = {1, 2, 4} cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? that players 1 and 2
leave from their current coalition and move to player 4’s coalition, and player 4
leaves from her current coalition and moves to players 1 and 2’s coalition, pi?
{1,2,4}−−−−→
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}, since {4, 5} 4 {3, 4}.
H = {1, 2, 5} cannot strongly Nash block the partition pi? that players 1 and 2
leave from their current coalition and move to player 5’s coalition, and player 5
leaves from her current coalition and moves to players 1 and 2’s coalition, pi?
{1,2,5}−−−−→
{{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}}, since {4, 5} 5 {3, 5}.
Hence, pi? is strongly Nash stable.
Claim 2. This hedonic game does not satisfy the weak top-choice property.
Proof of Claim 2. We will show that the weak top-coalitions of the grand coalition
is not a partition of N .
Note that for player 1 we have {1} 1 {N}, so N is not a weak top-coalition of
itself for any ordered partition.
Also notice that {1, 2, 3} is a weak top-coalition of N with H1 = {3}, H2 = {1}
and H3 = {2}.
Now, we will show that {4, 5} is not a weak top-coalition of N for any ordered
partition.
{4, 5} is not a weak top-coalition of N with H1 = {4, 5}, since for player 5 we have
Ch5(N) 6= {4, 5}, i.e., {N} 5 {4, 5};
{4, 5} is not a weak top-coalition ofN withH1 = {4} andH2 = {5}, sinceCh4(N) 6=
{4, 5} and also notice that {1, 2, 5} ⊂ N , {1, 2, 5} 5 {4, 5} and {1, 2, 5} ∩ {4} = ∅;
{4, 5} is not a weak top-coalition of N with H1 = {5} and H2 = {4}, since for player
5, we have Ch5(N) 6= {4, 5}.
So, W (N) = {{1, 2, 3}} which is not a partition for N . Hence, this game does not
satisfy the weak top-choice property.
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Claim 3. None of the conditions of descending separable preferences is satisfied.
Proof of Claim 3. Condition 1 (CRI). Suppose that there exists a reference ranking
p such that CRI is satisfied. Under p, either 3 > 4 or 4 > 3 holds. 3 > 4 does not
hold, since we have {1, 4} 1 {1, 3} for agent 1. 4 > 3 does not hold, since we have
{2, 3} 2 {2, 4} for agent 2. So, there is no p such that CRI is satisfied.
Condition 2 (DD). Suppose that there exists a reference ranking p such that DD is
satisfied. Then, either 1 > 2 or 2 > 1 holds under p. If 1 > 2 holds, then {2, 3, 4, 5} 2
{2} for agent 2 implies that {1, 3, 4, 5} 1 {1} must hold for agent 1. However, for
agent 1 we have {1} 1 {1, 3, 4, 5}. So, 1 > 2 does not hold. If 2 > 1 holds, then
{1, 3, 5} 1 {1} for agent 1 implies that {2, 3, 5} 2 {2} must hold for agent 2.
However, for agent 2 we have {2} 2 {2, 3, 5}, so 2 > 1 does not hold. Hence, there
is no p such that DD is satisfied.
Condition 3 (SP). If SP holds, then {4, 5} 5 {5} for agent 5 implies that
{1, 3, 4, 5} 5 {1, 3, 5}. However, we have {1, 3, 5} 5 {1, 3, 4, 5}. Hence, SP is
violated.
Condition 4 (GSP). If GSP holds, then {1, 2, 5} 2 {2} for agent 2 implies that
{1, 2, 3, 5} 2 {2, 3}. However, we have {2, 3} 2 {1, 2, 3, 5}. Hence, GSP is vio-
lated.
Condition 5 (RESP). If RESP holds, then {1, 2} 2 {2, 5} for agent 2 implies that
we must have {1, 2, 3, 4} 2 {2, 3, 4, 5}. However, we have {2, 3, 4, 5} 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Hence, RESP is violated.
Condition 6 (REP). Suppose that there exists a reference ranking p such that REP
is satisfied. Then, either 3 > 5 or 5 > 3 holds under p. If 3 > 5 holds, then {N} 5
{5} for agent 5 implies that {N} 3 {3} must hold for agent 3. However, we have
{3} 3 {N}. So, 3 > 5 does not hold. If 5 > 3 holds, then {3, 4, 5} 3 {3} for
agent 3 implies that we must have {3, 4, 5} 5 {5} for agent 5. However, we have
{5} 5 {3, 4, 5}. So, 5 > 3 does not hold. Hence, there is no p such that REP is
satisfied.
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We now provide omitted proofs of Chapter 3.
Proof of Lemma 10 Let F be an SCR which is implementable via Rechtsstaat
ω = (β, γ). Let i ∈ N , B ∈ P0(A) and x ∈ B.
(i) Let B 6= A and {i} /∈ γ(x, y) for all y ∈ (A \ B). We will show that
x ∈ Ess(F, i, B), i.e., we will show that there exists RN ∈ W (A)N such that
L(x,Ri) ⊆ B and x ∈ F (RN). We consider profile RN where for agent i, Ri is
any weak ordering such that L(x,Ri) = B, and any agent j ∈ (N \ {i}) is in-
different among all alternatives under RN , i.e., top(Rj) = A. We will show that
x ∈ F (RN). Since top(Rj) = A for all j ∈ (N \ {i}), for any y ∈ (A \ B) we have
β(x, y;RN) = {i}. This fact, together with {i} /∈ γ(x, y) for all y ∈ (A \ B), implies
that β(x, y;RN) ∩ γ(x, y) = ∅ for any y ∈ (A \ B). So, x ∈ ε(ω,RN). As F is
implementable via ω, we have x ∈ F (RN). Hence, x ∈ Ess(F, i, B).
(ii) Let B 6= A and {i} ∈ γ(x, y) for some y ∈ (A \ B). We will show that x /∈
Ess(F, i, B). Suppose not. Then, there exists R̂N ∈ W (A)N such that L(x, R̂i) ⊆ B
and x ∈ F (R̂N). Since B $ A and L(x, R̂i) ⊆ B, for all y ∈ (A \ B) we have yP̂ix.
So, {i} ∈ β(x, y; R̂N) for all y ∈ (A \ B). This fact combined with {i} ∈ γ(x, y) for
some y ∈ (A \ B) implies that there exists at least an alternative y ∈ (A \ B) such
that {i} ∈ [β(x, y; R̂N) ∩ γ(x, y)], which is in contradiction with x ∈ F (R̂N). Hence,
x /∈ Ess(F, i, B).
(iii) Let B = A. We will show that Ess(F, i, B) = A. Let x ∈ A. We consider
profile RN where top(Ri) = {x} for agent i, and top(Rj) = A for all j ∈ (N \ {i}).
Now, β(x, y;RN) = ∅ for all y ∈ (A \ {x}) implying that x ∈ F (RN). Hence
x ∈ Ess(F, i, B), and since x was arbitrary we have Ess(F, i, B) = A.
We now prove Corollary 1 which states that if an SCR is implementable via some
Rechtsstaat satisfying ETEA, then it satisfies Condition µ of Moore and Repullo
(1990).
Proof of Corollary 1: Let F : W (A)N → P0(A) be an SCR that is implementable
via some Rechtsstaat ω = (β, γ) satisfying ETEA. We will show that F satisfies
Condition µ.
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Let RN ∈ W (A)N and a ∈ A be such that a ∈ F (RN). We take B = A and
Ci(a,RN) = L(a,Ri), and show that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
(i) Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N be such that L(a,Ri) ⊆ L(a, R̂i) for all i ∈ N . Then, a ∈
F (R̂N) since F satisfies Maskin monotonicity (by Proposition 9). Hence, condition (i)
is satisfied.
(ii) Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N , i ∈ N and c ∈ A be such that c ∈ L(a,Ri) ⊆ L(c, R̂i), and
L(c, R̂j) = A for all j ∈ (N \ {i}). We will show that c ∈ F (R̂N).
Let RN ∈ W (A)N be such that cI ia for all i ∈ N , and for any z, z´ ∈ (A \ {c}),
zRiz´ if and only if zRiz´. That is, for each i ∈ N , Ri is obtained from Ri by placing
c indifferent to a without changing the ordering of other alternatives. Note that for all
i ∈ N we have L(a,Ri) ∪ {c} = L(a,Ri), i.e., L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,Ri) for all i ∈ N .
So, a ∈ F (RN) since a ∈ F (RN) and F is Maskin monotonic (by Proposition 9).
This result, together with cI ia for all i ∈ N , implies that c ∈ F (RN) since F satisfies
ETEA.
We will now show that for all i ∈ N , L(c, Ri) ⊆ L(c, R̂i). Since L(c, R̂j) = A for
all j ∈ (N \ {i}), L(c, Rj) ⊆ L(c, R̂j) = A is trivially satisfied for all j ∈ (N \ {i}).
For the agent i we have L(a,Ri) = L(c, Ri) because c ∈ L(a,Ri) and cI ia. This fact,
together with L(a,Ri) ⊆ L(c, R̂i), implies that L(c, Ri) ⊆ L(c, R̂i). Hence, for all
i ∈ N , we have L(c, Ri) ⊆ L(c, R̂i). Then, c ∈ F (R̂N) by Maskin monotonicity of
F . Hence, condition (ii) is satisfied.
(iii) Let R̂N ∈ W (A)N and c ∈ A be such that L(c, R̂i) = A for all i ∈ N . Since
L(c, R̂i) = A for all i ∈ N , for all b ∈ (A \ {c}) we have β(c, b; R̂N) = ∅. So,
c ∈ ε(ω, R̂N). Hence, c ∈ F (R̂N), showing that condition (iii) is satisfied.
Hence, F satisfies Condition µ. So, F is Nash implementable by Moore and Re-
pullo (1990)’s result when there are at least three agents in the society.
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We now provide omitted proofs of Chapter 4.
We first provide an SCR which satisfies Young’s cancellation property (Y-Ca) but
violates degree equality (DE).
Example 23 Let A = {a, b, c}. The set of all weak preference orderings over A is
given below.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13
a, b, c a a b b c c a b c a, b a, c b, c
b c a c a b b, c a, c a, b c b a
c b c a b a
We define F˜ as follows:
• for #N = 1, F˜ (Rk) = top(Rk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , 13},
• for #N = 2, F˜ (R11 +R11) = {c}, F˜ (R12 +R12) = {b}, F˜ (R13 +R13) = {a},
and for any other profile (Rj +Rk) we have F˜ (Rj +Rk) = A,
• for #N ≥ 3, F˜ (RN) = A for all RN ∈ W (A)N .
It is clear that F˜ satisfies Young’s cancellation property (Y-Ca). For all x ∈ A we
have D(x,R2 + R4) = D(x,R11 + R11), however F˜ (R2 + R4) 6= F˜ (R11 + R11).
Hence, F˜ violates degree equality (DE).11
Proof of Lemma 12 Let F be an SCR which satisfies faithfulness (F), reinforce-
ment (RE) and degree equality (DE). Let RN ∈ W (A)N and x ∈ A.
(i) Note that for anyR ∈ W (A) and any x ∈ A, we have d(x,R)+d(x, R̂) = m+1.
So, for any x ∈ A we have D(x,RN) +D(x, R̂N) = (m+ 1)n.
11We note that F˜ also satisfies neutrality (N) and faithfulness (F), and violates reinforcement (RE).
181
We now consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
For every x ∈ A, d(x, R¯) = m+1
2
. Consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n. So,
for every x ∈ A we have D(x, R¯2n) = (m+1)n. So, for all x ∈ A, D(x,RN + R̂N) =
D(x, R¯2n) = (m + 1)n. Then, degree equality (DE) implies that F (RN + R̂N) =
F (R¯2n). Faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply that F (R¯2n) = A. Hence,
F (RN + R̂N) = A.
(ii) We know that for any x ∈ A, D(x,RN + R̂N) = (m + 1)n. We now consider
the profile
∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N + R̂N)τ =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R
N)τ +
∑
τ∈Ψx(R̂
N)τ = Rx + R̂x.
We find the total degree of every alternative atRx+ R̂x. For alternative x, we have
D(x,Rx + R̂x) = (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n, and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}) we have
D(y,Rx + R̂x) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (m+ 1)n]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1)]
= (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n.
Hence, for every a ∈ A we have D(a,Rx + R̂x) = (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n.
Now, consider following profile, R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
The degree of x at R¯ is (m+ 1)/2. Consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n. We
now consider the profile R¯2nx =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R¯
2n)τ . For alternative x we have
D(x, R¯2nx ) = (m− 1)!2nm+12 = (m− 1)!n(m+ 1). For any y ∈ (A \ {x}), we have
D(y, R¯2nx ) = (m − 2)![m(m + 1)n − n(m + 1)] = (m − 2)![(m + 1)n(m − 1)] =
(m− 1)!(m+ 1)n.
Hence, for every a ∈ A we have D(a, R¯2nx ) = (m − 1)!(m + 1)n. So, for every
a ∈ A we have D(a,Rx + R̂x) = D(a, R¯2nx ). Then degree equality (DE) implies
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that F (Rx + R̂x) = F (R¯2nx ). Faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply that
F (R¯2nx ) = A. So, F (Rx + R̂x) = A.
Proof of Lemma 15 Let F be an SCR satisfying faithfulness (F), reinforcement
(RE) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters, RN ∈ W (A)N
and x ∈ A. Consider two copies of RN , denoted by R2N . Let D(x,R2N) =∑
Ri∈R2N d(x,Ri) = tx andRx =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R
2N)τ .
(i) SinceD(x,RN) = (m+1)n
2
, we have tx = (m+1)n. We will show that F (Rx) =
A. Let us first find the total degree of every alternative at the profileRx:
D(x,Rx) = (m− 1)!tx = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n],
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y,Rx) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− tx]
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (m+ 1)n)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1)]
= (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n].
Hence, for all a ∈ A, D(a,Rx) = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n].
We now consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
The degree of x at R¯ is m+1
2
. Consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n. Consider the
profile R¯2nx =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R¯
2n)τ . Now,
D(x, R¯2nx ) = (m− 1)!2n(m+12 ) = (m− 1)!(nm+ n) = (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n,
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y, R¯2nx ) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (nm+ n)]
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (m+ 1)n]
= (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n.
Now, for all a ∈ Awe haveD(a,Rx) = D(a, R¯2nx ) = (m−1)!(m+1)n. Then, de-
gree equality (DE) implies that F (Rx) = F (R¯2nx ). Faithfulness (F) and reinforcement
(RE) imply that F (R¯2nx ) = A. Hence, F (Rx) = A.
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(ii) SinceD(x,RN) < (m+1)n
2
, we have tx < (m+1)n. We will show that F (Rx) =
{x}.
Let k = (m + 1)n − tx. Note that k ∈ Z++. We find the total degree of every
alternative atRx,
D(x,Rx) = (m− 1)!tx = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n− k],
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y,Rx) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− tx]
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− ((m+ 1)n− k)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1) + k].
Now, consider following profile, R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
The degree of x at R¯ is m+1
2
, i.e., d(x, R¯) = m+1
2
. Consider 2k copies of R¯, denoted
by R¯2k. Consider the profile R¯x =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R¯
2k)τ ). Now,
D(x, R¯x) = (m− 1)!2k(m+12 ) = (m− 1)!(km+ k),
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y, R¯x) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − (km+ k)].
We now consider the profile Rx + R¯x. Note that the total number of voters is
(m− 1)!(2n+ 2k) at the profileRx + R¯x, and
D(x,Rx + R¯x) = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n− k] + (m− 1)!(km+ k)
= (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ km],
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y,Rx + R¯x) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1) + k] + (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − (km+ k)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1) +m(m+ 1)k − km].
Consider following profile R´ ∈ W (A):
R´
A \ {y}
y
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where y ∈ (A \ {x}). Now, the degree of x at R´ is m
2
, i.e., d(x, R´) = m
2
. Consider 2k
copies of R´, denoted by R´2k. Consider the profile R´x =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R´
2k)τ ). We have,
D(x, R´x) = (m− 1)!2k(m2 ) = (m− 1)!km,
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y, R´x) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − km].
We again consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
The degree of x at R¯ is m+1
2
. Consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n. Consider the
profile R¯2nx =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R¯
2n)τ . Now,
D(x, R¯2nx ) = (m− 1)!2n(m+12 ) = (m− 1)!(nm+ n) = (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n,
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y, R¯2nx ) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (nm+ n)]
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− (m+ 1)n]
= (m− 2)!(m+ 1)n(m− 1).
We now consider the profile R´x + R¯2nx . Note that the total number of voters at
R´x + R¯2nx is (m − 1)!(2n + 2k) which is equal to the number of voters at Rx + R¯x,
and for every a ∈ A we have D(a, R´x + R¯2nx ) = D(a,Rx + R¯x), that is,
for alternative x we have,
D(x, R´x + R¯2nx ) = D(x, R´x) +D(x, R¯2nx )
= (m− 1)!km+ (m− 1)!(m+ 1)n
= (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ km]
= D(x,Rx + R¯x),
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}) we have,
D(y, R´x + R¯2nx ) = D(y, R´x) +D(y, R¯2nx )
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − km] + (m− 2)!(m+ 1)n(m− 1)
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − km+ (m+ 1)n(m− 1)]
= D(y,Rx + R¯x).
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Since F satisfies degree equality (DE), we have F (Rx + R¯x) = F (R´x + R¯2nx ).
We now have that F
(R¯2nx ) = A and F(R´x) = {x}12 because F satisfies faithful-
ness (F) and reinforcement (RE). So, F
(R´x) ∩ F(R¯2nx ) = {x}, then reinforcement
(RE) implies that F (R´x + R¯2nx ) = {x}.
Hence, F (Rx + R¯x) = {x}. By faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE), we have,
F
(R¯x) = A. Then, {x} = F (Rx+ R¯x) = F (Rx)∩F(R¯x) = F (Rx)∩A = F (Rx).
(iii) Since D(x,RN) > (m+1)n
2
, we have tx > (m + 1)n. We will show that
F (Rx) ⊆ A \ {x}. Let tx = (m+ 1)n+ k. Note that k ∈ Z++. We calculate the total
degree of every alternative atRx,
D(x,Rx) = (m− 1)!tx = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ k],
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y,Rx) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− tx]
= (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)n− ((m+ 1)n+ k)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1)− k].
Consider following profile R´ ∈ W (A):
R´
A \ {y}
y
where y ∈ (A \ {x}). Now, the degree of x at R´ is m
2
. Consider 2k copies of R´,
denoted by R´2k. Consider the profile R´x =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R´
2k)τ ). Now,
D(x, R´x) = (m− 1)!2k(m2 ) = (m− 1)!km,
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y, R´x) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − km].
We now consider the profile Rx + R´x. Note that the total number of voters is
12Since x ∈ topR´, for every τ ∈ Ψx we have x ∈ topR´τ , and for every y ∈ (A \ {x}) there exists
τ ∈ Ψx such that y /∈ topR´τ . Hence,
⋂
τ∈Ψx topR´
τ = {x}.
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(m− 1)!(2n+ 2k) at the profileRx + R´x, and
D(x,Rx + R´x) = (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ k] + (m− 1)!km
= (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ k + km],
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}),
D(y,Rx + R´x) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1)− k] + (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)k − km]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1)− k +m(m+ 1)k − km]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1) +m(m+ 1)k − k(m+ 1)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n(m− 1) + k(m+ 1)(m− 1)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)(m− 1)(n+ k)].
Now, consider following profile, R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
The degree of x at R¯ is m+1
2
. Consider 2n + 2k copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n+2k.
Consider the profile R¯2n+2kx =
∑
τ∈Ψx(R¯
2n+2k)τ . Note that the total number of voters
is (m − 1)!(2n + 2k) at R¯2n+2kx which is equal to the number of voters at Rx + R´x,
and for every a ∈ A we have D(a,Rx + R´x) = D(a, R¯2n+2kx ), that is,
for alternative x we have,
D(x, R¯2n+2kx ) = (m− 1)!(2n+ 2k)(
m+ 1
2
)
= (m− 1)!(n+ k)(m+ 1)
= (m− 1)![nm+ n+ km+ k]
= (m− 1)![(m+ 1)n+ km+ k]
= D(x,Rx + R´x),
and for any y ∈ (A \ {x}) we have,
D(y, R¯2n+2kx ) = (m− 2)![m(m+ 1)(n+ k)− (n+ k)(m+ 1)]
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)(n+ k)(m− 1)]
= D(y,Rx + R´x).
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Since F satisfies degree equality (DE), we have F (Rx+R´x) = F (R¯2n+2kx ). Faith-
fulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply that F (R¯2n+2kx ) = A. So, F (Rx+R´x) = A.
We have that F (R´x) = {x} since F satisfies faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE).
If we suppose that x ∈ F (Rx), then F (Rx + R´x) = {x} which contradicts with
that F (Rx + R´x) = A. Hence, x /∈ F (Rx), i.e., F (Rx) ⊆ A \ {x}.
Proof of Lemma 16 Let F be an SCR satisfying faithfulness (F), reinforcement
(RE) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters, RN ∈ W (A)N
and x, y ∈ A. Consider two copies of RN , denoted by R2N . Let D(x,R2N) =
D(y,R2N) = t < (m + 1)n and Rxy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R
2N)τ . We will show that
F (Rxy) = {x, y}.
Let k = (m + 1)n− t. Note that k ∈ Z++. We calculate the total degree of every
alternative atRxy,
D(x,Rxy) = D(y,Rxy) = (m− 2)!t = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n− k],
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z,Rxy) = (m−3)![m(m+1)n−2t] = (m−3)![m(m+1)n−(2(m+1)n−2k)] =
(m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) + 2k].
Now, consider following profile, R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
Note that d(x, R¯) = d(y, R¯) = m+1
2
. Consider 2k copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2k.
Consider the profile R¯xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R¯
2k)τ . We have,
D(x, R¯xy) = D(y, R¯xy) = (m− 2)!2km+12 = (m− 2)!(km+ k),
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R¯xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2(km+ k)].
We now consider the profile Rxy + R¯xy. See that the total number of voters is
(m− 2)!(2n+ 2k) at the profileRx + R¯x, and
D(x,Rxy + R¯xy) = D(y,Rxy + R¯xy)
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n− k] + (m− 2)!(km+ k)
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ km],
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for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z,Rxy + R¯xy) = (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) + 2k]
+(m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2(km+ k)]
= (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) + 2k +m(m+ 1)k − 2km− 2k]
= (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) +m(m+ 1)k − 2km].
Consider following profile R´ ∈ W (A):
R´
A \ {z}
z
where z ∈ (A \ {x, y}). Now, d(x, R´) = d(y, R´) = m
2
. Consider 2k copies of R´,
denoted by R´2k. Consider the profile R´xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R´
2k)τ . We have,
D(x, R´xy) = D(y, R´xy) = (m− 2)!2km2 = (m− 2)!km,
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R´xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2km].
We again consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
where, d(x, R¯) = d(y, R¯) = m+1
2
. Consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n. Consider
the profile R¯2nxy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R¯
2n)τ . Now,
D(x, R¯2nxy) = D(y, R¯2nxy) = (m−2)!2nm+12 = (m−2)!(nm+n) = (m−2)!(m+1)n,
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R¯2nxy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)n− 2(m+ 1)n] = (m− 3)!(m+ 1)n[m− 2].
We now consider the profile R´xy + R¯2nxy . Note that the total number of voters is
(m− 2)!(2n+ 2k) which is equal to the number of voters atRxy + R¯xy, and for every
a ∈ A we have D(a, R´xy + R¯2nxy) = D(a,Rxy + R¯xy), that is,
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for alternatives x and y we have,
D(x, R´xy + R¯2nxy) = D(y, R´xy + R¯2nxy)
= (m− 2)!km+ (m− 2)!(m+ 1)n
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ km]
= D(x,Rxy + R¯xy)
= D(y,Rxy + R¯xy),
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}) we have,
D(z, R´xy + R¯2nxy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2km] + (m− 3)!(m+ 1)n[m− 2]
= (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) +m(m+ 1)k − 2km]
= D(z,Rxy + R¯xy).
Since F satisfies degree equality (DE), we have F (Rxy + R¯xy) = F (R´xy + R¯2nxy).
Now, F
(R¯2nxy) = A and F(R´xy) = {x, y}13 because F satisfies faithfulness (F)
and reinforcement (RE). So, F
(R´xy) ∩ F(R¯2nxy) = {x, y}, then reinforcement (RE)
implies F (R´xy + R¯2nxy) = {x, y}.
Hence, F (Rxy + R¯xy) = {x, y}. Faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply
that F
(R¯xy) = A. So, F (Rxy) ∩ F(R¯xy) 6= ∅. Then, {x, y} = F (Rxy + R¯xy) =
F (Rxy) ∩ F
(R¯xy) = F (Rxy) ∩ A = F (Rxy).
Proof of Lemma 17 Let F be an SCR satisfying faithfulness (F), reinforcement
(RE) and degree equality (DE). Let N be a finite set of voters, RN ∈ W (A)N and
x, y ∈ A.
Let D(x,RN) = tx <
(m+1)n
2
, D(y,RN) = ty <
(m+1)n
2
and tx < ty. Let
kx =
(m+1)n
2
− tx and ky = (m+1)n2 − ty. Since tx < ty, we have kx > ky. Let
k = kx − ky.
Consider two copies of RN , denoted by R2N , and considerRxy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R
2N)τ .
We will show that y /∈ F (Rxy) and x ∈ F (Rxy).
13Since x, y ∈ topR´, for every τ ∈ Ψxy we have x, y ∈ topR´τ , and for every z ∈ (A \ {x, y}) there
exists τ ∈ Ψxy such that z /∈ topR´τ . Hence,
⋂
τ∈Ψxy topR´
τ = {x, y}.
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We find the total degree of every alternative atRxy.
D(x,Rxy) = (m−2)!2tx = (m−2)![(m+1)n−2kx] = (m−2)![(m+1)n−2ky−2k].
D(y,Rxy) = (m− 2)!2ty = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n− 2ky].
For any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z,Rxy) = (m − 3)![m(m + 1)n − 2tx − 2ty] = (m − 3)![m(m + 1)n − 2(m +
1)n+ 4ky + 2k].
Note that 2k ∈ Z++ and 4ky ∈ Z++.
We now consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A), where
R¯
A
Note that d(x, R¯) = d(y, R¯) = m+1
2
. Consider 2k + 4ky copies of R¯, denoted by
R¯2k+4ky . Consider the profile R¯xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R¯
2k+4ky)τ . We have,
D(x, R¯xy) = D(y, R¯xy) = (m−2)!(2k+4ky)m+12 = (m−2)!(km+k+2kym+2ky),
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R¯xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)(k + 2ky)− 2(km+ k + 2kym+ 2ky)].
We now consider the profile R˜ ∈ W (A), where
R˜
x, y
A \ {x, y}
Note that d(x, R˜) = d(y, R˜) = 3
2
. Consider 2k copies of R˜, denoted by R˜2k. Consider
the profile R˜xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R˜
2k)τ . We have,
D(x, R˜xy) = D(y, R˜xy) = (m− 2)!(2k)32 = (m− 2)!3k,
for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R˜xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2(3k)].
We now consider the profileRxy+R¯xy+R˜xy. Note that the total number of voters
is (m− 2)!(2n+ 4k + 4ky) at the profileRxy + R¯xy + R˜xy, and
D(x,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n− 2ky − 2k]
+(m− 2)!(km+ k + 2kym+ 2ky) + (m− 2)!3k
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ 2kym+ km+ 2k],
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D(y,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n− 2ky]
+(m− 2)!(km+ k + 2kym+ 2ky) + (m− 2)!3k
= (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ 2kym+ km+ 4k],
for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)n− 2(m+ 1)n+ 4ky + 2k]
+(m− 3)![m(m+ 1)(k + 2ky)
−2(km+ k + 2kym+ 2ky)]
+(m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 2(3k)]
= (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) +m(m+ 1)(k + 2ky)
−2(km+ 2kym) +m(m+ 1)k − 6k].
Note that faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply that F (R¯xy) = A and
F (R˜xy) = {x, y}.
Now, we will construct another profile (with (m − 2)!(2n + 4k + 4ky) number of
voters) such that the total degree of every alternative is equal to its total degree at the
profile Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy and such that under this profile alternative y is not chosen
and alternative x is chosen by the SCR F .
Again, consider the profile R¯ ∈ W (A):
R¯
A
where d(x, R¯) = d(y, R¯) = m+1
2
. Now, consider 2n copies of R¯, denoted by R¯2n.
Consider the profile R¯2nxy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R¯
2n)τ . We have,
D(x, R¯2nxy) = D(y, R¯2nxy) = (m− 2)!(2n)m+12 = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n],
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R¯2nxy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)n− 2(m+ 1)n] = (m− 3)!(m+ 1)n(m− 2).
We now consider the profile R˘ ∈ W (A):
R˘
A \ {z}
z
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where z ∈ (A \ {x, y}). Note that d(x, R˘) = d(y, R˘) = m
2
. Consider 2k + 4ky copies
of R˘, denoted by R˘2k+4ky . Consider the profile R˘xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R˘
2k+4ky)τ . Now,
D(x, R˘xy) = D(y, R˘xy) = (m− 2)!(2k + 4ky)m2 = (m− 2)!(km+ 2kym),
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R˘xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)(k + 2ky)− 2(km+ 2kym)].
Consider the profile R` ∈ W (A):
R`
x
y
A \ {x, y}
where d(x, R`) = 1 and d(y, R`) = 2. Consider 2k copies of R`, denoted by R`2k.
Consider the profile R`xy =
∑
τ∈Ψxy(R`
2k)τ . Now,
D(x, R`xy) = (m− 2)!2k, D(y, R`xy) = (m− 2)!4k,
and for any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R`xy) = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − (2k + 4k)] = (m− 3)![m(m+ 1)k − 6k].
We now consider the profile R¯2nxy +R˘xy+R`xy. Note that the total number of voters
is (m−2)!(2n+4k+4ky) at the profile R¯2nxy+R˘xy+R`xy which is equal to the number
of voters at the profileRxy + R¯xy + R˜xy.
We now show that D(a, R¯2nxy + R˘xy + R`xy) = D(a,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy) for every
a ∈ A.
For alternative x,
D(x, R¯2nxy + R˘xy + R`xy) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ (km+ 2kym) + 2k]
= D(x,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy).
For alternative y,
D(y, R¯2nxy + R˘xy + R`xy) = (m− 2)![(m+ 1)n+ (km+ 2kym) + 4k]
= D(y,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy).
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For any z ∈ (A \ {x, y}),
D(z, R¯2nxy + R˘xy + R`xy) = (m− 3)![(m+ 1)n(m− 2) +m(m+ 1)(k + 2ky)
−2(km+ 2kym) +m(m+ 1)k − 6k]
= D(z,Rxy + R¯xy + R˜xy).
Hence, degree equality (DE) implies that F (Rxy+R¯xy+R˜xy) = F (R¯2nxy+R˘xy+R`xy).
Faithfulness (F) and reinforcement (RE) imply that F (R¯2nxy) = A, F (R˘xy) =
{x, y} and F (R`xy) = {x}. Then, reinforcement (RE) implies that F (R¯2nxy + R˘xy +
R`xy) = {x}. Hence, F (Rx + R¯x + R˜xy) = {x}. This result, together with the facts
that F (R¯xy) = A and F (R˜xy) = {x, y}, implies, y /∈ F (Rxy) and x ∈ F (Rxy).
We now show that degree equality (DE) is stronger than cancellation property
(CA).
Proof of Lemma 20 (i) Let F be an SCR which satisfies degree equality (DE). We
will show that F satisfies cancellation property (CA).
Let RN ∈ W (A)N be such that there exist i, j ∈ N and α, β ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}
such that rα(Ri) = rβ+1(Rj) and rα+1(Ri) = rβ(Rj). Let R´N (derived from RN ) be
as follows:
• for all voters l ∈ (N \ {i, j}), R´l = Rl,
• for voter i, rα(R´i) = rα(Ri) ∪ rα+1(Ri),
for all h < α, rh(R´i) = rh(Ri),
for all h > α + 1, rh(R´i) = rh+1(Ri),
• for voter j, rβ(R´j) = rβ(Rj) ∪ rβ+1(Rj),
for all h < β, rh(R´j) = rh(Rj),
for all h > β + 1, rh(R´j) = rh+1(Rj).
In order to show that F satisfies cancellation property (CA), we need to show that
F (RN) = F (R´N). It is enough to show that for all a ∈ A we have D(a,RN) =
D(a, R´N), since F satisfies degree equality (DE).
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Let x ∈ rα(Ri) = rβ+1(Rj) and y ∈ rα+1(Ri) = rβ(Rj).
Since R´l = Rl for all l ∈ (N \ {i, j}), for any a ∈ A we have D(a,RN\{i,j}) =
D(a, R´N\{i,j}). So, we will show followings:
1- d(x,Ri) + d(x,Rj) = d(x, R´i) + d(x, R´j),
2- d(y,Ri) + d(y,Rj) = d(y, R´i) + d(y, R´j), and
3- for any z ∈ [A\(rα(Ri)∪rα+1(Ri))], d(z,Ri)+d(z,Rj) = d(z, R´i)+d(z, R´j).
For voter i, we have SU(x,Ri) = SU(x, R´i), U(x, R´i) = U(x,Ri)∪rα+1(Ri) and
U(x,Ri) ∩ rα+1(Ri) = ∅. For voter j, we have U(x,Rj) = U(x, R´j), SU(x,Rj) =
SU(x, R´j) ∪ rβ(Rj) and SU(x, R´j) ∩ rβ(Rj) = ∅. Now,
d(x,Ri) + d(x,Rj) = (#SU(x,Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#SU(x,R´i)
+ #U(x,Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#U(x,R´i)−#rα+1(Ri)
+1)/2
+( #SU(x,Rj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#SU(x,R´j)+#rβ(Rj)
+ #U(x,Rj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#U(x,R´j)
+1)/2,
= [#SU(x, R´i) + #U(x, R´i) + 1]/2
+[#SU(x, R´j) + #U(x, R´j) + 1]/2,
= d(x, R´i) + d(x, R´j).
For voter i, we have U(y,Ri) = U(y, R´i), SU(y,Ri) = SU(y, R´i) ∪ rα(Ri) and
SU(y, R´i) ∩ rα(Ri) = ∅. For voter j, we have SU(y,Rj) = SU(y, R´j), U(y, R´j) =
U(y,Rj) ∪ rβ+1(Rj) and U(y,Rj) ∩ rβ+1(Rj) = ∅. So,
d(y,Ri) + d(y,Rj) = ( #SU(y,Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#SU(y,R´i)+#rα(Ri)
+ #U(y,Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#U(y,R´i)
+1)/2
+(#SU(y,Rj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#SU(y,R´j)
+ #U(y,Rj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
#U(y,R´j)−#rβ+1(Rj)
+1)/2,
= [#SU(y, R´i) + #U(y, R´i) + 1]/2
+[#SU(y, R´j) + #U(y, R´j) + 1]/2,
= d(y, R´i) + d(y, R´j).
Notice that for any z ∈ [A \ (rα(Ri) ∪ rα+1(Ri))], we have U(z,Ri) = U(z, R´i),
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SU(z,Ri) = SU(z, R´i), U(z,Rj) = U(z, R´j) and SU(z,Rj) = SU(z, R´j). So, for
any z ∈ [A \ (rα(Ri)∪ rα+1(Ri))] we have d(z,Ri) + d(z,Rj) = d(z, R´i) + d(z, R´j).
So, for all a ∈ A we have D(a,RN) = D(a, R´N). Then, we have F (RN) =
F (R´N) by degree equality (DE). Hence, F satisfies cancellation property (CA).
(ii) We now provide an SCR which satisfies cancellation property (CA) but violates
degree equality (DE).
Let A = {a, b, c}. The set of all weak preference orderings over A is given below.
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13
a, b, c a a b b c c a b c a, b a, c b, c
b c a c a b b, c a, c a, b c b a
c b c a b a
We define F` as follows:
• for #N = 1, F` (Rk) = A for all k ∈ {1, . . . , 13},
• for #N = 2, F` (R2 + R5) = {c}, F` (R1 + R4) = {b}, and for any other profile
(Rj +Rk) we have F` (Rj +Rk) = A,
• for #N ≥ 3, F` (RN) = A for all RN ∈ W (A)N .
It is clear that F` satisfies cancellation property (CA). For all x ∈ A we have
D(x,R2 + R5) = D(x,R1 + R4), however F` (R2 + R5) 6= F` (R1 + R4). Hence,
F` violates degree equality (DE).
196
The Algorithm SPGAA for Example 6
We apply the algorithm SPGAA to the problem given in Example 6.
Note that student 2 is not permitted to make offers to departmentA in the algorithm
SPGAA, since a2A = 0.
t = 1. a) Student 1 offers bB = 1075 to department B, student 2 offers bB = 1075
to department B and student 3 offers bB = 1075 to department B, since for each
student s ∈ {1, 3} we have (B, bB)Ps(A, bA) and student 2 can make offers only to
department B.
b) Department A has no offer, so SA1 = T
A
1 = ∅. Department B has offers from the
group students SB1 = {1, 2, 3} and it accepts student 2’s offer and rejects the others,
since ({2}, bB)PB({s}, bB) for any s ∈ (SB1 \ {2}). So, TB1 = {2}.
c) Student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance, students 1 and 3 have no accep-
tances.
So, we have following matching at the end of period 1:
µ1 =

1 2 3
∅ B ∅
0 1075 0
 .
t = 2. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(2) = bB − 1 = 1074 to department
B, student 2 offers bB = 1075 to department B and student 3 makes a new offer
m3B(2) = bB − 1 = 1074 to department B. Note that there is no holding offer at
period 2.
b) Department A has no offer, hence SA2 = T
A
2 = ∅. Department B has offers from
SB2 = {1, 2, 3} and it accepts student 2’s offer and rejects the others, so TB2 = {2}.
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c) Student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance, students 1 and 3 have no accep-
tances, yielding the matching
µ2 =

1 2 3
∅ B ∅
0 1075 0
 .
Note that at further periods students 1 and 3 decrease their offers to department
B, and student 2 continues to offer bB = 1075 to department B. So, at some further
period t = l we have following:
t = l. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(l) = 741 to department B, student 2
offers m2B(l) = m2B(1) = bB = 1075 to department B, and student 3 makes a new
offer m3B(l) = 741 to department B. Note that there is no holding offer at this period
l.
b) Department A has no offer, so SAl = T
A
l = ∅. Department B has offers from
SBl = {1, 2, 3} and it accepts student 2’s offer and rejects the others, hence TBl = {2}.
c) Student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance, students 1 and 3 has no accep-
tances, which yields the matching
µl =

1 2 3
∅ B ∅
0 1075 0
 .
t = l + 1. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(l + 1) = m1B(l) − 1 = 740 to
department B. Student 2 offers m2B(l + 1) = m2B(1) = bB = 1075 to department B.
Student 3 makes a new offer m3A(l + 1) = bA = 440 to department A, and her last
new offer m3B(l) = 741 made to department B and got rejected remains valid at this
period as a holding offer m¨3B(l + 1) = m3B(l) = 741.14
14Let us make clear that why student 3 makes a new offer to department A but not to department B.
Note that if student 3 would make a new offer to department B at this period the algorithm SPGAA
requires that it has to be m3B(l) − 1 = 740. However, for student 3 we have (A, 440)P3(B, 740),
so student 3 makes a new offer to department A and her last new offer made to department B and got
rejected remains valid at this period as a holding offer.
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b) Department A has an offer from student 3 and accepts her offer, i.e., SAl+1 =
TAl+1 = {3}. Department B has offers from SBl+1 = {1, 2, 3} and it accepts student 2’s
offer and rejects the others, so TBl+1 = {2}.
c) Student 1 has no acceptance, student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance and
student 3 accepts department A’s acceptance.
So, at the end of period l + 1 we have matching
µl+1 =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 .
At further periods, student 1 decreases her offers to department B, student 2 con-
tinues to offer bB = 1075 to department B, and student 3 continues to make offers
bA = 440 to department A and her last new offer m3B(l) = 741 made to department B
and got rejected remains valid as a holding offer. Hence, at some further period h we
have following:
t = h. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1A(h) = bA = 440 to department A
and her last new offer m1B(h − 1) = 340 made to department B and got rejected
remains valid as a holding offer m¨1B(h) = m1B(h − 1) = 340.15 Student 2 offers
m2B(h) = m2B(1) = bB = 1075 to department B. Student 3 offers m3A(h) =
m3A(l + 1) = bA = 440 to department A, and her last new offer m3B(l) = 741
made to department B and got rejected remains valid at this period as a holding offer
m¨3B(h) = m3B(l) = 741.
b) Department A has offers from SAh = {1, 3}, and it accepts student 3’s offer and
rejects 1’s offer, i.e., TAh = {3}. Department B has offers from SBh = {1, 2, 3} and it
accepts student 2’s offer and rejects the others, so TBh = {2}.
c) Student 1 has no acceptance, student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance and
15Student 1 makes a new offer to department A, since for student 1 we have (A, 440)P1(B, 339),
where if she would make a new offer to department B at this period h the algorithm SPGAA requires
that m1B(h) = m1B(h− 1)− 1 = 339.
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student 3 accepts department A’s acceptance, yielding the matching
µh =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 .
At further periods student 1 decreases her offers to departments A and B, and we
have following at some further period k¯:
t = k¯. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1A(k¯) = 435 to department A and her last
new offer m1B(k¯ − 1) = 335 made to department B and got rejected remains valid as
a holding offer m¨1B(k¯) = m1B(k¯− 1) = 335.16 Student 2 offers m2B(k¯) = m2B(1) =
bB = 1075 to department B. Student 3 offers m3A(k¯) = m3A(l + 1) = bA = 440
to department A and her last new offer m3B(l) = 741 made to department B and got
rejected remains valid at this period as a holding offer m¨3B(k¯) = m3B(l) = 741.
b) Department A has offers from SA
k¯
= {1, 3}, and it accepts student 3’s offer and
rejects 1’s offer, i.e., TA
k¯
= {3}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯
= {1, 2, 3} and it
accepts student 2’s offer and rejects the others, so, TB
k¯
= {2}.
c) Student 1 has no acceptance, student 2 accepts department B’s acceptance and
student 3 accepts department A’s acceptance.
So, at the end of period k¯ we have matching
µk¯ =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 .
t = k¯ + 1. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(k¯ + 1) = m1B(k¯ − 1)− 1 = 334
to department B and her last new offer m1A(k¯) = 435 made to department A and
got rejected remains valid as a holding offer m¨1A(k¯ + 1) = m1A(k¯) = 435. Student
2 offers m2B(k¯ + 1) = m2B(1) = bB = 1075 to department B. Student 3 offers
m3A(k¯ + 1) = m3A(l + 1) = bA = 440 to department A and she also has a holding
offer m¨3B(k¯ + 1) = m3B(l) = 741 to department B.
16Since for student 1 we have (A, 435)P1(B, 334), where if she would make a new offer to depart-
ment B at this period k¯ the algorithm SPGAA requires that m1B(k¯) = m1B(k¯ − 1)− 1 = 334.
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b) DepartmentA has offers from SA
k¯+1
= {1, 3}, and it accepts student 3’s offer and
rejects 1’s offer, hence TA
k¯+1
= {3}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯+1
= {1, 2, 3}
and it accepts students 1 and 3’s offers and rejects 2’s offer, so TB
k¯+1
= {1, 3}.
c) Student 1 accepts department B’s acceptance. Student 2 has no acceptance.
Student 3 has acceptances from departments A and B, and she accepts B’s acceptance
and rejects A’s acceptance since (B, 741)P3(A, 440).
So, we have following matching at the end of period k¯ + 1:
µk¯+1 =

1 2 3
B ∅ B
334 0 741
 .
t = k¯ + 2. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(k¯ + 1) = m1B(k¯ − 1)− 1 = 334
to department B and her last new offer m1A(k¯) = 435 made to department A and got
rejected remains valid as a holding offer m¨1A(k¯ + 2) = m1A(k¯) = 435. Student 2
has no new offer and his last offer m2B(k¯ + 1) = 1075 made to department B and
got rejected remains valid as a holding offer m¨2B(k¯ + 2) = m2B(k¯ + 1) = 1075.17
Student 3 offers m3B(k¯ + 2) = m3B(l) = 741 to department B, and note that there is
no holding offer for student 3 at this period.
b) Department A has an offer from student 1 and accepts her offer, i.e., SA
k¯+2
=
TA
k¯+2
= {1}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯+2
= {1, 2, 3} and it accepts students 1
and 3’s offers and rejects 2’s offer, so TB
k¯+2
= {1, 3}.
c) Student 1 accepts department A’s acceptance and rejects B’s acceptance, since
for student 1 we have (A, 435)P1(B, 334). Student 2 has no acceptance. Student 3
accepts B’s acceptance and rejects A’s acceptance, which yields the matching
µk¯+2 =

1 2 3
A ∅ B
435 0 741
 .
17Note that at this period department B is a rejector of student 2, i.e., F 2
k¯+2
= {B}, since department
B rejected student 2’s offer because of the group of students TB
k¯+1
= {1, 3} and B matched with TB
k¯+1
at the end of period k¯ + 1.
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t = k¯ + 3. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1A(k¯ + 3) = m1A(k¯) = 435 to
department A, student 2 makes a new offer m2B(k¯ + 3) = m2B(k¯ + 1) = 1075 to
department B,18 and student 3 offers m3B(k¯ + 3) = 741 to department B. Note that
there is no holding offer at this period.
b) Department A has an offer from student 1 and accepts her offer, i.e., SA
k¯+3
=
TA
k¯+3
= {1}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯+3
= {2, 3} and it accepts students 2’s
offer and rejects 3’s offer, so TB
k¯+3
= {2}.
c) Student 1 accepts department A’s acceptance. Student 2 accepts B’s acceptance.
Student 3 has no acceptance.
So, at the end of period k¯ + 3 we have matching
µk¯+3 =

1 2 3
A B ∅
435 1075 0
 .
t = k¯ + 4. a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1A(k¯ + 4) = m1A(k¯) = 435 to
department A. Student 2 makes a new offer m2B(k¯ + 4) = m2B(k¯ + 1) = 1075 to
department B. Student 3 makes a new offer m3A(k¯ + 4) = m3A(k¯ + 1) = 440 to
department A and her last new offer m3B(k¯+ 3) = 741 made to department B and got
rejected remains valid at this period as a holding offer m¨3B(k¯+4) = m3B(k¯+3) = 741.
b) Department A has offers from SA
k¯+4
= {1, 3}, and it accepts student 3’s offer
and rejects 1’s offer, hence TA
k¯+4
= {3}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯+3
= {2, 3}
and it accepts students 2’s offer and rejects 3’s offer, so TB
k¯+3
= {2}.
c) Student 1 has no acceptance, student 2 accepts B’s acceptance, and student 3
accepts department A’s acceptance, which yields the matching
µk¯+4 =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 .
18Note that student 2 can make this offer to department B since F 2
k¯+3
= ∅.
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t = k¯ + 5 a) Student 1 makes a new offer m1B(k¯ + 5) = m1B(k¯ + 1) = 334 to
department B and her last new offer m1A(k¯+ 4) = 435 made to department A and got
rejected remains valid as a holding offer m¨1A(k¯ + 5) = m1A(k¯ + 4) = 435. Student
2 offers m2B(k¯ + 5) = 1075 to department B. Student 3 offers m3A(k¯ + 5) = 440 to
department A, and she also has a holding offer m¨3B(k¯ + 5) = m3B(k¯ + 3) = 741 to
department B.
b) Department A has offers from SA
k¯+5
= {1, 3}, and it accepts student 3’s offer
and rejects 1’s offer, so TA
k¯+5
= {3}. Department B has offers from SB
k¯+5
= {1, 2, 3}
and it accepts students 1 and 3’s offers and rejects 2’s offer, hence TB
k¯+5
= {1, 3}.
c) Student 1 accepts department B’s acceptance. Student 2 has no acceptance.
Student 3 accepts B’s acceptance and rejects A’s acceptance.
So, we have following matching at the end of period k¯ + 5:
µk¯+5 =

1 2 3
B ∅ B
334 0 741
 .
Note that µk¯+5 = µk¯+1 and if we continue we get following matchings at further
periods: µk¯+6 = µk¯+2, µk¯+7 = µk¯+3, µk¯+8 = µk¯+4, µk¯+9 = µk¯+5 = µk¯+1 and so on.
Hence, the algorithm SPGAA does not stop and a cycle occurs consisting of fol-
lowing four matchings:
µk¯+1 =

1 2 3
B ∅ B
334 0 741
 , µk¯+2 =

1 2 3
A ∅ B
435 0 741
 ,
µk¯+3 =

1 2 3
A B ∅
435 1075 0
 , µk¯+4 =

1 2 3
∅ B A
0 1075 440
 .
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